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Summary 
The present report reviews the fundamental right to privacy and data protection 
which shall be assured to individuals and the Directive 95/46/EC which 
provides more detailed rules on how to establish protection in the case of 
biometric data processing. The present framework does not seem apt to cope 
with all issues and problems raised by biometric applications. The limited 
recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of 
Justice sheds some light on some relevant issues, but does not answer all 
questions. The report provides an analysis of the use of biometric data and the 
applicable current legal framework in six countries. The research demonstrates 
that in various countries, position is taken against the central storage of 
biometric data because of the various additional risks such storage entails. 
Furthermore, some countries stress the risks of the use of biometric 
characteristics which leave traces (such as e.g., fingerprint, face, voice…). In 
general, controllers of biometric applications receive limited clear guidance as 
to how implement biometric applications. Because of conflicting approaches, 
general recommendations are made in this report with regard to the regulation 
of central storage of biometric data and various other aspects, including the 
need for transparency of biometric systems. 
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Executive Summary 
Biometrics is a high tech identification technology that has grown in maturity over the last 
years and that is increasingly used for authentication in public and private applications.  
While the focus of debate about biometrics was in the past in many cases on technical aspects 
of security and privacy, often in relation with the introduction of biometrics in the electronic 
passport (epass), decisions on a regulatory framework for the use of biometrics in general are 
hardly taken. 
The present Fidis Deliverable D13.4 reviews the fundamental right to privacy and data 
protection which shall be assured to individuals because these principles are laid down in 
binding international conventions and national constitutions. The application of these 
fundamental rights upon new technologies, such as the processing of unique human 
characteristics for the verification or identification of individuals, however, is not self-
explanatory. The Directive 95/46/EC provides more detailed rules on how to establish 
protection in case of personal data processing but seems not apt to cope with all issues and 
problems raised by biometric applications. The limited recent case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights and the Court of Justice sheds some light on some relevant issues, but does 
not answer all questions.  
The report further analyses the use of biometrics and the applicable current legal framework 
for the processing of biometric data in various countries. Six country reports confirm that 
biometrics are not only introduced and deployed in government controlled wide scale 
deployments but are gradually entering our day to day lives, mainly for access control type of 
applications. In many countries, the national DPAs have issued (sometimes also technical 
(e.g., Switzerland)) guidelines and advice for the use of biometrics. The report demonstrates 
that in various countries, position is taken against the storage of biometric data in (central) 
databases because of the various additional risks such storage entails (e.g., unintended use for 
law enforcement purposes, other use without knowledge and function creep, ….). There is in 
that case a clear preference for local storage of the biometric data, for example, on a card or 
token. Only in exceptional cases, the position against central storage is confirmed in some 
specific national legislation, e.g., on the use of biometric identifiers in passports (e.g., 
Germany). However, the DPAs do not exclude all storage in central databases, and sometimes 
provide criteria (e.g., France, Belgium, …) which shall be applied in order to evaluate 
whether central storage could be acceptable. Furthermore, some countries stress the risks of 
the use of biometric characteristics which leave traces (such as e.g., fingerprint, face, voice, 
…).  In other countries, such as in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there is a 
preference for storage in a central database for government controlled ID applications.  
In general, controllers of biometric applications receive limited clear guidance as to how 
implement biometric applications. Because of conflicting approaches, general 
recommendations are made in this report with regard to the regulation of central storage of 
biometric data. Such legislation shall also address various other aspects, including the need 
for transparency of biometric systems and shall address the errors and technical failures of 
biometric systems. 
This report aims at feeding the discussion about the regulation of the wider use of biometric 
data and the enactment of appropriate remedies for individuals subject to biometric 
technologies. The research, which contains a limited number of country reports, may need to 
be completed with additional research in other countries and further recommendations. FIDIS 
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1 Introduction 
Biometrics is a high tech identification technology that has grown in maturity over the last 
years and that is increasingly used for authentication in public and private applications.  
The research on biometrics in general has been concentrated on the improvement of the 
technology and of the processes to measure the physical or behavioural characteristics of 
individuals for automated recognition or identification. Biometric technology has also been 
the subject of research of the NoE Fidis at regular intervals as an important factor of the 
future of identity. Previous Fidis work has analysed the state-of-the-art techniques, the 
technical strengths and weaknesses as well as privacy aspects as set out in the Fidis 
deliverables 3.2, 3.6 and 3.10. In these deliverables, various approaches of the use of 
biometrics were analysed from a multi-disciplinary perspective. The biometric methodologies 
and specific technologies have been analysed and described
4 and the deployment of 
biometrics in various contexts, such as in a PKI structure
5 or in Machine Readable Travel 
Documents
6 researched and presented. In these deliverables, various security and privacy 
aspects of biometrics were discussed as well.  
In Fidis Deliverable D3.2, attention was given to the recommendations for the processing of 
biometric data of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
 contained in their working 
document on biometrics of 2003.
7 In Fidis Deliverable D3.6, an overview of the current 
European initiatives regarding the large scale deployment of biometrics, such as in Eurodac 
(the EU central fingerprint database in connection with asylum seekers), the Visa Information 
System (VIS – the EU central database set up to create a common visa policy) and the 
European Passport (requiring fingerprints and facial images as biometrical identifiers) was 
provided. The legal basis for these systems was analysed and critically discussed, as well as 
the compliance with the data protection Directive 95/46/EC and fundamental human rights.
8  
 
In Fidis Deliverable 3.10, the technical details of a biometric authentication process were 
described and illustrated in detail.
9 It was also convincingly argued and demonstrated that 
biometric data become an increasingly used key for interoperability of databases, without an 
appropriate regulation. To facilitate the discussion on biometrics, it was further proposed to 
make a classification of applications models which use biometrics, depending on differences 
in control, purposes, and functionalities.  The application types that were introduced are the 
Type I – government controlled ID applications, the Type II – security and access control 
applications, the Type III – public/private partnership applications, the Type IV Convenience 
and personalisation applications and the Type V - Tracking and tracing (surveillance) 
                                                 
4 M. Gasson, M. Meints, et al., (eds.), D.3.2. A study on PKI and biometrics, FIDIS, July 2005, (‘Fidis 
Deliverable D3.2’), p. 62 et seq. 
5 Ibid., p. 120 et seq. 
6 M .  Meints  and M. Hansen (eds.),  D.3.6. Study on ID Documents, FIDIS, December 2006, 160 p. (‘Fidis 
Deliverable D3.6’). 
7 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working document on biometrics, WP 80, 1 August 2003, 12 p. 
(‘WP 29 Working Document on Biometrics’). The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party was set up under 
Article 29 of the Directive 95/46/EC as an independent European advisory body on data protection and privacy 
and consists of representatives of the national Data Protection Authorities of the EU. 
8  M. Meints and M. Hansen (eds.), o.c., p. 40 et seq. 
9 E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), D.3.10. Biometrics in identity management, FIDIS, December 2007, 130 p.  
(‘Fidis Deliverable D3.10’). FIDIS 
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applications.
10 The distinction of the use of biometrics for verification and identification 
purposes was stressed and the research also showed that various technical aspects of 
biometric systems are not taken into account in the legal treatment of biometrics. This results 
in a considerable ‘margin of appreciation’ of the national Data Protection Authorities 
(hereafter ‘DPAs’) in their opinions on biometric systems, whereby the proportionality 
principles plays an important role.
11  
The present Fids Deliverable D13.4 contains various country reports from a legal point of 
view which illustrate that biometrics are not only deployed in wide scale deployments but are 
gradually entering our day to day lives. The use of biometric applications, however, is often 
debated and criticized. Biometric data are in most cases personal data to which article 8 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 
data protection legislation apply, but this legislation does not mention biometric data 
explicitly. As a result, the legislation does not provide an adequate answer to many questions 
in most cases. This deliverable aims at analyzing the gaps in the present legal framework 
which shall tackle the issues of the increasing use of biometric data in various identity 
management systems.
12 This deliverable will hereby make further use where possible of the 
classification proposed in Fidis Deliverable D 3.10 and mentioned above in order to facilitate 
the discussion.  
Six country reports discuss the spreading of biometric applications and the applicable 
legislation. The reports - by tackling  similar key aspects of biometrics - illustrate how the 
gaps in the general legal framework are handled and may provide useful suggestions for an 
appropriate legal framework for biometric data processing. The country reports have been 
prepared on the basis of legal research. However, in order to describe the domains in which 
biometrics are used and debated, additional sources have been taken into account, including 
reports with a broader focus than only legal aspects and press releases. The use of biometric 
data also raises ethical questions, but these will not be discussed in this report.
13 The present 
deliverable will conclude with some specific recommendations to policy makers and the 
legislator.  
 
 
The content of the research for this deliverable is updated until the end of March 2009.  
The views expressed in this report represent the opinion of the authors only and do not bind 
their organisation, other Fidis members or the EU institutions. 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p.60 et seq.  
11 Ibid.,  p. 37 et seq.  
12 Only for specific large-scale biometric databases in the European Union, such as Eurodac, VIS, SIS II and the 
epass, regulations containing specific but incomplete requirements for biometrics were enacted. 
13 About the ethical questions, we refer to the Biometric Identification Technology Ethics project (BITE), an EU 
project N°. SAS6-006093. Information is available at www.biteproject.org. About ethical aspects, see also the 
Commission de l’Ethique de la Science et de la Technologie, L’utilisation des données biométriques à des fins 
de sécurité : questionnement sur les enjeux éthiques, Québec (Canada),  2005, 42 p. and the National 
Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences, Opinion N° 98. Biometrics, identifying data and 
human rights, France, April 2007, 22 p.  
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2 The privacy legal framework for biometrics in the 
European Union  
2.1 Introduction   
At the end of the 1970s, some realized that a new ‘information age’ was commencing in 
which the processing of information would play a major role. Because some of this 
information related to individuals, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (‘OECD’) issued upon initiative of the United States the 1980 Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. These OECD Guidelines in 
fact stressed the need to ensure the free flow of data. This free flow was threatened by the at 
that time increasing – by some perceived as redundant and annoying
14 – concern for privacy. 
Soon thereafter, however, the Council of Europe issued Convention No. 108 for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.
15 The 
Convention was opened for signature in January 1981 in Strasbourg and was – contrary to the 
OECD Guidelines - really concerned about privacy: it attempted to reconcile the right to 
privacy with the transfer of personal data. The Convention was the first legally binding 
international instrument in the data protection field. It imposed upon the Member States of the 
Council of Europe an obligation to issue legislation which would enforce various declared 
principles, such as there were the data minimization and the purpose specification principle. 
The Convention further intended to harmonize the at that time existing but fragmented 
legislation relating to data protection.
16  
About fifteen years later, the 1980 Guidelines and the Convention No. 108 were further 
completed with the Directive 95/46/EC (the ‘Data Protection Directive’ or ‘Directive 
95/46/EC’) and, some years thereafter, with the Directive 2002/58/EC (the ‘ePrivacy 
Directive’).  
In the meantime, more than a decade has lapsed since the adoption of Directive 95/46/EC and 
privacy has become an increasingly important concern. In this period, telecommunication 
networks and the Internet have introduced a new ‘communication age’: online electronic 
communications and the collection and use of (personal) data will never be what they were 
before. New legal rules have been introduced, for example for e-commerce, such as relating to 
the liability of information service providers and for making online contracts legally valid and 
binding. But the privacy legislation – apart for electronic communications – has barely been 
changed or completed. At the same time, the technology is further developing, including 
technologies for the authentication of persons.  
                                                 
14 See e.g., H. Lowry, ‘Transborder Data Flow: Public and Private International Law Aspects’, Houston Journal 
of International Law, 1984, (159-174), p. 166 : ‘As the reader can see, very little of this information is about 
individuals. Most transborder data flows are by organizations and about their operations. Privacy plays a very 
minor part of the import and export of this type of information. Certainly some data, such as payroll or personnel 
files, should be protected. But often privacy is just a convenient club with which to beat to death the freedom to 
exchange information’ (stress added).  
15 Council of Europe, ETS No. 108, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, 28 January 1981, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty 
/EN/Treaties/HTML/108.htm  
16 See P. Miller, ‘Teleinformatics, Transborder Data Flows and the Emerging Struggle for Information : An 
Introduction to the Arrival of the New Information Age’, Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 1986, 
(89-14), p. 120. FIDIS 
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Biometrics is an authentication technology which is very promising. Biometric systems are 
implemented for various purposes by various actors, whether private or public. However, 
many agree that privacy risks are one of the important factors which reduce the willingness to 
fully engage biometric methods. Another aspect is that the current privacy legal framework 
does not provide clear answers to many issues relating to the processing of biometric data. 
The legislation is not adapted to cope with biometric authentication methods. The general 
principle of the right to privacy as laid down in Article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (‘Article 8 ECHR’), Article 
7 and Article 8 of the EU Charter of 2000 and the general Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
need to solve the various (privacy) issues of biometrics, but do not provide legal certainty 
because many questions remain unsolved. It seems therefore that this new wave of the 
‘communication age’ challenges the existing legal framework again.  
In this first chapter, the application of the present privacy and data processing provisions 
which are relevant for biometrics and the difficulties of the application of these provisions 
will be demonstrated and discussed.  
At the same time, biometric data is already increasingly used in specific, often large scale 
public sector systems, such as in the European epassport, but also in Eurodac, VIS and SIS II. 
As set out in Fidis Deliverable D3.6, specific regulations were made for these large-scale 
systems. To the extent relevant, some of these systems will herein be briefly touched, but the 
legal aspects of the processing of biometric data in these large-scale biometric systems will 
not be discussed in depth. This deliverable D.13.4 aims principally at discussing the legal 
aspects of the processing of biometric data in general, in particular in ‘civil’ applications 
(hereby excluding applications used for public or national security or for law enforcement 
purposes). The Directive 95/46/EC is moreover not applicable in these cases.   
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(hereafter the ‘EDPS’) have over the last five years issued numerous opinions and 
recommendations with regard to the use of biometric data.
17 These opinions provide valuable 
guidelines since the existing legal framework is too general compared to the need for 
clarification imposed by the processing of biometric data. Some of these significant opinions 
of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and the EDPS are therefore in this 
deliverable recapitulated (see section 2.5).   
The Consultative Committee of the Convention No. 108 of the Council of Europe has also 
issued in 2005 a so-called ‘progress report’ on the application of the data protection principles 
on the processing of biometric data.
18 This deliverable will refer to this report, but as it is 
intended to revise or complement the progress report, it will not be discussed in depth herein.  
 
                                                 
17 These opinions were necessary mainly because some political developments have resulted in a consensus to 
introduce biometrics in various applications on EU level, in particular the introduction in passports and travel 
documents, in the related Visa Information System (VIS), and in the second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II) (see above). 
18 Consultative Committee  of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regards to   
Automatic Processing of Personal Data [CETS No. 108] (T-PD), Progress report on the application of the 
principles of convention 108 to the collection and processing of biometric data, Strasbourg, Council of Europe,   
CM(2005)43, March 2005 (‘Progress report, Council of Europe’),  available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2005)43&Language=lanEnglish&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DB
DCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=  
 FIDIS 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D13.4 
 
Final , Version: 1.1 
File: fidis_deliverable13_4_v_1.1.doc 
Page 14 
 
2.2 Fundamental  rights in the European Union: Right to respect for 
privacy and the right to data protection  
The right to respect for privacy (Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 7 of the EU Charter) and the right to 
data protection (Article 8 of the EU Charter) are fundamental rights in the Member States of 
the European Union.
19  
While the right to respect for privacy is already recognized for a long time as a human right, 
the explicit recognition of the right to data protection as a fundamental right is far more 
recent. The fundamental right to data protection was listed in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (Charter) which was proclaimed and published in 2000. 
2.2.1  Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights   
The concept of private life and the recording and storage of information relating to identity 
The right to respect for one’s private (and family) life is one of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms that was listed in 1950 in the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concluded in the framework of the Council of 
Europe (hereinafter the ‘Convention’).
20 The notion of one’s private life is ‘a broad term not 
susceptible to exhaustive definition’ and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
(hereinafter the ‘Court’) has continuously interpreted the concept of ‘private life’. As a result, 
private life does not merely cover the physical and psychological integrity of a person, but 
also embraces multiple aspects of a person’s identity.   
In recent case law, the Court has repeatedly stated that the concept of private life extends to 
aspects of a person’s physical and social identity, and includes protection of a person’s name 
and a person’s right to his image.
21 The Court stated that Article 8 of the Convention protects 
a right to identity and a right to personal development, also in interaction with other persons, 
even in a public context.
22  
The concept of private life has known a continuing evolution in the case law of national 
courts and of the Court, also in view of threats posed by new technologies. Because of the 
increasing processing of information, the Court also gradually included a right to data 
protection in article 8 of the Convention.
23  
                                                 
19 For other human rights that may be involved, such as the freedom of movement and the human right to a fair 
trail, we refer to M. Meints and M. Hansen (eds.), o.c., pp. 54 – 55.  
20 Council of Europe, ETS no. 005, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
as amended by Protocol No. 11, 4 November 1950, available at http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm This Convention is to be distinguished from Convention No. 108 discussed 
above. 
21 ECHR, Sciacca v. Italy, no. 50774/99, 11 January 2005, § 29 (‘Sciacca v. Italy’).  
22 ECHR, Peck v. U.K., no. 44647/98, 28 January 2003, §57 (‘Peck’).  
23 The Court, however, hereby initially did not interpret the right to data protection in the same way as  the right 
as laid down in the data protection legislation, for example in the Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of the Council of Europe of 1981.  The Court for example 
made a distinction between privacy sensitive information and non privacy sensitive information. See on this 
issue, P. De Hert, ‘Grondrechten die bijna niet verdedigd kunnen worden; De bescherming van persoonlijke 
gegevens op het Internet’, De rechten van de mens op het internet, Maklu,  Antwerpen – Apeldoorn,  2000, (21),  
p. 33. FIDIS 
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The Court, for example, stated that private life considerations may arise when, taking into 
account a person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy, systematic or permanent records are 
made from a public scene.  
The Court also decided that a recording, for example of voices, for further analysis, was 
regarded as the processing of personal data and was of direct relevance to identifying that 
person when considered in conjunction with other personal data, amounting to an interference 
with the right to respect for their private life.
24 The unforeseen use of photographs may also 
amount to an invasion of privacy.  
The fact that a person is an ‘ordinary person’ (as compared with a public figure, such as a 
politician, etc) enlarges the zone of interaction which may fall within the scope of private life. 
This distinction between ordinary persons and public figures, however, seems to disappear in 
more recent case law of the Court.  
A person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy are significant but not necessarily a 
conclusive factor. The fact that a person is subject of criminal proceedings does not curtail 
the scope of the protection of Article 8 of the Convention either.  
There is hence increased attention for interference with aspects of a person’s identity in recent 
case law of the Court, which it finds to be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention especially 
when the recording and storage of data is involved.  
This is a contrast with the case law of the Court of the nineties, when the Court or the 
Commission
25 paid less attention to possible threats posed by the recording of identity 
information. In a case of 1995, Friedl v. Austria, Mr. Friedl who participated in a 
demonstration in Vienna, complained that the police took video recordings of the public 
demonstration, noted down personal data and took photographs individually of him. In that 
case, which resulted in a friendly settlement, the Commission expressed the opinion that there 
had been no breach of Article 8. The Commission hereby gave importance to the fact that no 
names were noted down and hence in its view the photographs taken remained anonymous, 
the personal data recorded and photographs taken were not entered into a data-processing 
system and no action had been taken to identify the persons photographed on that occasion 
by means of data processing.
26 This decision was in line with another case of that decade, 
Reyntjes v. Belgium
27 of 1992, where the Commission did not find that the registration of 
identity data of an ID card was in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.  
In these (earlier) cases, more attention was paid to the actual use that is made of the data in 
the particular case, rather than the possible uses that could be made of the identity data 
recorded for deciding on interference of the private life right. 
Video monitoring or the use of photograph equipment which does not record visual data as 
such, however, is considered by the Court to fall outside the application field of Article 8 of 
the Convention. In Pierre Herbecq and Ligue des droits de l’homme v. Belgium
28 of 1998, the 
Commission found that video surveillance did not automatically come within the scope of 
Article 8 unless specific criteria were fulfilled. In the decision Peck, the Court reminded of its 
                                                 
24 ECHR, P.G. and J.H. v. U.K., no. 44787/98, 25 September 2001, §59-60. 
25 In previous cases, not only the Court but also the competent Commission made decisions.  
26 ECHR, Friedl v. Austria,  31 January 1995, §§ 49-51, Series A no.305-B. 
27 F. Reyntjens v. Belgium,  Commission decision, 9 September 1992.  
28Pierre Herbecq and Ligue des droits de l’homme v. Belgium  , nos. 32200/96 and 32201/96, Commission 
decision, 14 January 1998, A.J.T., 1998 with note of P. De Hert and O. De Schutter, pp. 501-511.  FIDIS 
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position and stated that (only) the recording of the data and the systematic or permanent 
nature of the record may give rise to the application of Article 8.
29  
Although the decisions referred to above do not explicitly refer to automated recognition or 
identification by biometrics, the judgements and decisions do warn for the processing of 
personal data, such as of images and of voices, which would permit identification or allow 
additional uses which the person in question did reasonably not foresee.  
In various decisions, the Court stressed that ‘increased vigilance in protecting private life is 
necessary to contend with new communication technologies which make it possible to store 
and reproduce personal data’.
30 Because of the privacy (and security) risks, such vigilance is 
in our opinion also required for biometrics. 
In the significant recent case S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, that is also considered 
important by the Court because the ‘Grand Chamber’ decided it, and that pertains to the 
retention of DNA and fingerprint, the Court continued its general approach as in respect of 
photographs and voice samples. The Court noted that ‘fingerprint records constitute personal 
data (…) which contain external identification features much in the same way as, for example, 
personal photographs or voice samples’.
31 The Court stated that ‘fingerprint objectively 
contain unique information about the individual concerned allowing his or her identification 
with precision in a wide range of circumstances’ and that the ‘retention of fingerprints on the 
authorities’ records (…) may in itself give rise (…) to important private-life concerns’.
32 In 
this case, the Court further concluded that the retention of cellular samples and DNA profiles 
disclosed an interference with the right to respect for private life within the meaning of the 
Article 8 §1 of the Convention.   
Future decisions will shed further light on how the right to private life and Article 8 of the 
Convention shall be interpreted in the case of the use of biometric characteristics and data.  
  
Restrictions 
Fundamental rights, including the right to respect for one’s private life, are not always 
absolute. It means that it is possible to interfere with them and to restrict them, but only in 
specific circumstances and if the restriction and the means used are in proportion with the 
objectives sought.
33 Article 8 §2 of the Convention stipulates the conditions under which 
interferences with this right to respect for private life are possible as follows:  
 
‘2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.’
34 
 
                                                 
29 Peck, §59. 
30 ECHR, Von Hannover v. Germany,  no. 59320/00, 24 June 2004, § 70.  
31 ECHR, S. and Marper v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 30562/04, 4 December 2008, § 80 (‘S. and Marper’).  
32 Ibid., §§ 84-85. 
33 See E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), o.c., p. 72 et seq. 
34 Art. 8 §2 Convention.   FIDIS 
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Because of the privacy risk of the use of biometric technologies, such as unobserved and non-
interactive authentication, use of biometrics for tracking and surveillance purposes, direct 
identify ability, link ability and profiling, use of additional information contained in biometric 
characteristics, but also violation of the purpose binding principle, problems regarding 
revocability and risks of identity theft, all and more as described in the previous Fidis 
deliverables as mentioned above, biometrics could lead to an interference with the right to 
privacy.  
Hence, any interference that biometric systems impose with the right of privacy must, in the 
light of Article 8 of the Convention and of the case law related thereto, be adequately based 
and provided for in a law in a clear and generally comprehensible way (interference ‘in 
accordance with the law’) and pursuing ‘a legitimate aim’, both being tested as being 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ to achieve that aim and in so far the restriction is relevant 
and proportionate. These three steps test for interference with private life are hereunder 
further illustrated by some selected decisions of the Court where possible which involve the 
processing of personal data, such as images or voice.  
a. ‘In accordance with the law’. The deployment of biometric systems is because of the 
privacy risks only permitted if there is a law which provides for the use of the biometrics. 
Biometric systems of Type 1 government controlled ID (whether or not with central 
database(s))
35 are therefore only possible if there is a law providing for a legal basis for such 
identity control.  
The law shall have in addition particular qualities. The phrase ‘in accordance with the law’ 
requires, according to the Court,  
(1) that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law,  
(2) the law in question should be accessible to the person concerned,  
(3) the person must be able to foresee its consequences,  
(4) the law is compatible with the rule of law, and 
(5) the impugned measure complies with the requirements laid down by the domestic 
law providing for the interference.
36  
In Sciacca v. Italy, the Court found that there was no law governing the taking of photographs 
of people under suspicion or arrested, but rather a practice which had developed, and that the 
interference was therefore not ‘in accordance with the law’. In Perry v. United Kingdom, the 
Court found that there was a legal basis for the use of access control video taping images for 
identification (and prosecution) purposes of a person who had refused the so-called ‘Oslo 
confrontation’, but that the police did not comply with the requirements laid down in that law, 
in particular failed to inform the person and to ask his consent.
37 This requirement is set out 
because a law must provide sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness.  
The question arises whether without a legal basis, use of images or fingerprint for 
identification purposes by the government (see Type 1 Government controlled ID 
applications) or any other controller could also possibly be lawful if one would consent with 
                                                 
35 For the various types of biometric applications , see E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), o.c., section 3.3.3. 
36 See ECHR,  Perry v. United Kingdom, no. 63737/00,  17 July 2003, § 45 (‘Perry’).  
37 Perry, §47-49. In the case, the Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Art. 8 of the 
Convention for lack of compliance with the requirement ‘in accordance with the law’. FIDIS 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D13.4 
 
Final , Version: 1.1 
File: fidis_deliverable13_4_v_1.1.doc 
Page 18 
 
such control.
38 Consent is also often relied upon for Type 2 access control applications. 
However, in such case, some Data Protection Authorities have already stated that in case the 
processing is not proportional (see hereunder step 3), such consent will not be sufficient. 
b. Legitimate aim. The deployment of biometric systems is because of the privacy risks only 
permitted if there is a legitimate aim
39 which provides for the use of the biometrics. A 
legitimate aim can be the prevention and prosecution of crime.  
In S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, the Court agreed with the government of the United 
Kingdom that the retention of fingerprint and DNA information pursues the legitimate 
purpose of the detection and the prevention of crime. It further distinguished the original 
taking of the information for linking a person to a particular crime from the retention of it and 
clarified that the retention as such pursues the broader purpose of assisting in the 
identification of future offenders. In its analysis, the Court implicitly seems to accept that the 
use of retained samples for identification of future offenders still remains within this 
legitimate aim as it does not further elaborate as to whether identification of future offenders 
falls with the general legitimate aim of the prevention or detection of crime. As a result, some 
will defend that the registration in connection with the investigation of an offence and the 
keeping of identifying biometric data by police authorities for the prevention or detection of 
crime even in the future is a legitimate aim.  
c. ‘Necessary in a democratic society’. Any interference, even for a legitimate aim and with a 
legal basis, however, shall be ‘necessary in a democratic society’.  
Case law of the Court explains that ‘necessary in a democratic society’ means that  
(1) the interference shall be justified by ‘a pressing social need’,  
(2) the interference shall be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and 
(3) the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it shall be ‘relevant and 
sufficient’.   
The proportionality principle in the strict sense involves the need of a check of the 
proportionality of the means used which interfere with private life with the legitimate aims. 
For biometrics, it means that one shall check in particular whether the deployment of 
biometrics is an appropriate and necessary means to reach the goal.  
In the fore-mentioned case S. and Marper, the Court found that the retention of fingerprint, 
cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not convicted, as applied in the 
case at hand, including the retention of such data of a minor, failed to strike a fair balance 
between the competing public and private interests.
40 The Court hereby considered that it is 
                                                 
38 See and compare also with the explicit reference to consent in Article 8 of the EU Charter (see below). 
39 A legitimate aim as set forth in Article 8 of the Convention includes the prevention of crime, for example,  of 
‘look alike’ fraude with international passports and travel documents.  
40 See also the web commentary on the Marper case by B.-J. Koops and M. Goodwin, Strasbourg sets limits to 
DNA databases, available at www.tilt.nl. The authors have written this commentary immediately following the 
GC’s decision. With regard to the balance between private and public interests, the authors stated the following: 
‘Having established that privacy was at stake, the next question for the Court was to decide whether the retention 
was necessary within a democratic society. The Court was ‘struck’ by the blanket and indiscriminate nature of 
the powers of retention, powers which are not time-limited and do not distinguish between suspected offenders 
on the basis of the gravity of the crime of which they are suspected. Moreover, the Court was particularly critical 
of the failure to distinguish between adult and minor offenders and noted the need to pay special attention to the 
privacy needs of minors within the criminal justice system. Further, it noted the ability of ethnicity to be deduced FIDIS 
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acceptable that the database of the case at hand may have contributed to the detection and the 
prevention of crime. The final review that was made for the proportionality test however is in 
our view factual and will therefore vary from case to case.  
Based on the review made in S. and Marper, one could conclude for the time being that the 
specific provisions of the legal basis which provide for the interference will have to be taken 
into account and when they provide for the processing of personal data, they will have to be 
reviewed as to what safeguards are built in for the protection of private life. Questions which 
may be raised may include whether (i) the data collected are not excessive but minimal in 
relation to the purposes envisaged, (ii) the data are preserved in a form which permits 
identification for no longer than is required, (iii) there are adequate guarantees to efficiently 
protect the data against misuse and abuse
41, but also whether there is (iv) an indiscriminating 
element in the power of decision on the processing of the data, (v) an age minimum of 
persons whose personal data are collected and retained, (vi) a time period for retention, and 
(vii) a right to object of the data subject and independent review of the data processing.
42 
The level of interference may also differ in view of the nature or the category of personal data 
processed. The processing of cellular samples, for example, is particularly intrusive given the 
wealth of genetic and health information contained therein.
43 As stated in Fidis deliverable 
D3.10, other biometric data may also contain information relating to health. Such ‘sensitive 
information’ will differ for each kind of biometric data. 
One shall note that national authorities will enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when 
assessing whether an interference with a right protected by Article 8 of the Convention was 
necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 
Nevertheless, the Court will give the final ruling whether the measure is reconcilable with 
Article 8. In S. and Marper, the Court stated however that ‘where a particular important fact 
of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be 
restricted’.
44 The Court further said that it considers the protection of personal data of 
fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to privacy, especially in 
case of automatic processing’.
45 
It is expected that the courts will further elaborate relevant criteria to be used in order to 
assess whether the use of biometric data is necessary in a democratic society and 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. One important element will be whether the aim 
of the processing could not be reached with other means which interfere less with the right to 
respect for privacy. The weight to be attached to the respective criteria will however vary 
according to the specific circumstances of each case.  
                                                                                                                                                          
from DNA samples and restated its position that an individual’s ethnic identity falls within the meaning of 
privacy within Article 8; however, it did not elaborate on this element within its reasoning. For these reasons, the 
GC found that the balance between private and public interests had not been well met and the UK had 
overstepped its margin of appreciation.’ 
41 S. and Marper, §103. 
42 These criteria were mentioned in S. and Marper, §119.  
43 S. and Marper § 120. 
44 S. and Marper § 102. In the same case, the Court discovered a consistent approach in most Council of Europe 
Member States towards the collection and retention of DNA samples and profiles in the police sector, i.e., only 
collection from individuals suspected of offences of a minimum gravity and destruction immediately or within a 
limited period after acquittal or discharge, with only a limited number of exceptions (S. and Marper §§ 108-
110). Therefore, because of a strong consensus amongst Contracting States, the margin of appreciation is 
narrowed in the assessment of permissible interference with private life in this context. 
45 S. and Marper § 103. FIDIS 
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The fore mentioned requirements under Article 8 of the Convention are also reflected to some 
extent in Directive 95/46/EC.
46 While the Directive 95/46/EC imposes similar requirements 
for the deployment of biometric systems, other requirements of the Directive 95/46/EC 
impose additional conditions and concerns, which will be discussed below.   
2.2.2  Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) contains various 
human rights provisions, and includes the explicit right to respect for privacy (Article 7) and 
an explicit right to protection in case of personal data processing (Article 8).  
The Charter was proclaimed and published in December 2000.
47 Subject to the ratification of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the provisions of the Charter will become legally binding in (most of) 
the EU Member States (see Article 6.1 of the Lisbon Treaty).  
Article 7 of the EU Charter is stated as follows : 
 
‘Respect for private and family life 
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.’ 
 
This Article 7 of the EU Charter does not list the conditions under which interference with 
this right would be possible.  
Since it is explicitly stated that the Charter reaffirms the specific fundamental rights and 
freedoms as already set forth in the constitutions of the Member States and international 
treaties, in particular in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and that these provisions shall be applied in conformity with the 
interpretation of such rights, it is expected that the same exceptions as stated in Article 8 of 
the Convention would apply.  
 
Article 8 of the EU Charter is stated as follows: 
 
‘Protection of personal data 
 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to 
data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.’ 
 
This Article 8 of the EU Charter refers to some specific data subject’s rights such as the 
requirement that the data shall by fairly processed for specified purposes on a legitimate basis 
and the right of access and correction. One could wonder on what basis these rights where 
explicitly chosen amongst various other rights of the data subject (including the right to 
information) as already laid down in previously enacted data protection legislation.  
                                                 
46 See E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), o.c., p. 73.  
47 O.J. C 364, 18 December 2000, p. 1. FIDIS 
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The choice of the data subject’s rights in Article 8 may be relevant for the processing of 
biometric data. The reference to consent, however, may confuse, as the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party and various DPAs have already indicated that consent is in some 
particular situations biased (e.g., in the relationship employer-employee).  
 
2.3 The  Data  Protection Directive 95/46/EC  
Scope of Directive 95/46/EC 
The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC
48 is applicable to the processing of personal data, 
including the processing of biometric data. Biometric systems which process voice or images 
of persons, however, will not always fall under the provisions and obligations of the 
Directive.
49 In general, the Directive 95/46/EC is limited to the processing of personal data 
other than concerning public security, defence, State security (including the economic 
wellbeing of the State when the processing operation relates to State security matters) and the 
activities of the State in areas of criminal law.
50 For the processing of voices, images and 
other personal data by justice and home affairs authorities for these purposes, specific data 
protection rules are being set up, but the attempt to install an adequate protection seems not 
very successful.
51 Biometric data is often (intended to be) used for one or more of the above 
mentioned purposes, including the prevention and prosecution of criminal offences. In that 
case, the Directive 95/46/EC does not provide any rules.  
In addition, Member States can restrict specific obligations and rights under the Directive 
95/46/EC, such as the right to be informed, if necessary to safeguard national security, 
defence, public security, the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal 
offences, important economic or financial interests of a Member State (such as monetary and 
taxation matters), the exercise of an official authority for such purposes or the protection of 
rights and freedoms of others (Article 13 of the Directive).   
The processing of biometric data by a natural person for purely personal or household 
activities (e.g., for access to a laptop used for other than professional activities, or for access 
to someone’s home) does also not come within the scope of the Directive.
52 
In all other circumstances, biometric systems fall within the application field ratione materiae 
of the Directive, whether operated by a public or private data controller, if they are used in the 
                                                 
48 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, O.J.  L 281, 23 
November 1995, pp. 31-50. 
49 Recital 16 of the Directive 95/46/EC reiterates that the processing of sound and image data for purposes of 
public security, defence, national security or processed in the course of State activities for criminal law purposes 
or other non community matters, is not subject to the provisions of the Directive. 
50 Art. 3.2 of the Directive 95/46/EC. 
51 This results in a multitude of legislative proposals. See E. Kosta, F. Coudert and J. Dumortier, ‘Data protection 
in the third pillar : in the aftermath of the ECJ decision on PNR data and the data retention directive’, Bileta, 
Annual Conference, 2007, published and available at http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Data%20 
protection%20in%20the%20third%20pillar%20-%20in%20the%20aftermath%20of%20the%20ECJ%20decision 
%20on%20PNR%20data%20and%20the%20data%20retention%20directive.pdf. See also the recently adopted 
Framework decision of the Council on the processing of personal data in the third pillar discussed in section 2.4. 
According to article 34 §2 of the EU Treaty, framework decisions are adopted to align law and regulations of the 
Member States.  
52 Compare with the Type IV convenience model type of application, as defined in E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), 
o.c., p. 60 et seq. FIDIS 
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context of activities of an establishment of such controller on the territory of an EU Member 
State or if equipment is used on such territory (other than for transit purposes).  
The Directive 95/46/EC and biometric data 
It is generally accepted that the Directive 95/46/EC applies to the processing of biometric data 
because biometric data is generally considered as ‘information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person’ (Article 2 (a) of the Directive). Biometric data, however, comes in 
various formats (raw data or template form), protected or unprotected, and therefore the 
question as to whether biometric information remains personal data is still raised from time to 
time.  
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has also looked into this issue. In its working 
document on biometrics, it stated that ‘measures of biometric identification or their digital 
translation in a template form in most cases are personal data’. In a footnote, however, the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party left open the possibility that ‘[i]n cases where 
biometric data, like a template, are stored in a way that no reasonable means can be used by 
the controller or by any other person to identify the data subject, those data should not be 
qualified as personal data’.
53 It was, however, not clear how these ‘reasonable means’ shall be 
understood. In a more recent opinion of 2007 on the concept of personal data, the Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party stated that for assessing all the means likely reasonably to be 
used to identify a person, all relevant factors shall be taken into account, including not only 
the cost of conducting identification, but also the intended purpose, the way the processing is 
structured, the advantages expected by the controller and the interests of the data subjects.
54  
In addition, the test is a dynamic test, and shall not only take the state of the art in technology 
at the time of the processing into account, but also the possibilities of future technologies 
during the period of the processing of the data.
55 This clarification is significant for 
biometrics. Biometric technologies are in constant development. For example, images taken 
by a satellite system or a video surveillance camera system may not (yet) allow sufficient 
details to automatically identify or permit the automatical identification of persons, but other 
technology may do so (in the future).
56 The same applies to the storage of biometric 
information, for example in databases, which – as some argue - does not at first sight or with 
reasonable means permit the identification of the data subjects, but may do later.   
Finally, if the purpose of the processing implies the identification of individuals, it can be 
assumed that the controller or any other person involved have or will have the means likely 
reasonably to be used to identify the data subject. The Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party stated that ‘in fact, to argue that individuals are not identifiable, where the purpose of 
the processing is precisely to identify them, would be a sheer contradiction in terms’.
57 This 
clarification is for the processing of biometric data applicable and useful, but also raises 
questions. While biometrics can be used for identification, it can also be used for the 
verification of the identity. In the latter case, the identity will not always be established by the 
system in the sense of providing name etc. of the data subject, but it will be checked whether 
it is the same person or one of the group of persons that are authorized, for example to enter a 
                                                 
53 WP 29 Working document on biometrics, p. 5. About this important opinion, see also below, section 2.5.1. 
54 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, 20 June 
2007, 26 p. (‘WP 29 Opinion on personal data’).  
55 WP 29 Opinion personal data, p. 15. 
56 See also Progress report, Council of Europe, § 103. 
57 Ibid., p. 16. FIDIS 
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place, and as such - one could argue - the individuals are not identified. However, in view of 
existing and future technology, we esteem that it will remain possible to identify the 
individuals in this case, even if the biometrics would be locally stored, and hence, that the 
Directive 95/46/EC applies. 
The provisions of Directive 95/46/EC and the processing of biometric data  
The application of the provisions of the Directive 95/46/EC, which does not explicitly 
mention biometrics, raises various questions. Some of these questions and uncertainties are 
hereunder briefly described. 
  - Obligation to process data fairly and lawfully (Art. 5 and Art. 6.1.a)  
The Directive 95/46/EC requires that Member States shall state that personal data must be 
processed ‘fairly and lawfully’. The national laws that implement the Directive repeat mostly 
this general principle. This principle is because of its general wording apt to cope with a 
variety of situations. Judges will decide upon a case by case basis whether the processing of 
personal data is ‘fairly and lawfully’.  
On the other hand, the principle remains vague and gives little guidance when and how data, 
in our case biometric data, are processed fairly and lawfully. The Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party applies the principle in the WP 29 Working document on biometrics in 
connection with the collection of biometric data (only) and states that the data subject shall be 
informed of the purposes and the identity of the controller. However, this requirement to 
inform is always applicable to any data processing and does not add much to fair processing.  
The observation in the second paragraph on the same issue in the WP 29 Working document 
on biometrics however clarifies what the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party probably 
intends to communicate and is more significant: it is stated that the collection of data without 
the knowledge of data subjects must be avoided. In fact, several biometric data can be 
collected and processed without the knowledge of the person concerned, such as facial images 
for facial recognition, fingerprint and voice (and DNA). Such data processing present more 
risks, according to the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Does this comment of the 
WP 29 Data Protection Working Party mean that such data processing of facial images, 
fingerprint or voice is not allowed? Or does it mean that such processing shall only be limited 
and subject to specific requirements in order to be fairly and lawfully, while the processing of 
other biometric characteristics, such as for example hand veins, will be less restricted? In the 
absence of clear legislation on this issue, this remains uncertain. 
Very few countries have enacted general legislation regulating the processing of biometric 
data. Some countries have (more recently) enacted legislation regulating the use of camera 
surveillance. Article 5 of the Directive 95/46/EC states as a general rule that Member States 
shall determine ‘more precisely the conditions under which the processing of personal data is 
lawful’. In the absence of such legislation and conditions laid down therein for biometric 
systems, which exist in a large variety and modalities, this principle of ‘fair and lawful’ 
processing remains for biometric systems therefore vague and in our view difficult to 
enforce.
58  
                                                 
58 See, as an example of legislation which attempts to lay down (some limited) conditions for the lawful use of 
biometric data, the VIS Regulation (EC) N° 767/2008 (see below) which refers to lawful processing ‘in 
particular that only duly authorized staff have access to the data processed in the VIS for the performance of FIDIS 
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It is of particular interest for all citizens that biometric data such as facial images are not 
collected secretly (for example in public places). However, to the extent that such processing 
would be done for the prevention of crimes or in the case of activities of the State in criminal 
matters, this principle of fair and lawful processing of the Directive 95/46/EC would not 
apply because the Directive would not be applicable. Note that this principle of ‘fairful 
processing’, however, has been chosen to be repeated in Article 8 of the EU Charter. Article 8 
of the EU Charter could in such situations where the Directive 95/46/EC would not apply, 
such as in case of processing for prevention of crime, hence have a more significant role.  
   - Purpose specification and limitation (Art. 6.1.b)  
Article 6 1 (b) of the Directive 95/46/EC requires that biometric data must be collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and shall not be processed in a way incompatible 
with those purposes. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party links this principle of 
purpose specification to the proportionality principle in the WP 29 Working document on 
biometrics. Although both principles are connected (because the proportionality will have to 
measure the means used in relation with the purposes envisaged), they are very different and 
deserve a distinct review. 
The purpose limitation principle aims at setting the limits within which personal data may be 
processed. It also determines how and to what extent data collected for one purpose may be 
used for other purposes.  
The purposes of biometric systems are often indicated in a general way, such as ‘for security 
of access control’. Biometric systems, however, can be used in either the verification or 
identification mode, which are two very different functionalities
59 with different risks. The 
specification of the functionality which will be applied (identification or verification), the 
information as to whether the data will be stored in a central database or not and information 
about the related risks is in fact therefore necessary in order to duly specify the purposes.  
The specification of the purpose of ‘increasing security’ will not adequately reflect the 
purpose of a biometric system in operation. The error rates, such as the FRR and the FAR can 
be set by the controller/operator according to the purpose of the system. For commercial 
viable systems, these rates are often set for a fluent use. Such adapted error rates however 
could (invisibly) decrease the security which one would expect from a biometric system. A 
general purpose specification is therefore misleading without specification of the effects of 
the tuned FRR and FAR.  
The purpose specification and limitation principle of the Directive 95/46/EC in fact implies 
for biometric systems that due information is provided about these error rates and their 
effects.  
  - Obligation to process personal data which are adequate, relevant and not excessive 
in relation to the purposes   
The Directive 95/46/EC does not provide any guidance as to which (biometric) data could be 
considered adequate, relevant and not excessive for a given application.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
their tasks in accordance with this Regulation’ (Article 29). Compare also with legislation enacted in several 
member states relating to camera surveillance.   
59 See E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), o.c.,  p. 11 et seq. FIDIS 
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   - Obligation to process data on a legitimate ground (Art. 7)  
The Court of Justice has recently clarified its position in a particular case upon request for 
preliminary questions by the Higher Administrative Court for the Land  North-Rhine 
Westphalia (Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen)
60 before which 
proceedings were brought.
61 The German court asked the Court of Justice whether the 
processing of personal data of the kind undertaken in the centralised register is compatible 
with Community law. On the 16
th December 2008, the European Court of Justice rendered a 
judgment in the Case C-524/06 Heinz Huber v Germany.
62 
The Court of Justice held, first of all, that the data in question constitute personal data within 
the meaning of the Directive 95/46/EC. The Directive provides that such data may lawfully be 
processed only if it is necessary to do so for the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest or in the exercise of official authority. The Court noted also that the right of 
residence of a Union citizen in a Member State of which he is not a national is not 
unconditional but may be subject to limitations. Thus, it is, in principle, legitimate for a 
Member State to have relevant particulars and documents relating to foreign nationals 
available to it and to use a register for the purpose of providing support to the authorities 
responsible for the application of the legislation relating to the right of residence, provided 
that there is compliance with the requirement of necessity laid down by the Directive. The 
Court concluded that such a system for processing personal data complies with Community 
law if it contains only the data which are necessary for the application by those authorities of 
that legislation and if its centralised nature enables that legislation to be more effectively 
applied as regards the right of residence of Union citizens who are not nationals of that State. 
As regards the storage and processing of those data for statistical purposes, the Court then 
observed that Community law does not exclude the power of Member States to adopt 
measures enabling the national authorities to have an exact knowledge of population 
movements affecting their territory. Those statistics presuppose that certain information will 
be collected by those States. However, the exercise of that power does not, of itself, mean that 
the collection and storage of individualised personal information of the kind undertaken in the 
register at issue is, of itself, necessary. Consequently, the Court decided that such processing 
of personal data does not satisfy the requirement of necessity laid down by the Directive. 
Finally, as regards the question of the use of the data contained in the register for the purposes 
of fighting crime, the Court held that that objective involves the prosecution of crimes and 
offences committed, irrespective of the nationality of their perpetrators. The register at issue 
does not contain personal data relating to nationals of the Member State concerned. 
Consequently, use for the purposes of fighting crime is contrary to the principle of non-
discrimination and hence contrary to Community law. 
                                                 
60 http://www.ovg.nrw.de/presse/index.php 
61 The facts of the case were as follows : Mr Huber, an Austrian national, moved to Germany in 1996 in order to 
carry on business there as a self-employed insurance agent. On account of the fact that similar information on 
German nationals was not kept, Mr Huber requested deletion of the information. His request was refused and he 
filed a claim for discrimination. 
62  O.J. C 44 21.2.2009: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:044:0005: 
0005:EN:PDF ; see als ECJ Press Release 90/08: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/ecj-databases-
huber=prel.pdf 
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This ruling has hence clarified two points: (1) a centralised register of foreign nationals may 
contain only those data which are strictly necessary for the application of the rules relating to 
the right of residence; and (2) the processing and storage of those data relating to EU citizens 
for statistical purposes or with a view to fighting crime is contrary to Community law.
63 
  - Obligation to process accurate data, kept up to date (data quality) (Art. 6.1.d)  
Because of the various error rates, including the fact that a biometric comparison is a 
calculation of a probability, the processing of biometric data and the resulting decisions are 
never 100 % accurate.
64 This is even more problematic for the possible use of biometric 
information as an identification key.
65 In addition, factors such as age, but also light 
conditions will not only influence the accuracy of the processing, but also the resulting scores, 
decisions and records. In the case of false rejection, the system will for example produce a 
record showing that a person intended to access a secured area, while this person may have 
such rights. In general, the scores of biometric systems intended to be deployed, are 
sometimes not satisfactory.
66  
Therefore, the use and processing of biometric data present a problem under the present 
principle of data quality as formulated in the Directive 95/46/EC.  
The Directive does not provide an adequate answer in this respect.  
  - Prohibition of processing of data revealing racial or ethnic origin and of data  
  concerning health (Art. 8.1) 
Fidis deliverables 3.2 and even more 3.10 have described the additional information that 
biometric ‘raw data’ may contain, specifically concerning health.
67 But ‘raw data’, such as 
face images, could in some cases also reveal racial or ethnic origin. In addition, very little 
research has been made as to what extent templates may contain similar information while in 
some cases, it is likely that templates may also contain such information (e.g., in case of 
deformation of the face due to a stroke or deformation of a hand due to arthritis). Directive 
95/46/EC states clearly that the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
and of data concerning health shall be prohibited by the Member States (Article 8). Only in 
exceptional cases, such as if the processing of such data is necessary under employment law 
or for the protection of vital interests, or if the data subject has given explicit consent, or by 
law or decision of the supervisory authority ‘for reasons of substantial public interest’, such 
prohibition may be lifted.   
                                                 
63 ECJ Press Release 90/08: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/ecj-databases-huber=prel.pdf 
64 For a detailed analysis of the various error scores and their meaning, see E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), o.c., p. 
26 et seq. 
65 See also EDPS, Comments on the Communication of the Commission on interoperability of European 
databases, Brussels, 10 March 2006, 3,  available on http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/ 
webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Comments/2006/06-03-10_Interoperability_EN.pdf 
66 See the study of the United Kingdom Passport Service, Report of Biometrics Enrolment Trial, May 2005, pp. 8 
and 9, available on http://dematerialisedid.com/PDFs/UKPSBiometrics_Enrolment_Trial_Report.pdf. In this 
report, the results of the trial (for finger, one out of five false rejections and for face, one out of three) were far 
below the expectations on the basis of previous lab testing; See also the test end of 2006-early 2007 in Germany 
by the Bundeskriminalamt which showed that in a real life environment (in a train station), face recognition at a 
FAR  of 0,1 % could only successfully recognize about 60 % at day light conditions, while only 10 up to 20 % at 
night : Bundeskriminalamt, Forschungsprojekt. Gesichtserkennung als Fahndungshilfsmittel. Foto-Fahndung. 
Abschlussbericht, February 2007, 5 and 27. 
67 E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), o.c., p. 83 et seq. FIDIS 
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This prohibition under the Directive 95/46/EC is too easily disregarded. All biometric systems 
capture during the enrolment process (but also during the comparison phase) raw data from 
the data subjects for feature extraction and further processing, even if such systems would 
only store the templates. Because biometric systems capture always first ‘raw data’ which 
may contain information revealing racial or ethnic origin, or revealing the health condition, 
which are further processed in one way or another, additional legal safeguards should protect 
the legitimate interests of the data subject, for example by explicitly prohibiting any use of 
such additional information deduced from biometric data (whether ‘raw data’ or templates). 
The general prohibition in the Directive 95/46/EC and the exceptions thereto (for example, 
the consent of the data subject, which is often not explicit or not valid in view of the 
proportionality principle) is not fit for biometric systems and in many cases even not 
complied with.  
The specific characteristics and risks of the biometric process for the processing of these so-
called ‘sensitive data’ needs to be taken fully into account in the legislation in order to 
provide appropriate safeguards for the individuals.  
  - Right of data subject to obtain communication in an intelligible form of the data 
undergoing processing and knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic 
processing at least in case of automated decision (Art.12 a) 
Biometric systems are complex to understand. The processing of biometric data involves 
transformations of the data, various parameters, scores, algorithms and results, and in some 
cases automated decisions (see hereunder). Data subjects are rarely informed of all these 
processes and of the data processed (raw data versus templates) and receive no insight in the 
logic of the automated decisions. The Directive 95/46/EC states that Member States shall 
guarantee these rights. So far, there is to our knowledge no specific national legislation which 
guarantees and enforces such rights upon data controllers. 
 
The provisions of Directive 95/46/EC do not provide a global international legal framework   
It shall also be noted that the Directive 95/46/EC does not provide data protection rules for 
data processing outside the EU (and the EEA). It does not provide for a legal framework for 
processing of data exchanged between players situated in various countries around the globe.    
This poses problems for systems which are controlled by multilateral parties, in particular 
biometric multilateral controlled systems. 
68 
Another problem is where EU citizens carry biometric enhanced documents, such as travel 
documents, where the biometrics can be read and used in third countries (for example, by the 
immigration services).   
The Directive only states that the transfer of personal data to countries which do not provide 
for an adequate level of protection is in principle prohibited (Art. 25). Various exceptions 
apply, such as transfer with the unambiguous consent of the data subject or the necessity of 
the transfer for the performance of a contract (e.g., for a hotel reservation). A transfer could 
also be authorized under the ‘safe harbor’ system or by the DPAs involved if adequate 
safeguards result from appropriate contractual clauses.  
                                                 
68 E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), o.c., p. 59 et seq. FIDIS 
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However, these provisions of the Directive 95/46/EC only restrict or regulate the transfer and 
do not provide, for example for biometrics, for a global legal framework.   
 
2.4  The Framework Decision on the protection of personal data in 
the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
The Framework Decision on the protection of personal data in the field of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters is the first general data protection instrument in the EU third 
pillar.
69 Since various data processing in this third pillar (i.e., Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA)) include biometric data, this Framework Decision is herein briefly discussed. 
In a reaction to its adoption, the EDPS reminded the EU Institutions that it had repeatedly 
called for significant improvements of the proposal to ensure high standards in the level of 
protection offered and warned against a dilution of data protection standards.
70 The current 
decision was not amended to meet the criticisms of the EDPS. The EDPS reiterated its 
position that besides the inclusion of domestic data in the scope of the decision,  
 
‘further work was needed with regard to the following main points: 
 
• the need to distinguish between different categories of data subjects, such as suspects, criminals, 
witnesses and victims, to ensure that their data are processed with more appropriate safeguards; 
• ensuring an adequate level of protection for exchanges with third countries according to a common EU 
standard; 
• providing consistency with the first pillar's Data protection Directive 95/46/EC, in particular by 
limiting the purposes for which personal data may be further processed.’
71 
 
This Framework Decision is further in general criticized as that it regulates mainly the 
transmission and exchange of data between Member States and competent authorities/systems 
in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and not the data 
processing in the third pillar by the Member States as such. 
Furthermore, rules and guidelines have been issued that specifically relate to the processing of 
personal data for law enforcement purposes. These include, in particular, Council of Europe 
(CoE) Recommendation R(87)15 Regulating the Use of Personal Data in the Police Sector 
(1987) of the Committee of Ministers to Member States.
72 This Recommendation has become 
the effective standard on the issue: it is expressly referred to in various European police co-
operation instruments, including the Schengen and Europol treaties and associated 
                                                 
69 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27  November 2008 on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ L 350, 30.12.2008.   
70 European Data Protection Supervisor, EDPS sees adoption of Data Protection Framework for police and 
judicial cooperation only as a first step, available at <http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site 
/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/PressNews/Press/2008/EDPS-2008-11_DPFD_EN.pdf>, last consulted 11 
March 2009. p. 1.  
71 Ibid., p. 1. The application to domestic data and the need to distinguish between data subjects are issues that 
potentially affect the UK more than other EU states because the UK is one of the member states with the largest 
biometric (including DNA) databases. 
72 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R(87) 15 to the Member States on regulating 
the use of personal data in the police sector, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ 
economiccrime/organisedcrime/Rec_1987_15.pdf , last consulted 11 March 2009.  
 FIDIS 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D13.4 
 
Final , Version: 1.1 
File: fidis_deliverable13_4_v_1.1.doc 
Page 29 
 
regulations, and is also regularly invoked in recommendations by the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe and its Committee of Ministers, as well as by the European 
Parliament. 
The following broad guidelines can be derived from the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights, and are reflected in the case-law of the European Court of Justice, and in 
Recommendation R(87)15 : 
 
‘1. There must be a legal basis for any collection, storing, use, analysis, disclosure/sharing of personal 
data for law enforcement and anti-terrorist purposes. A vague, broad general statutory basis is not 
sufficient; rather: 
2. Such processing must be based on specific legal rules relating to the particular kind of processing 
operation in question; these rules must be binding, and they must lay down appropriate limits on the 
statutory powers such as: 
- a precise description of the kind of information that may be recorded; 
- a precise description of the categories of people against whom surveillance measures such as gathering 
and keeping information may be taken; 
- a precise description of the circumstances in which such measures may be taken; 
- a clearly set out procedure to be followed for the authorisation of such measures; 
- limits on the storing of old information and on the time for which new information can be retained; 
- explicit, detailed provisions concerning: 
the grounds on which files can be opened; 
the procedure to be followed [for opening or accessing the files]; 
the persons authorised to consult the files; 
the nature of the files; 
the use that may be made of the information in the files. 
 
It follows from the above: 
(1) that the collection of data on “contacts and associates” (i.e. on persons not suspected of involvement 
in a specific crime or of posing a threat), the collection of information through intrusive, secret means 
(telephone tapping and email interception etc.; “bugging”; informers; agents), and the use of “profiling” 
techniques, and indeed “preventive” policing generally, must be subject to a particularly strict 
“necessity” and “proportionality” test (.....); 
(2) that “hard” (factual) and “soft” (intelligence) data should be clearly distinguished; and that data on 
different categories of data subjects (officially indicted persons, suspects, associates, incidental contacts, 
witnesses and victims, etc.) should likewise be clearly distinguished; 
(3) that the nature of information and intelligence coming from private parties such as businesses or 
credit reference agencies requires additional safeguards, inter alia in order to ensure the accuracy of this 
information since these are personal data that have been collected for commercial purposes in a 
commercial environment; and 
(4) that access should only be allowed on a case-by-case basis, for specified purposes and under judicial 
control in the Member States. 
3. Such rules can be set out in subsidiary rules or regulations - but in order to qualify as “law” in 
Convention terms, they must be published.’
73 
 
These principles also apply to the processing of biometric data.  
 
                                                 
73 As quoted from the Commissioner for Human Rights, Protecting the right to privacy in the fight against 
terrorism, available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1380905&Site=CommDH&BackColorInternet 
=FEC65B&BackColorIntranet=FEC65B&BackColorLogged=FFC679, last consulted 11 March 2009.  FIDIS 
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2.5 A  selective  overview of opinions of the Article 29 Working Party 
and the EDPS on biometrics  
In this section, some selected opinions of the Article 29 Working Party and the EDPS on 
biometrics are discussed. It should be noted that because of the growing complexity of the 
privacy and data protection issues, especially in recently set up large scale EU systems, also a 
special Working Party on Police and Justice (‘WPPJ’) was mandated by the European 
conference of the DPAs to follow up on the privacy and data protection issues of specific EU 
wide databases and to provide advice in this regard. The WPPJ started its activities in June 
2007.
74 
2.5.1  Opinions and comments on the processing of biometrics in 
general 
In 2003, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party issued an opinion on biometrics 
because of the ‘rapid progress of biometric technologies and their expanded application in 
recent years’ to contribute to the effective and homogenous application of the data protection 
legislation.
75 One of the major concerns expressed by the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party is, after collection and processing of biometric data for routine applications, their fear of 
the potential re-use by third parties for their own purposes, including by law enforcement 
agencies. One aspect of its fear is also that the public may become desensitised to the effect 
that the processing of biometric data may have on their daily lives, especially when biometric 
data are collected from young children.  
The WP 29 Working Document on Biometrics of 2003 focuses on biometric systems used for 
authentication and verification purposes and contains a clarification of the general principles 
of the Directive 95/46/EC and its application to the processing of biometric data.
76 The 
opinion, although not clearly stated, is also restricted to use of systems for other than law 
enforcement or border control purposes. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party first 
points briefly in the more technical description of biometric systems to the problem of 
collection of so called ‘sensitive’ data and the risk of collection of some biometric 
characteristics without the knowledge of the individual involved. Thereafter, it stresses that a 
clear determination of the purpose shall be made.  
In view of the proportionality principle, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
recommends that (1) characteristics that do not leave traces shall be used, or (2) if such other 
characteristics are used (such as fingerprint), they should be stored on an object exclusively 
available to the user, and that (3) proportionality has to be in general assessed for each 
category of biometric data in relation with the intended purposes.  
If local storage of characteristics which leave traces would not be possible, the Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party hints to the possibility that Member States would provide in 
their national law for the requirement of prior checking with the data protection authorities 
before one could start such processing. It further states that ‘all measures must be taken to 
                                                 
74 See Working Party on Police and Justice, Activity Report 2007-2008, available at   
http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/static/pdf/working-party-on-police-and-justice-ar-nl.pdf   
75 WP 29 Working Document on Biometrics, 11 p.  
76 These guidelines and the principles, such as fair collection, information to the data subject, security of the 
processing, etc have been described in earlier Fidis work in M. Gasson, M Meints, et al. (eds.), o.c.,  p. 102 et 
seq.. These will therefore not be repeated here. We herein limit our analysis to some positions which the Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party takes for specific problems.  FIDIS 
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prevent […] incompatible re-use’ and implicitly states that local storage could maybe solve 
this problem as well, while this could also solve the risk of the use of biometric data as a key 
(or identifier of general application) for interconnecting databases.  
‘Mathematical manipulations’ are also mentioned as desirable in the case of central storage, 
to avoid that biometrics are used as a key, in addition to legislation as to the conditions of 
such processing by the Member States.
77 As a conclusion, the importance for the data subject 
to exercise better control over its personal data is stressed.  
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party also briefly mentions the possibility to use 
biometrics as a privacy enhancing technology (hereafter ‘PET’).
78 Biometrics is here 
mentioned as a way to reduce the need for the processing of other personal data, such as name 
or address. In addition, the use of PETs in general is reminded as a way to minimise data 
collection and to prevent unlawful processing. How this has to be done in case of biometric 
data processing, is not clarified.  
The opinion, although legally not binding, is an important document as it provides some keys 
in the complex discussion about biometrics. It gives some insights in how national data 
protection authorities may look at the issues (for example, as to their preference for 
characteristics which leave no traces). In opinions of DPAs, a similar point of view as set out 
in this WP 29 Working Document on Biometrics is sometimes repeated. 
In the context of biometrics, the interoperability of the systems is also received attention as 
one major concern.
79 The EDPS has in his comments on the Commissions’ Communication 
on interoperability of European databases expressed his concern in this regard. The EDPS 
stated that ‘making access to or exchange of data technically feasible becomes, in many cases, 
a powerful drive for the facto acceding or exchanging these data’.
80 This fear only is 
reinforced with the pronouncement of the principle of availability proclaimed in the The 
Hague Programme and since then adopted.
81  
Finally, another interesting opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party is the 
opinion on the Green Paper on Detection Technologies.
82 Although the opinion does not 
specify (yet) concrete guidelines on detection technologies, biometrics is mentioned several 
                                                 
77 See section 3.8 of the WP 29 Working Document on Biometrics. 
78 This point has been referred too many times and interpreted in various ways. The use of biometrics as a PET 
has been sometimes described as a way to control and limit access to persons to data in large systems by 
controlling who they are. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party separately mentions also the possibility 
to use biometrics as encryption keys.  
79 See also P. De Hert and A. Sprokkereef, ‘Regulation for biometrics as a primary key for interoperability ?’ in 
earlier Fidis work, in particular E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), o.c., section 3.2.3. pp. 47 -55. 
80 EDPS, Comments on the Communication of the Commission on interoperability of European databases, 
Brussels, 10 March 2006, 2,  available on http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/ webdav/site/mySite/shared/ 
Documents/Consultation/Comments/2006/06-03-10_Interoperability_EN.pdf 
81 The principle of availability was elaborated in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. The principle of 
availability is aimed at allowing national law enforcement agencies within the EU full access to all the data in 
national and European databases. The principle was embedded in the so-called the Hague Programme. The ‘The 
Hague Programme’ also introduced the idea of the use of biometric identifiers for passports and of a visa 
information system. As part of anti-terrorist measures, the Commission emphasised the need of improving 
exchanging information as means for strengthening the cooperation between law enforcement services. About 
the The Hague Programme, see also section 6.1.  
82 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2007 on the Green Paper on Detection Technologies 
in the Work of Law Enforcement, Customs and other Security Authorities, available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp129_en.pdf  FIDIS 
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times as an example of a detection technology (together with CCTV and RFID tags) for 
which appropriate data protection solutions need to be found.
83 It is stressed that a clear 
determination of the purposes of the data processing is a key issue. Only then, data protection 
authorities are able to determine whether the collected data are adequate, relevant and not 
excessive.  
2.5.2  The use of biometrics in specific large scale systems in the EU   
Biometric identifiers in epassports and travel documents 
The legal basis for the inclusion of biometric identifiers in passports and travel documents of 
EU nationals is the Council Regulation 2252/2004/EC.
84 The biometric features in the 
passports shall only be used for the verification of the authenticity of the document and the 
identity of the holder when the document has to be produced by law (Article 4, 3). At the time 
of the Regulation, the new technologies of inserting chips with biometric data, however, had 
not yet been applied or tried out. 
In the meantime, there is a proposal for amending the Regulation (EC) 2252/2004.
85 
Insufficient quality of fingerprint in some situations for one-to-one verification made the 
proposed amendments necessary. The proposal is complementing the Regulation and aims at 
defining harmonised exceptions: children under 6 years and certain persons who are 
physically unable to provide fingerprints for travel documents are exempt from the 
requirement to provide fingerprints. The proposal also introduces the principle of ‘one 
passport-one person' as an additional security measure, recommended by the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). This would ensure that the passport and the biometric 
features are only linked to the person holding the passport and could help combat child 
trafficking by requiring children to have their own passport with their own biometric 
identifiers. Finally, some minimum technical security measures are imposed set out in the 
Annex. 
The EDPS stated in his opinion of 2008 on this proposed amendment that while the 
introduction of these exemptions were welcomed, these exemptions remain unsatisfactory, 
because they fail to address all the possible issues relevant to the inherent imperfections of 
biometric systems.
86 Furthermore, the EDPS stated that the Commission should also propose 
further  harmonization measures in order to implement only the decentralized storage of 
biometric data for the Member States’ passports and that the Commission should propose 
common rates for the enrolment and matching process completed by fallback procedures.  
                                                 
83 Ibid., 4. 
84 Council Regulation No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued by Member States, O.J. L 385, 29 December 2004, p.1 (‘Regulation (EC) 
2252/2004’). This Regulation has been extensively discussed and analysed in earlier Fidis work, in particular M. 
Meints and M. Hansen (eds.), o.c., p. 49 et seq.   
85 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation No 
2252/2004, COM (2007) 619 final, 18 October 2007, available at  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0619:FIN:EN:PDF  
86 Opinion of the EDPS on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Regulation No 2252/2004, O.J. C 200, 6 August 2008, p.1, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:200:0001:0005:EN:PDF  FIDIS 
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In a resolution of 14 January 2009, the European Parliament has adopted the proposal, as 
amended (including raising the age from six to twelve).
87  
   
VIS  
In June 2004, the Council of Ministers of the EU decided to establish a Visa Information 
System (VIS).
88 The VIS system is an information system intended, according to the Decision 
of 2004, to enable national authorities to enter and update visa data of third country nationals 
and to consult these data electronically (Article 1). Measures necessary for the development 
of VIS were to be adopted, including the ‘development of security measures, including 
biometrics’ (Article 4). The Decision needed further implementation at the EU and national 
level. Regulation N° 767/2008 of 9 July 2008 provides for such further implementation (VIS 
Regulation’).
89  
The VIS system aims at providing border guards all necessary information to verify whether 
the entry conditions for third country nationals are fulfilled at the external borders.
90 Personal 
data of third country nationals to be recorded in the central database of VIS include not only a 
list of alphanumeric data, such as surname and first name, but also photographs and 
fingerprint data (Article 5 1. (a), (b) (c) of the VIS Regulation).  
According to the VIS Regulation, competent authorities (at the borders and within the 
national territory) have access to a search facility using the number of the visa sticker in 
combination with the verification of fingerprints of the visa holder (which will be stored in 
the VIS central database (and not in the visa sticker)) for purposes of verifying the identity of 
the visa holder and/or the authenticity of the visa and/or as to whether the conditions for 
entering the Schengen area or the stay on the territory are fulfilled (Article 18 and 19). Access 
for identification purposes is also regulated (Article 20), as well as access for determining 
responsibility for asylum applications (Article 21). 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party expressed already in August 2004 as one of its 
major concerns, the storage of biometric data in a central database for the purpose of 
carrying out subsequent checks with regard to proportionality. It referred also to the risks for 
                                                 
87 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do;jsessionid=E97F79F84DA75D9ABD3654A8B43D23B5. 
node2?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0015+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN  
88 Council Decision of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), 2004/512/EC, O.J. L 213, 
15 June 2004, pp. 5-7. The Council provided hereby the legal basis for the invitations for tenders for this system 
which were already under way and for the inclusion in the general budget of the EU. This decision was taken 
after a so-called ‘extended impact assessment’ submitted by the Commission to the public. See European 
Commission, JHA, Your views on the future EU Visa Information System (VIS), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_vis_en.htm This public consultation 
was decided by the Commission in its Annual Work Programme 2004. See also about impact assessment in 
general, COM(2002) 276 of 5 June 2002. 
89 Regulation (EC) N° 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning the 
Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas, O.J. L 218, 
13 August 2008, p. 60 (‘VIS Regulation’). About the draft of the Regulation, see M. Meints and M. Hansen 
(eds.), o.c., p. 45 et seq. 
90 VIS should hence improve the implementation of the common visa policy of the European Union. One should 
note that the recitals to the Decision mention the option of a common technical platform with the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II, see below) (recital 2). FIDIS 
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the persons concerned in case of a hijacked identity and the problem of such large-scale 
database  of the reliability of checks.
91 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
questioned what studies revealed compelling reasons of public safety or public order that 
would justify such central storage, and whether alternative approaches which do not involve 
such risks have been studied.
92  
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party repeated this concern in its opinion in 2005 
relating to VIS and the exchange of data.
93 It stated that an ‘assessment of the principle of 
proportionality (…) therefore begs the question of the fundamental legitimacy of collecting 
these data (...). (…) An extremely careful analysis of the lawfulness of the processing of such 
data  for identification purposes is necessary, given the possible prejudicial effects to the 
persons concerned if they are lost or used for purposes other than those for which they were 
intended’ (stress added). 
The EDPS, requested to issue an opinion on a proposal concerning access for consultation of 
VIS, warned in 2005 that while VIS is an information system developed for the European 
visa policy and not as a law enforcement tool, routine access by law enforcement authorities 
would not be in accordance with this purpose. Only access on a case by case basis, under 
strict safeguards, shall be granted, provided the consultation will ‘substantially contribute’ to 
the prevention, detection or investigation of a serious crime.
94  
The VIS Regulation has to some extent taken the remarks and comments of the Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party and the EDPS into account.
95 However, this did not prevent 
that, notwithstanding the original purpose of VIS, by decision of the Council of 23 June 2008, 
designated authorities of Member States and Europol have obtained access to VIS for 
purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other 
serious criminal offences.  
It is remarkable that a new Regulation (EC) N°81/2009 of 14 January 2009 already provides a 
derogation to the use of the biometric data in the central database when the waiting lines are 
too long. It is stated that ‘where traffic of such intensity arises that the waiting time at the 
border crossing point becomes excessive, all staff and facilities resources have been 
exhausted and based on an assessment there is no risk related to internal security and illegal 
immigration’,  VIS may be consulted using the visa sticker number only, leaving out the 
                                                 
91 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion N° 7/2004 on the inclusion of biometric elements in 
residence permits and visas taking account of the establishment of the European information system on visas 
(VIS), WP 96, 11 August 2004, pp. 4-5. 
92 Ibid., p. 5. 
93 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2005 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between 
Member States on short stay-visas, WP 110, 23 June 2005, p. 12.  
94 EDPS, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Decision concerning access for consultation of the Visa 
Information System (VIS) by the authorities of Member States responsible for internal security and by Europol 
for the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal 
offences, O.J. C97, 25 April 2006, p. 6. 
95 See, for example, Article 3 which confers access for investigation of terrorist offences and other serious 
criminal offences ‘if there are reasonable grounds to consider that consultation (…) will substantially 
contribute’. The VIS Regulation, for example, also makes a distinction between the use of the biometric data for 
verification and identification purposes, and restricts the access to the data.   FIDIS 
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verification of fingerprints (Article 1,1(ab)) (stress added)’.
96 It may be feared that such kind 
of provision could lead to the arbitrary use of the biometric data in VIS. 
 
The second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
On 31 May 2005, the European Commission made proposals for replacing the original 
Schengen Information System (‘SIS’), which was a system at both central (C-SIS) and 
national (N-SIS) level for allowing access to alerts on persons and property for the purposes 
of border checks and other police and customs checks, as detailed in Title VI of the Schengen 
Convention (later incorporated in the EU Treaty), by a fully central system with centralised 
database with new categories of data, in particular photographs (in the form of digital images) 
and fingerprints alongside an alert, for the broad purpose of ‘exchanging information for the 
control of persons and objects’ (Article 1).
97 Regulation (EC) N° 1987/2006 of 20 December 
2006 has adopted the proposal for SIS II.
98  
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party deplores in its opinion of November 2005 that 
‘without any proper assessment of the necessity’ for such new categories of data, the 
biometric data will be added to the system. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party also 
points out that no clarification is given about the enrolment procedure for the biometric data, 
the rules for access and the specific security measures to be introduced.
99 Because of the 
sensitivity of the data, which fall within the scope of article 6 of the Convention No 108, the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party states that the data should be safeguarded by 
adequate standards at international levels and that search functions based on these data 
should be ruled out.
100 It concludes by repeating that the use of biometrics for identification 
purposes must be strictly limited to specific cases where this information is really necessary, 
including in the interests of the data subject, and that the circumstances and purposes for 
biometric searches shall be defined, as well as appropriate guarantees by law in order to limit 
or reduce function creep.
101  
                                                 
96 Regulation (EC) N°81/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 amending 
Regulation (EC) N° 562/2006 as regards the use of the Visa Information System (VIS) under the Schengen 
Border Code, O.J. L 35, 4 February 2009, p. 56 - 58. 
97 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment, operation and 
use of the second generation Schengen information system (SIS II), COM(2005) 236 final. 
98 Regulation (EC) N° 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the 
establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), O.J.L 381, 28 
December 2006, p. 4 (‘SIS II Regulation’). In addition, access by services for issuing vehicle registration 
certificates to SIS II is also regulated by Regulation (EC) N° 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 December 2006, O.J. L 381, 28 December 2006, p. 1-3 ; See also Regulation (EC) N° 562/2006 of 
15 March 2006 established a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code) and lays down the detailed rules on border crossing checks, including checks in the 
Schengen Information System. 
99 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 6/2005 on the Proposals for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2005) 236 final) and a Council Decision (COM(2005) 230 
final) on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen information system (SIS II) 
and a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding access to the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) by the services in the Member States responsible for issuing 
vehicle registration certificates (COM(2005) 237 final), WP 116, 25 November 2005, p. 15. 
100 Ibid., p.15. 
101 Ibid., p.23. FIDIS 
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The EDPS proposed in his opinion on SIS II a non exhaustive list of common obligations and 
requirements which need to be respected when biometric data are used in a system, in order to 
avoid that the data subject is to carry the burden of system imperfections.
102  
The status of SIS II is for the moment however somewhat unclear, as some say it is delayed.  
 
Eurodac 
EURODAC is an EU wide database with centrally stored biometric data and which allows 
checking asylum applicants on double requests.
103 Eurodac is operational.  
The Working Party on Police and Justice (WPPJ) stated in a position on a proposal for access 
by law enforcement agencies to the Eurodac data, to assess first the necessity of such new 
item of legislation. In their view, Eurodac is set up in the frame of evaluating asylum 
applications and cannot be seen as ‘an ordinary fingerprint database’ which can be used for 
other purposes.
104 WPPJ estimates that there is no pressing need to take the risk of turning the 
Eurodac data base into a criminal law investigation tool. 
 
European Border Surveillance System and Frontex 
The EU Commission started in 2008 a discussion on the next steps on border management, 
the creation of an European Border Surveillance System and the evaluation of Frontex.
105  
The Article 29 Working Party, together with the WPPJ declared in 2008 that they make 
serious reservations as to the necessity and the proportionality of the proposals for the set up 
of the European Border Surveillance System and Frontex. They stated in a declaration that 
they regret that it is not evaluated first whether existing legal measures are properly 
implemented and proved to be inefficient which is needed to motivate the need for new 
systems. The inclusion of biometric data increases those risks. The WPPJ hereby underlined 
that ‘not everything that is technically feasible is also ethically acceptable or legally 
permissible’ (stress added).
106  
 
2.6  The role of the National Data Protection Authorities  
The National Data Protection Authorities (‘DPAs’) are in principle independent public 
authorities established in each of the Member States which are responsible for the 
development of relevant guidelines, the monitoring of the application of the data protection 
legislation and, if necessary, for its enforcement.  
The Directive 95/46/EC sets out in detail which powers shall be conferred by the legislator to 
the national DPAs (Article 28). The implementing national legislation shall observe that their 
national DPA shall as a minimum have the powers described in Article 28. These powers 
                                                 
102 EDPS, Opinion of 19 October 2005 on three Proposals regarding the Second Generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II).  
103 Eurodac has also been analysed in M. Meints and M. Hansen (eds.), o.c., p. 41 et seq. 
104 WPPJ, o.c., p. 5-6. 
105 See COM (2008) 69 final, COM (2008) 68 final,and COM (2008) 67 final. 
106 Declaration adopted on the Spring Conference of European Data Protection Authorities, Rome, 17-18 April 
2008, available at http://www.ip-rs.si/index.php?id=272&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=367. FIDIS 
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include (i) the obligation to be consulted when administrative or legislative measures or 
regulations are being taken and which affect the right to data protection, (ii) investigative 
powers, including audit and discovery powers on the premises, (iii) rendering opinions in case 
of prior checking, or in case of (iv) ordering the blocking, erasure or destruction of data or a 
(temporary or definitive) ban on the processing, (v) imposing (sometimes substantial) fines 
and (vi) power to engage in legal proceedings or to refer cases to the judicial authorities.  
In areas of new technologies, where legislation does not yet take such technologies into 
account, the DPAs play an important role. For new types of data processing, such as 
biometrics, the application of the law is not always clear, and the DPAs often provide 
guidance on the interpretation of the law to biometric applications in opinions, advice and 
recommendations. Although these are in principle not binding, they are of a great 
authoritative importance since in case of non-compliance, the DPA could use its powers 
conferred as described above. Some active DPAs further provide information in various ways 
and assist in creating awareness, by participating in debates on the use of biometrics, for 
example in parliament (e.g., the CNIL) or during scientific meetings, and by referring to such 
new technologies and the questions they may raise in the public (annual) reports they need to 
provide about their activities.  
The DPAs are also involved in advising on the enactment of national legislation and the 
implementation of European legislative initiatives, such as on the use of biometrics in 
passports and travel documents, in a national context.  
The number of processing, new technologies and resulting problems, which require the 
attention of the national DPAs
107, however, are increasing rapidly. The DPAs have therefore 
difficulties in terms of person power and financial means to fulfil their tasks and 
responsibilities. Sometimes, the required independence has also been revealed a problem, but 
is being resolved in some countries.
108  
The DPAs will also hear complaints of data subjects or representative organisations. The right 
to file a claim with the DPA appears very important in case of the use of biometrics in the 
employment context. Examples of claims brought by employees or labor organisations against 
the installation of a biometric access control systems can be found in countries such as Greece 
and Belgium. The decisions of the DPAs, however, can be appealed before the courts.   
The national DPAs are only competent to use their (interpretative, investigative and 
enforcement) powers on their own territory. For biometric systems, implemented in various 
places, for example of a multinational company, this could lead to different positions and 
approaches by the DPAs. Nevertheless, national DPAs can ask the DPAs of other countries to 
exchange useful information and could even request such other DPAs to exercise their powers 
(Article 28 (6)).  
Representatives of the national DPAs will also participate in international initiatives and 
working groups, in particular the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. This international 
cooperation is important for biometrics, since positions of the DPAs are there discussed, 
information exchanged, which sometimes results in joint declarations. In 2005, the national 
data protection authorities stressed in a joint resolution made at the occasion of their 27
th 
                                                 
107 For example, the use of RFID technology, of GPS and location data, of electronic surveillance, of camera 
surveillance and identity systems.   
108 In Belgian, for example, the DPA is no longer within the organisation of the Minister of Justice, but an 
independent commission receiving its funds from and reporting to the national parliament.  FIDIS 
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annual conference in Montreux, that the widespread use of biometric data will have a 
considerable impact on society and called for effective safeguards in an early stage in order to 
limit the risks inherent to biometrics.
109 Most importantly, they also called for a strict 
distinction between biometric data collected and stored for public purposes on the basis of 
legal obligations and for contractual purposes on the basis of consent. While the resolution 
was specific on passports, they also called for technical restrictions of the use of biometrics 
therein to verification purposes. The resolution has no binding legal effect. However, it is an 
important indication of the common view of the national DPAs on the processing of biometric 
data.  
Such international cooperation may have a positive effect on a more common approach of the 
DPAs towards biometric systems. However, the latter is not yet a fact and DPAs will have 
their own position towards biometric systems (e.g., in relation to the biometric characteristic 
to be used or central storage). This creates problems for transnational use and implementation 
of biometric systems. 
 
2.7 Preliminary conclusion  
The national Member States are compelled in assuring the fundamental right to privacy and 
data protection to individuals because these principles are laid down in binding international 
conventions and national constitutions. 
In view of new technologies and data processing, such as the processing of unique human 
characteristics for the verification or identification of individuals, the application of these 
fundamental rights is not self-explanatory. The Directive 95/46/EC provides more detailed 
rules on how to establish a protection in case of personal data processing but seems not apt to 
cope with all issues and problems raised by biometric applications, as described in section 
2.3. Specific legislation could address the risks and problems with biometrics. Alternatively, 
the existing provisions of the Directive 95/46/EC could be further interpreted by the DPAs.   
The limited recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice 
sheds some light on some relevant issues, but does not answer all questions.  
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and the EDPS clearly point out in their 
opinions on large scale EU databases that for the processing of biometric data in the proposed 
specific systems (VIS, SIS II,….) that they have reviewed, and for the processing of biometric 
data in general, that appropriate legal specifications are lacking, including for the decision 
about the proportionality of the collection and central storage of biometric data, the data 
quality (such as low false rejection rate requirements), the enrolment procedure, subsequent 
access by law enforcement authorities, and the safeguards for the individuals. These large 
scale databases also illustrate that the initial objective for establishing a central database (e.g., 
for VIS, for establishing a common visa policy) is often changed and access is granted for law 
enforcement purposes (e.g., for VIS, access is granted to for example Europol).
110  
                                                 
109 The resolution was presented by Germany and was on the use of biometric data in passports, ID cards and 
travel documents. See 27
th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Resolution 
on the use of biometrics in passports, identity cars and travel documents, 16 September 2005, available at 
http://www.privacyconference2005.org/fileadmin/PDF/biometrie_resolution_e.pdf  
110 The same is happening with regard to Eurodac, where developments indicate that the database, initially only 
for evaluating asylum applications, may be turned into a criminal investigation tool.  FIDIS 
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The country reports that follow will highlight how delicate questions in relation to biometrics 
are tackled in the selected countries. DPAs hereby have an important role in the interpretation 
and enforcement of the existing legislation. It is therefore necessary to review how these 
national authorities cope with such new technology as biometrics and how each country is in 
search of a comprehensive approach. 
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3 Belgium     
3.1 Introduction   
Biometric applications are being introduced in an increasing tempo in various domains of 
public and private life in Belgium. The plan of schools to introduce biometrics for access 
control and administration purposes has retained quite some press and media attention, while 
the introduction of biometrics on the work floor has raised concerns by 
employee(representative)s. Official institutions of the EU have also installed enhanced access 
control applications, for example the EU parliament based in Brussels which collects and 
registers detailed pictures of visitors upon entrance of the EU parliament premises. But also 
fitness clubs request members to provide their fingerprint. Besides these trends, more and 
more consumer goods sold in Belgium also include biometric functions, such as laptops. 
The introduction and use of biometrics in combination with the national electronic identity 
card was subject of further scientific research
111, but research about biometrics was also done 
in demonstrators and research projects, such as for securing banking applications and 
networks.
112 The introduction of fingerprints on the epassports is in principle scheduled to 
start in 2009.   
The data protection legislation does not refer explicitly to biometric data. Cases about the use 
of biometrics are pending before court. The uncertainty about the legal and privacy risks of 
the use of biometrics have lead to various questions posed to the Belgian Data Protection 
Authority (‘CBPL’). Initially, the CBPL referred to some of these questions in its annual 
reports only. However, and more importantly, the CBPL issued upon its own initiative in 
April 2008 an opinion on the subject of the processing of biometric data for authentication 
purposes. This opinion contains the view of the CBPL on various aspects of the processing of 
biometric data and promulgates several guidelines on the subject matter.
113 This opinion will 
be further discussed in section 3.4. 
In the field of law enforcement, it should be noted that Belgium has signed in 2005 the Prüm 
Treaty in which signatories agree to share access to fingerprint (and motor vehicle 
registration) databases. 
3.2 The  spreading  of  biometric applications  
3.2.1  Fields in which biometric applications are implemented  
Various schools are introducing biometrics for the administration of their students and for 
access control, for example to keep undesired persons outside the premises. These schools are 
located in the French speaking Community
114 (Luik), Brussels or the Flemish speaking 
                                                 
111 See, for example, the research in the IDEM project (an IBBT project ‘IDEntity Management for 
eGovernment’) of the Belgian and Flemish government (see  https://projects.ibbt.be/idem/index.php?id=126 )   
112 For example, the use of fingerprints of bank employees to secure access to systems.   
113 Commission for the Protection of Privacy, Opinion upon own initiative concerning the processing of 
biometric data in the framework of the authentication of persons, Opinion N° 17/2008 of 9 April 2008, 22 p., 
available at www.privacycommission.be (in French or Dutch) (‘CBPL Opinion on biometrics’).  
114 See also a question of a Walloon parliament member to the Education Minister of the Walloon community, 
Maria Arena of February 6, 2007 as to the use of biometric access control in schools, available at 
http://www.lecdh.be/docparlement/pa4896.htm . The Minister answered that the data shall not be used outside 
the school or for purposes other than school objectives.  FIDIS 
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Community (Mechelen, Opwijk, …).
115 These schools request the consent of parents and 
sometimes refer to the use of the biometric technology in their internal rules. The purposes for 
which they use the fingerprint technology include ensuring the security of the students and 
control of their presence. Sometimes, the use of instantaneous registration of the students is 
also defended for use in case of evacuation in emergency situations (e.g., a fire). The 
implementation in schools, however, are sometimes done in the form of a pilot and hence 
supplier driven. For avoiding the use of the data by police authorities, the school in Luik 
declared to use only a part of a fingerprint.
116  
Biometrics are also being reflected upon and being implemented in the context of access 
control of employees. Because of a complaint of the employee representatives, the CBPL has 
conducted an investigation on the matter, and, based on its investigation, has considered the 
use of biometrics as an important new technology, for which it issued guidelines in its opinion 
of 2008, as mentioned above.  
In public places and closed places which are open to the public (for example shops), camera 
surveillance has been introduced massively in Belgium. This has even resulted in a new 
legislation on the use of camera surveillance. A new and more recent trend, however, is to 
replace the existing camera surveillance systems with intelligent camera surveillance systems, 
which are digital and which can perform additional automated functions. At the Belgian coast, 
various cameras which allow the recognition of faces, have been installed since 2005.
117 After 
the successful pilot with 9 cameras, about 60 cameras were planned to be installed in various 
communes along the Belgian coast. The system was promoted as a system that would allow 
relocating young children who got lost on the boardwalk or on the beach, by scanning a 
picture provided by the parents which would be recognized by the system. However, the 
system would in addition also be used to find criminals.
118 In and around Brussels, a new 
cooperation amongst various police zones would result in the installation and the operation of 
new camera surveillance systems and techniques observing the traffic on the belt around 
Brussels and taking down the license plates of the vehicles, to be compared with those of 
stolen or uninsured cars. These camera surveillance systems are examples of the use of 
biometrics as Type V surveillance applications or if they would be used in a specific context 
by a mix of public and private organisations, of Type III public – private applications.
119    
Biometrics is also increasingly used in law enforcement services. Police services are investing 
in new systems which allow the digital collection of fingerprints of persons who have been 
arrested.
120 The fingerprints can in such application instantaneously be compared with central 
                                                 
115 See X., Scholen gebruiken vingerafdruk voor leerlingenregistratie’, Maks, 18 April 2008, available at 
http://www.maks.be/nieuws.php?id=8439  
116 See S. Danneels, ‘Vingerafdrukken garanderen veiligheid in Luikse school’, Niewsblad.be, 18 April 2008, 
available at http://www.nieuwsblad.be/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleID=SA1QVC6H 
117 Y. Naesen, ‘Nooit meer verloren kinderen aan de kust’, Nieuwsblad.be, 26 July 2005, available on 
http://www.nieuwsblad.be/Article/Detail.aspx?articleID=gktgko78  
118 X., ‘Speciale apparatuur in Vlaamse badplaatsen zoekt zelf naar criminelen of vermiste kinderen’, Elsevier,  
available on http://www.elsevier.nl/login/login_preview_e.asp?strretpath=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2 
Eelsevier%2Enl%2Fmagazine%2Fartikel%2Easp%3Fartnr%3D60423%26jaargang%3D61%26week%3D33  
119 About these suggested classes of biometric systems, see E. Kindt and L. Müller, (eds.), D.3.10. Biometrics in 
identity management , Fidis, December 2007, p. 60 et seq. 
120 See Questions & Answers Chamber 2008-09, 16 February 2009, p. 1129 (Question of 2 February 2009 n° 
229 Van Biesen): On December 2, 2008, the final approval for the purchase of the AFIS-system was given 
which shall replace the present 10 year old system. Local Lifescan systems and systems for the electronic 
sending of ‘ink fingerprints’ will be connected to the central system; see also X., ‘Digitaal vingerafdrukken FIDIS 
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databases in Brussels for checks on persons who were arrested before and may have 
committed crimes. Fingerprints may also be taken from asylum applicants (see below). While 
such prints may in principle not be used for law enforcement purposes, access to the 
fingerprints of asylum seekers may be asked by a magistrate in the case of an investigation of 
a crime.   
The fields which were described above are only examples of situations in which biometrics 
are implemented. Other illustrations which demonstrate the increasing role of biometrics are 
therefore not excluded.   
3.2.2 National  studies  and debate about biometrics 
Unisys Corporation, a main IT system supplier, has opened in Brussels, Belgium, a 
Biometrics Centre of Excellence to serve its clients established in EU countries in 2006.
121 
The centre publishes at regular intervals studies conducted by Unisys or its partners on 
biometrics. In one of these studies, consumers in fourteen countries were randomly surveyed. 
The survey found that two-thirds of the respondents favoured biometrics as an ideal way to 
combat fraud and identity theft.
122 For the survey, 436 Belgians were questioned out of a total 
of 3669 persons. Not less than 89% of the Belgians involved had no objection if banks would 
use voice recognition or fingerprints to control their identity. The main reason that was given 
was the ease of use: because of the use of biometrics they hoped that it would not be required 
any longer to memorize pin codes and passwords. 42% thought that the biometrics would 
increase the security of the information and 35% stated that the verification of the identity 
would be faster. In general, one out of five of the Belgians described the Belgian banks as the 
‘most trustable industry’.
123 
The cryptography research team of the French Catholic University of Louvain (Louvain-la-
Neuve) has also studied the storage and the use of biometrics, in particular (so far) the digital 
picture stored on the RFID chip in the international passport. The research group made in an 
announcement of mid 2007 public that they made a study and discovered that Belgian 
passports of the first generation (issued from 2004 until July 2006 (and valid through 2011)) 
did not possess any security mechanism to ensure the protection of personal data. They 
demonstrated that the data stored on the chip of these biometric passports can be read at a 
distance in a few seconds without the owner’s notice. The biometric passports issued after 
July 2006 do benefit from a security mechanism, but these are insecure. Anyone with an easy 
to purchase electronic reading device can acquire all the data on the chip, including picture 
and signature, without authorization and without the owner knowing it.
124 The weakness has 
already been revealed for passports of other countries, including German and Dutch biometric 
                                                                                                                                                          
nemen kan in Hasselt’, available at http://www.hasseltlokaal.be/Item/ 
tabid/55/seqAxNewsItem/2672/Default.aspx; X, ‘Mechelse politie krijgt digitaal systeem voor vingerafdrukken’, 
available at http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/957/Belgi/article/detail/635931/2009/01/23/Mechelse-politie-krijgt-
digitaal-systeem-voor-vingerafdrukken.dhtml  
121 W. Gardner, ‘Unisys opens Brussels Biometric Centre’, Techweb Network, 26 April 2006, available at 
http://www.techweb.com/wire/security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=186701106  
122 X., ‘Consumers Worldwide Overwhelmingly Support Biometrics for Identity Verification, Says Unisys 
Study’,  26 April 2006, available at http://www.unisys.com/about__unisys/news_a_events/04268651.htm  
123 K. Van der Stadt, ’Belgen hebben geen bezwaar tegen biometrie’, Data news, nr. 35. 
124 G. Avoine, K. Kalach & J-J. Quisquater, Belgian Biometric Passport does not get a pass… Your personal 
data are in danger’, available on http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/passport/index.html ; zie hierover ook E. 
Kindt, ‘Belgisch biometrisch paspoort onveilig’, Computerrecht 2007, pp. 221 – 223. 
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passports. The weakness of Belgian biometric passports, however, is considered worse, 
because the information needed to read the chip, the two coded lines at the bottom of the first 
page, containing birth date, expiry date and passport number, can be guessed in about one 
hour with a search of all possible combinations if the data of birth and the date of expiry are 
known. The reason is that the passports numbers are given in an increasing order, are linked 
to the language and that the passports are only valid for five years, thus limiting the possible 
combinations to be ‘guessed’.  
At the occasion of that study, parliament questioned the Minister of the Interior and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2007 as to whether the Belgian biometric passports were 
sufficiently safe. The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied by referring to the technical 
specifications of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, in particular the Basic Access 
control and the Active Authentication, which are implemented in the passports and hereby 
concluded that the Belgian passport is secure.
125 In general, the competent ministers are 
regularly questioned in parliament about the introduction of the biometric passports, but one 
can hardly say that there is a real debate with defenders and opponents of biometrics in 
parliament.
126  
In communications with the press in 2008, the CBPL however has warned for the generalized 
use of biometrics.
127 The Belgian Data Protection Authority hereby attempted to clarify its 
position taken in its opinion on the subject (see below, section 3.4). At this occasion, various 
articles appeared in the press on biometrics. These articles warned that biometric systems 
shall be carefully considered, but one cannot say that there was a debate in the press on the 
topic with opponents and defenders at the occasion of the newly issued opinion by the 
Belgian Data Protection Authority.   
 
3.3 Legislation  regulating the use of biometric data  
3.3.1  General and specific privacy legal framework for biometrics 
The collection and processing of biometric data is subject to the general data protection 
legislation, the Law of 8 December 1992
128 (as modified by the Law of 11 December 1998
129) 
which was completed with a Royal Decree of 13 February 2001
130 (hereinafter together the 
‘Law of 1992’). The Law of 1992 implements the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. The 
Law of 1992 applies to the processing of biometric data. There are however no specific 
                                                 
125 Questions and Answers, Chamber 2006-07, 9 January 2007, 17-20 (Questions no 13251 of Arens and no. 
13421 of Maene), also available at http://www.lachambre.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/51/ic1146.pdf ; see also Questions 
and Answers, Chamber 2006-07, 22 January 2007, 112-114 (Question no 420 of Bex), also available at   
http://www.dekamer.be/QRVA/pdf/51/51K0150.pdf.  
126 See for example question nr. 584 in which the Minister was asked whether the negative study of the London 
School of Economics on the electronic identity card in the United Kingdom was also relevant for the Belgian 
eID,  Questions and Answers, Chamber 2004-05, 23 May 2005, 79-85 (Question no 584 of Di Rupo), also 
available at http://www.dekamer.be/QRVA/pdf/51/51K0079.pdf  
127 See Belgian Data Protection Authority, Privacy commissie schetst kader voor verwerking van biometrische 
gegevens,  6 june 2008, available at the website of the CBPL at http://www.privacycommission.be 
/nl/press_room/pers_bericht6.html ; See also M. Justaert, ‘Te veel misbruik van biometrische gegevens. 
Wildgroei gebruik vingerafdrukken en scans in bedrijven’,  De Morgen, 17 april 2008, 1. 
128 Belgian State Gazette, 18 March 1993. 
129 Belgian State Gazette, 3 February 1999. 
130 Belgian State Gazette, 13 March 2001. FIDIS 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D13.4 
 
Final , Version: 1.1 
File: fidis_deliverable13_4_v_1.1.doc 
Page 44 
 
provisions in this general data protection legislation which tackle the issues of the collection 
and use of biometric data.   
Article 22 of the Constitution, introduced in the 1990’s, confers the fundamental right to 
respect for private life.  
 
3.3.2  Legal provisions for government controlled ID biometric 
applications (passports, other civil ID biometric applications and 
law enforcement) 
Passports 
The Belgian Act of 1974 on the issuance of passports states in article 5 that Belgian passports 
shall contain the identity of the holder and shall include a picture and signature. Since 
March/April 2001, passports with machine readable zones were distributed and since 2004, a 
Belgian so-called biometric passport with machine readable zone and with chip could be 
obtained. The chip contained in the first phase identity data, signature and picture, which is 
information that can de visu be read on page two of the passport. Fingerprints were not 
included yet.  
Immigration legislation 
The collection and the use of specific biometric data have been regulated in Belgium in the 
context of immigration legislation.  
In a so-called ‘Program Law’, which is passed by parliament at the end of the year and which 
contains an amalgam of various legal provisions, most often in the context of budget and 
fiscal matters, some provisions about the collection of biometric data from foreigners where 
included in 2004.
131 In the parliamentary discussion, it was critized that such provisions were 
part of this ‘Program Law’ and were not subject of a separate bill which was properly debated 
in parliament.  
It the legislation relating to access, stay, establishment and removal of foreigners
132, it is now 
specified that fingerprints and ‘photographic material’ can be collected from foreigners 
requesting a visum or a stay on the territory by Belgian or who are expulsed (Art. 30bis). The 
data are collected upon the initiative of the diplomatic or consular representatives, the 
minister, an officer of the judicial police or an officer of the administrative police (Art. 30bis 
§3). The biometric data shall only be used for (1) the identification of the foreigners or the 
verification of the identity (stress added), (2) the checking whether the foreigner is a danger 
for the public order or the national security, or (3) the compliance with regulations or 
directives of the Council of Ministers of the EU (Art. 30bis §4). It is further provided that the 
collection and the processing shall be done under the control of the Belgian Privacy 
Commission. It is also stipulated that the same biometric data can be obtained upon request of 
the Minister from the police, the judicial police and the officials and agents of public services 
who would have such biometric data (Art. 30bis §6). A Royal Decree has stipulated that the 
term for keeping the biometric data which are taken from foreigners under this legislation 
                                                 
131 Article 450 of the Program Law of 27 December 2004, Belgian State Gazette, 31 December 2004 (2
nd ed.), 
87097. This Article was inserted in the Act of 15 December 1980.  
132 The Act of 15 December 1980 with regard to the access to the territory, the stay, the establishment and the 
removal of foreigners, as modified.   FIDIS 
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shall be kept for a term of ten years and is subject to further implementation by the competent 
Minister.
133 The legal provisions relating to the collection of biometric data however have no 
effect for the foreigners who were already on Belgian territory when the legislation entered 
into force. The same legislation also already provided for the collection of fingerprints from 
asylum seekers (Art. 51.3). These prints may only be used for establishing the identity of the 
foreigner or for determining the State which is responsible for the asylum request (Art. 51.3 
§2). 
In the parliamentary discussions, reference was made to an already existing system for the 
collection of biometric data of asylum seekers, the so-called ‘Printrak system. Since 1993 
until 2004, 271962 sets of fingerprints were taken and registered in this system. The legal 
provisions described above, however, intend to expand the collection to other categories of 
foreigners and immigrants. The Minister for Internal Affairs clarified that notwithstanding the 
Eurodac system of the European Commission, in which the biometric data are kept for ten 
years, national countries can decide to establish their own national databases, such as Printrak 
of the Service foreigners’ affairs, in which fingerprints are kept, possibly for a longer 
period.
134 
The International Seafarer’s identity document 
A new (biometric) identity card for seafarers has been discussed, developed and agreed in a 
Convention no 185 of 2003 of the International Labour Organization. The treaty entered into 
force on 9 February 2005 after the ratification by France and Nigeria. The treaty provides for 
new biometric identity cards for seafarers. The new identity card which shall include 
biometric information is intended to increase the security of the identity documents while 
improving the facilities and conditions for the seafarers to go on land in a country of which 
they are not a national.
135 As long as a country has not ratified the treaty, seafarers need their 
own national passport and visa if needed, to go on shore.  
Belgium has adopted the Convention, but has not ratified it yet.
136 Various other countries, 
however, such as the Netherlands do not intend to ratify the Convention because of the high 
costs for producing, implementing and securing the Seafarer’s Identity Document (SID) while 
the advantages of ratifying the Convention are in practice not proven.
137  
 
                                                 
133 Article 1 and 2 of the Royal Decree of 21 April 2007, Belgian State Gazette, 31 May 2007 (2
nd ed.), p. 29533. 
134 Parl. Doc, Chamber 2004-05, n° 1437/022, 19-20. 
135 See also the positive opinion n°1.533 of the National Labour Organization  of 9 November 2005, available at 
http://www.cnt-nar.be/ADVIES/advies-1533.pdf  
136 For the list of the ratifications of the Convention no 185, see the ILO site at 
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/index.cfm?lang=EN; See also Parl. Doc, Chamber 
2005-06, n° 2308/01, 22 p., available on http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/pdf/51/2308/51K2308001.pdf;  
137  The Netherlands have stated that they do not intend to ratify the Convention because of the cost and since 
other countries have not yet or are hesitating to ratify. See Second Parliamentary Chamber (‘Tweede Kamer’), 
2007-2008, 29 427, no 48, available at http://ikregeer.nl/document/KST117845 and 
http://static.ikregeer.nl/pdf/KST117845.pdf  FIDIS 
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Law enforcement 
The collection, the storage and the use of DNA data for law enforcement purposes has been 
regulated by law in Belgium in 1999.
138   
The Act of 22 March 1999
139 provides for the setting up of two DNA databases with the 
Belgian National Institute for Criminalistics and Criminology (‘NICC’): a database named 
‘Criminalistics’ and a database ‘Convicted Persons’. In addition, the Act contains two new 
legal provisions to be inserted in the Code of Criminal Proceedings (‘Wetboek van 
strafvordering’/’Code d’instruction criminelle’). A new Article 44ter regulates the collection 
(of traces) of human cell material, DNA profiles and the use and storage thereof in the context 
of a criminal investigation (‘opsporingsonderzoek’). A new Article 90undecies provides for a 
DNA analysis ordered by the investigation judge (‘onderzoeksrechter’/‘juge d’instruction’).  
The DNA database ‘Criminalistics’ contains the DNA profiles and additional data of traces of 
human cell material found. The database also contains results of the comparative DNA 
analysis, i.e. a positive link with other profiles and/or a code given by the magistrate which 
links the profile to a person.
140   
The DNA database ‘Convicted Persons’ which was (formally) established in 1999 with the 
NICC contains the DNA profiles of each person who has been convicted to imprisonment or a 
more severe punishment or who has been locked away for one of the crimes listed. Additional 
data
  is stored as well. 
Since Belgium is a signatory state of the Prüm Treaty
141 of 2005 and various important 
provisions of the Treaty were adopted in EU legislation
142 for Schengen States in June 2007, 
DNA and fingerprint information becomes within the EU internationally available for law 
enforcement authorities.
143  
As of now, fingerprints from suspects are sometimes still taken with ink on a paper
144, where 
after the fingerprint(s) are sent by fax to the national database for comparison. However, the 
use of digitalised fingerprint collections, which can be sent electronically, are more and more 
introduced.    
The collection of fingerprint of asylum seekers is in principle not intended for use for law 
enforcement purposes. However, this does not mean that law enforcements may not request 
fingerprints collected from asylum seekers in order to compare those with prints taken in the 
course of an investigation. This could be asked to establish the identity of a person who is 
under investigation. In that case, an investigation judge could request such comparison.    
                                                 
138 The collection and the use of DNA data, however, were already practiced before, without any legal basis.   
139 Act of 22 March 1999 relating to the identification procedure via DNA-analysis in law enforcement, B.S. 20 
May 1999, err. B.S. 24 June 1999 (‘Act DNA-analysis’).   
140 See Art. 4 §1 Act DNA-analysis. 
141 Other signatory states are Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria. The Prüm 
Treaty is the basis for exchanging DNA and fingerprint, as well as vehicle data, across the EU. The Prüm Treaty 
is therefore sometimes also referred to as Schengen III. 
142 See the Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border co-operation, 
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, O.J. L,  210,  6.08.2008,  pp. 12 – 17,  available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:210:0012:0072:EN:PDF  
143 The NCCI received in 2008 less than 50 requests for the comparison of DNA from countries outside Belgium. 
See Questions & Answers Chamber 
144 See Questions & Answers Chamber 2008-09, 16 February 2009, p. 1129 (Question of 2 February 2009 n° 229 
Van Biesen).  FIDIS 
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3.3.3 Legal provisions relating to other biometric applications (access 
control, public-private, convenience and surveillance applications) 
For biometric applications other than in the passports and the use of biometric information for 
asylum seekers and immigrants, there are presently no specific legal provisions which would 
regulate the collection and use of biometric data for purposes other than the use for law 
enforcement (see above). 
In this context, it is interesting to note that for access control, there is a (rather recent) 
collective labor agreement (‘CAO’)
145 of 30 January 2007 for theft prevention and exit 
control of employees upon leaving the company or the employment place.
146 This CAO no 89 
lays down the principles of the exit control and aims to enhance transparency and to protect 
the privacy of the employees, but does not refer to any biometric measurement for the control 
of the identity of the employees. 
  
3.3.4  Biometric systems and the privacy rights of employees  
The CBPL issued an opinion on the use of badges and on employee tracking by use of GPS 
systems. The CBPL hereby stressed that the continuing surveillance of employees was not in 
proportion with the purposes envisaged by a systems of geographic tracking and not 
necessary. The CBPL considered the use biometric identifiers in the context of badge systems 
used to monitor the hours of an employee’s presence also disproportional, because of the 
intrusive nature of this type of surveillance.
147  
 
3.4  The National Data Protection Authority on biometrics  
Volume of files related to biometrics 
The CBPL stated in its annual report for 2007 that it treated five files related to the use of 
identification technologies, in particular biometrics, in the field of e-government and almost 
an equal number of files (four) related to biometrics/DNA in the sector of police, justice and 
security. Biometrics in general was also subject of one file. These files represent less than 1% 
of the total number of files that the CBPL had to resolve in 2007.
148 
Opinion of April 2008 concerning the processing of biometric data 
As mentioned above, the CBPL has issued at its own initiative an opinion on the use of 
biometric data for the authentication of persons in April 2008. 
The opinion is restricted to the field of the use of biometric data by public and private parties 
for purposes other than police and security purposes (law enforcement) and border control. 
                                                 
145 A collective labour agreement is an agreement which is the result of discussions amongst representative 
organisations of employees  and of employers. They may become generally binding upon confirmation in a  
Royal Decree.    
146 Collective Labour Agreement N° 89 concerning theft prevention and exit control of employees upon leaving 
the company or the employment place. 
147 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Ninth Annual Report,  June 2006, p. 22. 
148 Commission for the Protection of Privacy, Annual report 2007,  p. 54-55. FIDIS 
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The focus of the opinion is the use of biometric data for authentication purposes. The use of 
the term ‘authentication’, however, is confusing, because both the identification functionality 
of a biometric system and the verification functionality can be used to authenticate a person. 
These two functionalities of a biometric system are however completely different and pose 
different risks for the privacy. The Working group 37 of ISO/JTC 1 which spends many 
efforts in the establishment of a harmonized vocabulary, recommended earlier to no longer 
use the term authentication in the context of biometric systems and to refer to either 
identification or verification.
149   
After an introduction in which the CBPL stressed the importance of biometric information as 
a tool to link the identity of a person to a physical person and an explanation of the 
functioning of a biometric system, the CBPL stated clearly that it considers biometric data in 
principle as being personal data. Nevertheless, the CBPL stated in a footnote that in rare 
cases, biometric data may not be personal data because a link with persons can not be 
established with reasonable means. The CBPL hereby stressed that while data may at a given 
point in time may not be personal data, they may become personal data because of new 
circumstances or new technologies which facilitate identification.
150 The CBPL also stated 
that biometric data can give information relating to health or racial origin.
151 However, they 
will only be considered as ‘sensitive’ data by the CBPL if they are used to obtain information 
relation to health or racial origin. The CBPL further commented that the processing of 
templates implies in its opinion that one does not process sensitive data.
152  
The core of the opinion of the CBPL relates to the requirement that the processing shall not 
only be legitimate (‘rechtmatig’ of ‘toelaatbaar’), but also proportional. The CBPL hereby 
explained in about nine pages what it considers to be proportional. This lengthy description of 
the factors which have to be taken into account to judge the proportionality is quite 
interesting.   
The legitimate processing of personal data requires that the processing is based on one of the 
conditions of Article 5 of the Law of 1992 (which implements article 7 of the Directive). One 
of these conditions is that the data subject has consented with the processing. Interesting is 
that the CBPL notes that a ‘free, specific and informed’ consent requires that there is an 
alternative system to be used by the data subject. Furthermore, the CBPL also notes that 
consent will not make an excessive biometric processing, which is a processing that is not 
‘absolutely necessary’, legitimate.
153  
The CBPL explained that for measuring the proportionality, one shall take the interests of the 
controller into account and balance these interests against the right for respect to private life 
of the data subjects. The interests of the controller are according to the CBPL the automation 
of the process, the increased certainty, sometimes the decreased cost and the user friendliness, 
but above all the increased security offered by biometrics as an authentication tool. The right 
and interest of the data subject with regard to respect for private life is explained by the CBPL 
by pointing to (1) the fact that the biometric data are normally unchangeable, hereby 
                                                 
149 E. Kindt, ‘Biometric applications and the data protection legislation’, Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 2007, 
vol. 3, p. 166 et seq. The groups stated that authentication is depreciated and should be replaced by verification.   
150 CBPL Opinion on biometrics , o.c.  at footnote 113, p. 8.   
151 Ibid., p. 9. The CBPL stated that various kind of biometric data could contain information relating to health 
and referred in a footnote to the use of hand geometry.   
152 Ibid., p. 9. The CBPL referred for its position to Council of Europe, Progress report on the application of the 
principles of convention 108 to the collection and processing of biometric data, Strasbourg, February 2005.   
153 Ibid., p. 10.  FIDIS 
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increasing the risk for lifelong profiling, (2) the deployment of biometric data and human 
dignity aspects, (3) the biometric data as an identification tool, (4) the increased risk of 
identity theft in case biometrics are increasingly used as an authentication tool, (5) the fact 
that some biometrics leave traces (such as fingerprint) which increase the risk for re-use of the 
data and (6) the choice of a society by allowing unrestricted use of biometrics, for example in 
school libraries, while biometrics pose risks.
154   
The CBPL recapitulated that the proportionality of the use of biometric systems shall be 
interpreted in a strict way. Proportionality means that only biometric systems shall be used 
which respect the privacy as much as possible, for applications which require special 
measures, further avoiding excessive use of personal data (e.g., consumers shall not be 
identified for purchasing goods) or excessive use of additional identifying data accompanying 
the biometric data.  
Biometric systems which respect the privacy as much as possible are put by the CBPL in two 
categories:  
A. the biometric systems which are by the CBPL considered in se proportional and, if the 
system does not comply herewith,  
B. the biometric systems which have to be first compared with other systems on the market.   
These two categories are hereunder further explained. The biometric systems which are by the 
CBPL considered in se proportional (category A) 
  - only use personal data if necessary or proportional; and  
 -  do  not use biometric characteristics which leave traces, and  
which follow the recommendations of the CBPL to 
a. not store reference data in databases and use the verification functionality,  
b. not store images but templates (because of the risk of cross linking), 
c. not use biometric characteristics which can be collected without the data  
  subjects’s  knowledge, and  
d. which deploy appropriate security measures.
155 
The CBPL interestingly commented that the fact that the central storage may be more user 
friendly (because the data subject does not need to carry a token), does not outweigh the risks 
of central storage.
156 
If a biometric system does not comply with the above mentioned criteria, for example because 
the system uses biometric characteristics which leave traces (category B), the system has to be 
compared with other non-biometric systems which are available on the market and should 
only be used if they are the only way to reach the objective. The CBPL stated that this is for 
example required for systems used by schools. Only if the control at high level is justified by 
a specific circumstance, the use of a biometric system could be considered proportional. The 
same applies according to the CBPL for the use of a biometric system as time and attendance 
control. The controller should first make an evaluation of the type and importance of fraud 
                                                 
154 Ibid., p. 13. The CBPL hereby referred to the Working document on biometrics of 2003 of the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, p. 3.  
155 Ibid., p. 15-17. 
156 Ibid., p. 16. FIDIS 
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and the rights of the data subjects. Furthermore, the CBPL stated that the risk of fraud 
diminishes considerably in case the number of employees is small. A pure economic 
advantage alone is not sufficient for the proportionality. Finally, for these systems of category 
B in so far the conclusion would be that a biometric system is the only way to reach the goal, 
all recommendations of the CBPL which apply for the systems of category A (which are per 
se deemed proportional (see above)), (recommendations such as no central database, no 
samples, etc) apply.
157 
The proportionality further requires according to the CBPL that the use of the system is 
restricted to the areas or services which justify biometric control and that no more personal 
data need to be mentioned with the biometric information than required.
158  
The CBPL further concluded with recommendations with regard to the information to be 
provided to the data subject (such as about the type of system, the possibility of errors and the 
procedure in that case, and about the right to prove the contrary), the term of storage 
(including that storage shall be limited to the time employees have access rights to a specific 
place and that sensors shall not keep the data longer than for the comparison phase) and 
security measures (which shall be very high and designed for each and every step in the 
processing).  
The CBPL stated that the opinion may be reviewed later in function of further developments 
of technology and the experiences of the commission.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
With the Opinion on biometrics of the CBPL in 2008, the proportionality of the deployment 
of biometric systems gained attention in Belgium. While the use of biometric identifiers was 
already briefly reviewed in some opinions of the CBPL in relation with proposed (mainly 
immigration) legislation, the Belgian DPA has now extensively clarified its opinion on the 
proportional use of biometric identifiers.  
There has been no legislation initiatives however in order to regulate the (general) use of 
biometrics in the public or private sector.  
 
                                                 
157 Ibid, p. 18, §74. 
158 Ibid., p. 19. 
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4 France   
4.1 Introduction   
Biometric systems have been introduced in France as well. The use of biometric systems has 
become quite widespread, in particular for Type II access control purposes in companies, 
administrations and schools. Various systems are also used for Type I government controlled 
ID applications, in particular for foreigners (visa) and immigrants, although biometric systems 
are intended to be deployed in Type I government controlled ID applications for the French 
citizens as well (e.g., the INES project and biometric passports). 
In 2004, the French data protection legislation was modified. The French law now requires 
that the automated processing of biometric data for identity control, whether by public or 
private entities, is subject to the prior authorisation of the French Data Protection Authority, 
the  Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (‘CNIL’). In case of such 
biometric processing for the government, such biometric data processing needs to be 
authorised by a decree (‘décret’).  
The CNIL stated in a communication that it reviewed its first biometric application for civil 
purposes in 1997, and that since then, the requests for authorization of biometric systems have 
rapidly grown. In 2005, the CNIL had reviewed and approved 34 biometric systems (while 
five systems were refused). In 2006, this number of reviewed systems has been multiplied 
with ten: the CNIL registered 299 declarations of conformity, approved 52 biometric systems 
and refused nine systems.
159 In 2007, 515 biometric processing applications were submitted 
for review by the DPA (an increase of 43 % as compared with 2006), 449 of which were 
declarations of conformity, and 66 systems which requested prior checking. Of the latter, 21 
systems were refused authorisation, and 45 were authorized. 120 requests for checking were 
still pending.
160  
Because of the ever increasing number of requests, the CNIL has adopted in 2006 three 
simplified procedures for authorization which will be explained below.  
It is further important to note that the CNIL favours the use of biometrics which do not leave 
traces (such as hand geometry) and the storage of biometrics (e.g. fingerprint) on objects 
under the control of the data subject. Finally, importance is also given to the ethical aspects of 
the use of biometrics.   
 
4.2 The  spreading  of  biometric applications  
4.2.1  Fields in which biometric applications are implemented  
As stated above, biometric methods are in France mainly used for access control purposes, in 
particular in the employment context. Such biometric access control systems represented in 
2006 299 out of the 351 systems for which an approval was given.  
                                                 
159 CNIL, 27
e Rapport d’Activité 2006, p. 13, available at http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/La_CNIL/ 
publications/CNIL-27erapport-2006.pdf  
160 CNIL, 28
e Rapport d’Activité 2007, p. 18, available at http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/La_CNIL/ 
publications/CNIL-28erapport-2007.pdf  ; See also CNIL, Biométrie : la CNIL encadre et limite l’usage de 
l’empreinte digitale,  28 December 2007, available at http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=2363&0=  FIDIS 
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However, a new trend is that biometrics are increasingly used by controllers other than 
employers, such as casino’s, who ask approval for the (voluntary) use of membership cards 
with fingerprint of customers for access control (the access control is imposed by law since 1 
November 2006 in France). 
 
4.2.2 National  studies  and debate about biometrics 
Attention by the National Parliament  
The use of biometric methods has received attention from the French parliament. In 2002, the 
‘Assemblée Nationale’ commissioned with the parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of the 
Scientific and Technological Choices a study about the scientific methods of identification of 
persons based on biometric data and related technologies. The Office deposited its study on 
June 16, 2003 (‘Report Cabal’).
161 The Report Cabal consists of three parts, in which the use 
of biometrics is discussed by experts, not only from a technical point of view, but also 
including a discussion of the need to come soon to an adapted legal framework, and with 
recommendations.   
In November 2005, the French Senate and the CNIL also organized a two day conference 
entitled ‘Information technology: slavery or liberty?’, during which identification by 
biometric technologies was discussed as well.
162 
Studies  
In 2008, the DPA commissioned for the first time three studies in the field of biometrics in 
order to evaluate ‘the state of the art’.
163   
Ethical aspects 
The ethical aspects of the use of biometric data were also the topic of study and an opinion of 
the National Advisory Commission for Ethics for Life and Health Sciences.
164  
National Electronic Secured Identity project (‘INES’) 
The Minister of the Interior, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, approved on 11 April 2005 the project 
‘Identité nationale électronique sécurisée (‘INES’) to review the issuance of the national 
identity card in France.
165 A problem is that new non falsified identity cards are increasingly 
issued on the basis of falsified documents establishing identity. The idea was to reinforce the 
reliability of the identity card by establishing a root identity, a so-called ‘titre fondateur’
166 
which consists of a bloc of secured information and which should allow to secure the issuance 
of the identity cards. The data for such root identity would include not only picture and 
                                                 
161   Office for the Evaluation of the Scientific and Technological Choices,  Study about the scientific methods of 
identification of persons based on biometric data and the used technologies, Assemblée National N°  938/Sénat, 
N° 355, (‘Report Cabal’). 
162 ‘ Information technology : slavery or liberty’,  Conference organized by the CNIL and the Univesity 
Panthéon-Assas-Paris II, Senate, available at http://www.senat.fr/colloques/colloque_cnil_ 
senat/colloque_cnil_senat1.html    
163 CNIL, Press conference. Presentation of 28th annual report 2007, p. 15, available at www. cnil.fr. 
164 Comité Consultatif National d’Ethique pour les Sciences de la Vie et de la Santé, Opinion N° 98. Biométrie, 
données identifiantes et droits de l’homme, 31 May 2007.   
165 E. Dumout, ”INES”, nom de baptême de la carte d’identité électronique, 25 August 2001, ZDNet.fr  , 
available at http://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/telecoms/0,39040748,39168171,00.htm#storytalkback   
166 See also references to such ‘titre fondateur’ in the Report Cabal, cited at footnote 161, p. 48. FIDIS 
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signature, but also fingerprint. Two digital fingerprints would be included in the chip on the 
card, and six digital fingerprints would be stored in a data base. INES would foresee in the 
creation of two large central databases, one for the digital images of the French citizens and 
the other one with the fingerprints. In addition to secured identity title deliverance, the 
objective was to simplify the process of issuance by the administration and to establish an 
electronic identity card that could be used for e-government. This plan was also considered in 
line with international developments in the United States and Europe, which require biometric 
passports. One of the other uses of the databases would also be their use by the police for 
comparison of ‘anonymous’ biometric data with those of the INES databases in order to 
identify the owners.  
The first electronic identity cards were scheduled to be issued in 2006. The plan, however, 
caused a lot of debate.
167 The CNIL clarified its position on the proposed biometric eID as 
well.
168 The INES project involves according to opponents major societal issues, such as the 
biometric identification of the French population. Therefore, the INES project is not on 
schedule anymore.   
Schools 
The installation of biometric systems for access control purposes in schools or for access to 
school restaurants has caused tumult as well. In November 2005, two biometric systems in a 
high school of Valleé de Chevreuse were destroyed during a playful action. In June 2006, 
students destroyed two biometric access control systems of a school restaurant in a high 
school of Gif-Sur-Yvette. Various schools that installed a biometric access system are listed 
as nominees for the Big Brother Awards in France. The school Joliot-Curie de Carqueiranne 
that was the first school that attempted (without success) to install a biometric access control 
system and filed a declaration with the CNIL in 2002 obtained for France the ‘Big Brother 
award’ of Privacy International in 2005 because ‘it caused dozens of other schools in 2003, 
2004 and 2005 to follow its example’.
169  
 
4.3 Legislation  regulating biometric applications  
4.3.1 General  and  specific legal privacy framework for biometrics 
General 
The French general data protection law N° 78-17 of 6
th January 1978, as modified, 
(hereinafter the ‘Act N° 78-17’) mentions explicitly biometric data.
170 The Act N° 78-17 
requires since a modification of the Act in 2004 that all the automated processing of biometric 
data for identity control must receive the prior authorisation of the CNIL (Article 25, I, 8°).  
                                                 
167 See e.g., Le Forum des droits sur l’internet, Carte nationale d’identité électronique. Deuxième étape du débat 
public itinérant, 31 March 2005, available at http://www.foruminternet.org/telechargement/forum/cpte-rendu-
lyon-20050331.pdf   
168 See CNIL, Position de la CNIL sur la carte nationale d’identité et la biométrie, 31 May 2005, available at 
http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/approfondir/dossier/CNI-biometrie/Position-cnil-CNI-05-2005.pdf   
169 See “Big Brother Awards France”, available at http://bigbrotherawards.eu.org/spip.php?page=liste-
bba&annee=2005 
170 For the text of the Act N° 78-17’, see the website of the CNIL, at http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=300. FIDIS 
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The processing of biometric data necessary for the ‘authentication or the identity control’ for 
the government needs to be authorised by a decree (‘décret en Conseil d’Etat’) in execution 
of the law after the CNIL has rendered its opinion which shall be public and motivated 
(Article 27, I, 2°). 
The CNIL may also issue an unique authorisation (‘decision unique’) for the data processing 
which include biometric data and which have a same purpose, contain the same categories of 
personal data and have the same (categories of) receivers as set forth in the unique 
authorisation which the CNIL proclaims (Article 25, II). If a controller esteems that the data 
processing of the biometric data meets these criteria, he shall send a ‘letter of conformity’ to 
the CNIL stating that the data processing complies with the description in the unique 
authorisation. 
Since this modification, the CNIL has issued three so-called ‘unique authorisations’ with 
regard to the processing of specific biometric data for specific purposes. Two of the three 
unique authorisations relate to the use of biometrics in the employment context.
 171  They will 
be discussed in section 4.3.4. The other unique authorisation N° 103 relates to the use of hand 
geometry of pupils and personnel for access to a school restaurant and will be discussed in 
section 4.3.3.  
 
The Act, however, does not contain any other references to the processing of biometric data 
than the requirement for prior authorization.  
 
Case law relating to biometric data 
There has been some (limited) case law in France on the use of biometrics in the employment 
context (see below section 4.3.4). In a decision of March 2007 of the highest administrative 
court, the Conseil d’Etat, to whom various claims were brought against the setting up of a 
database of illegal immigrants, named ELOI, for expulsion, stated that since the database 
would include a digitised photograph, the database should have been created by a law (‘loi’) 
or decree (‘décret’) instead of the ministerial order (‘arrêté’) of 30 July 2006.
172 The 
ministerial order was hereby annulled because an incompetent authority enacted the legal 
basis. According to some commentators, the Court hereby indirectly acknowledged that a 
digitised photograph is a biometric identifier, even though in the case at hand the images were 
not processed by face recognition software. 
 
                                                 
171 In one such authorisation, the use of fingerprints for access control is accepted if the biometric is stored on a 
token (smart card or USB token) held under the control of the employee. According to another authorisation, the 
use of hand geometry for access and time and attendance control of employees is possible. See CNIL, 
Délibération n°2006-0102 du 27 avril 2006 portant authorisation unique de mise en oeuvre de dispositifs 
biométriques reposant sur la reconnaissance de l'empreinte digitale exclusivement enregistrée sur un support 
individuel détenu par la personne concernée et ayant pour finalité le contrôle de l'accès aux locaux sur les lieux 
de travail, 27 April 2006 (‘Délibération n°2006-0102’)and CNIL, Délibération n°2006-0101 du 27 avril 2006 
portant authorisation unique de mise en oeuvre de dispositifs biométriques reposant sur la reconnaissance du 
contour de la main et ayant pour finalités le contrôle de l'accès ainsi que la gestion des horaires et de la 
restauration sur les lieux de travail, 27 April 2006 (‘Délibération n°2006-0101’). See also below, section 4.3.4.  
172 See Conseil d’Etat, App. N° 297888, 297896,298085,  13 March 2007, available at http://www.conseil-
etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index_ac_ld0712.shtml  FIDIS 
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Specific regulation on the use of genetic information  
Article 16-10 of the French Civil Code states that genetic characteristics shall not be studied 
except for medical reasons or scientific research. The written consent shall in that case be 
required and can be revoked at any time.  
Moreover, Article 16-11 states that the identification of a person by his genetic data shall not 
be made unless for investigation purposes during a judicial procedure, for medical purposes 
or scientific research. In civil matters, such identification can only be made upon order of a 
judge in matters of kinship or for the obtaining or suppression of subsidies, all provided 
consent was obtained. Unless with consent, no identification can be made after death. Penal 
sanctions are imposed. Moreover, only the persons who are licensed may conduct such 
identification.
 173  
Finally, the French Civil Code states that nobody shall be discriminated based on his or her 
genetic characteristics (Article 16-13).  
Article 25, I, 2° of the Act N° 78-17 further requires the prior authorisation of the CNIL in 
principle for the processing of genetic data (except if necessary for preventive medicine, 
diagnostics or health care administration).   
  
4.3.2  Legal provisions for government controlled ID biometric 
applications (passports, other civil ID biometric applications and 
law enforcement) 
 
Legislation for the biometric passport 
By decree (‘décret’)
174 of 30 April 2008, the new French biometric passport was introduced. 
The passport will contain an electronic chip, which contains not only the picture of the holder, 
like the present passports, but also two fingerprints, in accordance with the Regulation 
2252/2004. The same decree provides for the creation of a central database, containing the 
pictures of the applicants for a passport, and the fingerprint of eight fingers.
175  
 
                                                 
173 See Article 16-11 and 16-12 of the French Civil Code, as modified by Act N°2004-800 of 6 August 2004, 
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721&idArticle 
=LEGIARTI000006419305&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid   
174 A ‘décret’ is an executory act and is not the same as a ‘loi’, which is passed by Parliament. 
175 See Article 6-1 of the decree (‘décret’) N° 2005-1726 of 30 December 2005 relating to passports (as 
modified) providing upon application for a passport for the taking of eight fingerprints, Article 18 allowing an 
automated processing called ‘TES’ for the issuance, renewal and revocation of passports and the prevention and 
detection of false passports and Article 19 which provides for the storage of the digital image of the face and the 
fingerprints. Article 21 provides for access to the information stored on the chip of the passport for identity 
control and control of the authenticity of the passport by the police and Article 21-1 provides for access to the 
central database, excluding the facial images and the fingerprints, for police and intelligence services for specific 
cases in the sphere of the fight against terrorism after due authorisation by the head of the police or the 
intelligence service. Article 23 provides for interconnection with the information systems of Schengen and 
Interpol, but only relating to numbers of stolen or lost passports. See also the opinion of the CNIL  about the 
proposed modifications, Délibération n° 2007-368 du 11 décembre 2007 portant avis sur un projet de décret en 
Conseil d’Etat modifiant le décret n° 2005-1726 du 30 décembre 2005 relatif aux passeports électroniques 
available at http://www.cnil.fr/?id=2427.    FIDIS 
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Modifications to the legislation relating to the French national identity card   
By decree (‘décret’) N° 99-973 of 25 November 1999, some provisions of the decree 
(‘décret’) N° 55-1397 of 22 October 1955 which introduced the French national identity card, 
have been modified. Article 5 of the decree N° 55-1397 now states that when a request is 
made for a national identity card, digital fingerprints of the applicant are taken which are 
‘kept in the file of the service administrator’. The law states that the fingerprints can only be 
used for (1) detection of the attempts to obtain or use an identity card in a fraudulent way; and 
(2) the secure identification of a person in a judicial procedure.
176   
The CNIL issued in 1980 and 1986 advices at the occasion of the modification of the law on 
the national identity card for automated data processing and noted at these occasions that, for 
the request for fingerprint at the time someone applies for an identity card, (i) no manual, 
mechanical or automated central database with fingerprint on the national level would be 
made and that (ii) no digitalised prints would be kept, but on paper support in files kept by the 
department. In its opinion of 1980, it stated that the (digitalised) signature and the digitalised 
pictures and the storage in a national database, shall only be used for the term strictly 
necessary for the manufacturing of the card. Moreover, the CNIL repeated its request to take 
all necessary measures to effectuate the destruction of the files in case of important crisis.   
More recently, the CNIL repeated in 2005 in an opinion on the national identity card and the 
use of biometrics, its position with regard to the use of biometrics, as developed in 2000. In 
particular, the CNIL stressed the risk of function creep, i.e. the use of the biometric data for 
other purposes as initially intended. More precisely, it referred in that annual report of 2000 to 
the fact that fingerprint was not only in the past mainly used by the police, but that a database 
with fingerprints is likely to be used in the future as well by the police and to become ‘a new 
instrument of the police’, notwithstanding the original purposes of the processing. 
In the meantime, the access rights to the national identity card databases have been 
enlarged.
177   
 
4.3.3 Legal provisions relating to other biometric applications (access 
control applications, public-private model, convenience, 
surveillance) 
Unique authorizations for Type II access control applications 
As stated above, the CNIL issued three unique authorizations. Two of the three unique 
authorisations relate to the use of biometrics in the employment context and will be discussed 
in section 4.3.4. 
The unique authorisation N° 103 of the CNIL relates to the use of hand geometry of pupils 
and personnel for access control to a school restaurant.
178 The unique authorization of the 
                                                 
176 Decree (‘décret’) N° 55-1397 of 22 October 1955 introducing the national identity card (as modified), 
available at  at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006060725&date 
Texte=20090508 ; For the text of the Decree N° 99-973, see  http://admi.net/jo/19991130/INTD9900188D.html   
177 See the decree (‘décret en Conseil d'Etat’)  N° 2007-391 of 21 March 2007 (JO of 23/03/2007) modifying the 
decree n° 55-1397 of 22 October 1955.  
178 CNIL, Délibération n°2006-0103 du 27 avril 2006 portant authorisation unique de mise en oeuvre de 
traitements automatisés de données à caractère personnel reposant sur l'utilisation d'un dispositif de 
reconnaissance du contour de la main et ayant pour finalité l'accès au restaurant scolaire, 27 April 2006. FIDIS 
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CNIL requires from the system to be compliant inter alia  that (i) no pictures of the hand are 
kept and that only a template is processed, (ii) only the geometry of the hand is used (and not, 
e.g., lines, or print of fingers,…), (iii) limited and restricted specific information are 
processed, (iv) the data are restricted to specific receivers and that (v) the data subjects (and 
their parents) have the right to object in which case they shall receive another way (alternative 
means) to have access to the school restaurant. 
Before, for example in an opinion of 2000, published in the annual report of that year, the 
CNIL had refused a biometric fingerprint system with central database for facilitating access 
to and the administration of the accounts of a school restaurant. The CNIL hereby referred to 
the facts that (i) fingerprint leave traces and these prints and traces can be used to identify 
persons and that as a result (ii) fingerprint databases can be used for purposes other than those 
initially envisaged. In 2000, the CNIL rendered in fact several opinions with regard to the use 
of fingerprint centrally stored for a variety purposes.
179 At the occasion of these requests for 
opinion, the CNIL did not hesitate to point out in its annual report of 2000 that fingerprint was 
not only in the past mainly used by the police, but that a database with fingerprints is likely to 
be used in the future as well by the police and to become ‘a new instrument of the police’, 
notwithstanding the original purposes of the processing.
180 The CNIL concluded that the use 
of such biometric system in the school was therefore ‘excessive’ in relation to the purposes of 
the processing and rendered a negative advice.
181   
 
4.3.4  Biometric systems and the privacy rights of employees  
 
Biometric technologies deployed at the workplace are mainly used with the purpose of 
controlling physical access and of monitoring the working time of the employees. The use of 
biometric systems is furthermore expected to increase in the following years in this context. It 
is interesting in this context to mention Microsoft’s patent regarding the implementation of a 
biometric device which would monitor employees’ for changes in their heart rate or facial 
expression and report them to their manager.
182 One of the main problems is the impossibility 
to delete the traces left and the biometric characteristics themselves. Whereas a password may 
be changed, a biometric identifier can not. Their use renders the technology highly intrusive 
in terms of privacy and thus calls for stronger safeguards.  
 
                                                 
179 The first opinion of the CNIL with regard to the use of fingerprint for access control, however, dates from 
1997. The CNIL hereby rendered a positive opinion on a fingerprint access control system by the National Bank, 
Banque de France, for access to highly secured zones.  CNIL, Consultation n° 97-044, 10 June 1997, referred to 
in CNIL, 21e rapport d’activité 2000, p.104 (‘CNIL, 21e rapport d’activité 2000’). 
180 Ibid., p.108 :’Quoiqu’il en soit, la connotation policière ne résulte pas uniquement de ce que la prise d’une 
empreinte digitale est, à l’origine, une technique policière. Elle est bien plus généralement liée à ce que dans la 
plupart des cas, si ce n’est tous, la constitution d’un fichier d’empreintes digitales, même à des fins qui ne sont 
pas illégitimes, va devenir un nouvel instrument de police, c’est-à-dire un outil de comparaison qui pourra être 
utilisé à des fins policières, nonobstant sa finalité initiale’. 
181 CNIL, Consultation n°00-015 of 21 March 2000 with opinion on an automated data processing by the school 
Jean Rostand of Nice for access administration to the school restaurant by fingerprint verification, published in 
CNIL, 21e rapport d’activité 2000,  p. 110. 
182 Press release, Microsoft big-brother patent? 18
th January 2008, available online at: http://www.microsoft-
watch.com/content/corporate/microsofts_big_brother_patent.html FIDIS 
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Employees’ privacy vs. employer’s right to control the working activity 
The use of biometrics at the workplace requires the weighting of the right to privacy against 
the right of the employer to control the work activity. In 2001, the French Supreme Court 
acknowledged the protection of the employees’ privacy at the workplace. The Court ruled in 
the so-called “Nikon” judgment that the right of the employer to control the use of the 
company’s personal computers should not put at stake the employee’s right to privacy.
183 
Legal constraints for the use of biometrics will thus arise from both labour and data protection 
law. 
The Labour Code stipulates that the measures with an impact on the personal rights and 
individual and collective freedoms of employees introduced and implemented by the 
employer should be justified by the nature of the task that should be accomplished, and be 
proportionate to the purpose (Art. L.120-2). Control of the measure’s proportionality will be 
dealt with by the Courts. On the basis of this article, the Tribunal of High Instance of Paris 
judged in 2005 that a company should justify the need to use biometric systems for purpose of 
monitoring employees’ working time. If the company fails to do so, the processing is deemed 
to be disproportionate and to violate individual freedoms, more particularly the integrity of 
the body.
184 According to this Tribunal, the integrity of the body does not however justify 
restrictions on the use of biometrics for purposes of security. The Tribunal further followed 
the doctrine elaborated by the CNIL.  
This reasoning has been contested however by some scholars who considered that body 
integrity should be acknowledged as an intangible principle to be placed above any other 
consideration. Whereas derogations to this principle could be justified for purposes of public 
safety and individual security when processed by judicial or administrative authorities, the 
processing of biometrics by private parties should be avoided in any case. Derogations to the 
employees’ dignity could not be based on (legitimate) interests of the employer.
185 
Moreover, a general obligation of transparency is set up by the Labour Code. Prior 
information should be provided to the Work Council
186 and to the workers and candidates 
(articles L432-2 and L121-8).   
 
The protection against privacy-invasive biometrics devices: the doctrine of the CNIL 
Personal data processing at the workplace should also be compliant with data protection 
legislation. In that sense, the Supreme Court judged that the processing relative to the 
monitoring of working hours that have not been declared to the CNIL could not be used by 
the employer to ground a dismissal.
187 
As mentioned above, any processing involving biometrics data should since the last reform of 
the French data protection law in 2004 be authorised by the CNIL. Before the reform, the 
                                                 
183 Cass. Soc., 2 Oct. 2001, n°99-42 942, Nikon c/Frédéric Onof: Juris-data n°2001-011137; Dr. Social 2001, p. 
915, note J.-E.Ray. 
184 TGI Paris, 1
ère ch. Soc., Comité d'entreprise d'Effia Services, Fédération des Syndicats SUD Rail c/ Société 
Effia Services, 19 April 2005, available  at Juriscom.net, <http://www.juriscom.net/jpt/visu.php?ID=700>. 
185 D. Touchent, La mise en oeuvre d’un système de badgeage par empreintes digitales dans l’entreprise, La 
Semaine Juridique Entreprise et Affaire n°37, 15 September 2005, 1337. 
186 The violation of this obligation constitutes a hindrance [délit d’entrave] (Article L438-1 of the Labour Code). 
The texts applying to civil service established a similar obligation of information and consultation. 
187 Cass. Soc. 6 April 2004, n°01-45227, Sté Allied signal industriel Fibers SA c/X. FIDIS 
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CNIL had a mere power of recommendation, which were not always followed in practice. 
Over the last years, the CNIL has been defining the margin of manoeuvre of controllers 
depending on the kind of storage, the type of biometrics identifiers and the purpose of the 
processing. It is thus a multitude of criteria that will be examined by the CNIL to assess the 
proportionality of the processing. Some of these components will be further discussed below. 
It is important to retain, however, that fingerprints are designated as the paradigm of 
biometrics data that leaves traces. Individuals may not be aware that their traces are being 
captured and this thus increases the risks of function creep and more particularly of ID fraud. 
To that effect, the CNIL will be more willing to authorise application base on hand geometry 
or iris scan rather than ones based on fingerprints.
 188  
The “unique authorisations” of 2006 of the CNIL in the context of employment 
On the basis of the criteria developed by the CNIL, the CNIL has issued various ‘unique 
authorisations’
189, i.e. simplification notification procedures, for three different biometric 
processing based on hand geometry and fingerprint, two of them for the use of biometrics in 
the context of employment. These processing are by the CNIL deemed to present lower risks 
for the data subject’s right to privacy and are hereunder briefly discussed. 
 
Biometric applications for access control of employees based on fingerprints stored on 
individual carriers 
First, applications with the purpose of access control based on fingerprints stored on 
individual carriers over which the data subject keeps a complete control are deemed 
compliant with the Data Protection Act.
190 Individual carrier means any carrier under the 
exclusive control of the individual, e.g. a card with a chip or magnetic. The purposes of the 
working time monitoring are expressly excluded from the scope of this authorisation.  
Furthermore, the application should comply with a series of additional technical features such 
as: 
  Only the ‘template‘ of the fingerprint can be stored on the device. Images of the 
fingerprint can not be stored;  
  The information stored can not be read without knowing of the individual; 
  After the enrolment and registration process, the fingerprint data should be erased 
from the computer used to this purpose. This process should not last more than a few 
seconds;  
  The access control should be realised though a comparison between the finger and the 
fingerprint template. No copy of the ‘template’ can be made; 
                                                 
188 CNIL, Press release, La biométrie sur les lieux de travail, 19 July 2006, available online at: 
http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=1555&news[uid]=130&cHash=f74e43e56a 
189 Certain files or processing of sensitive data or data with a high risk of intrusion in privacy right, with a same 
purpose, are authorised by the CNIL through framework decisions called unique authorizations (‘unique 
autorisation’). Controllers are then only required to submit a declaration of conformity. 
190 CNIL, Authorization unique n° AU-008, Délibération n°2006-0102, 27 April 2006, O.J. of 16 June 2006, text 
n° 100. FIDIS 
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  Other non biometrics data necessary to the identification of the individual and the 
verification of the validity of the badge can be recorded on the server dedicated to 
access control.  
There is also a limitation on the personal data that can be processed to: (a) the identification 
data (name, surname, card number and fingerprint template), (b) professional data (internal 
number, department and grade), and (c) movements (used door, areas and time when the 
access is authorized, data and hours of entries and exits). When the application controls the 
access to a parking, it is moreover possible to process (d) the license plate number and the 
number of parking place. When it is necessary to process visitors’ data, in addition, data 
relating to the company and the name of the employee guiding the visitor may be processed.  
The Authorization stipulates that the staff managing human resources and security may access 
the data related to identity, professional life (not for security staff), movements and parking 
for the needs of the accomplishment of their tasks. However, they have in principle no access 
to the fingerprint template unless temporarily and for purposes of registration or deletion from 
the individual carrier. 
Finally, strict delays of storage for various categories of data are established. The biometric 
template can only be processed during the time that the employee is authorized to access the 
restricted area. Data relating to the movement of the employees and the visitor related 
information can not be kept for more than 3 months. The other data can be stored a maximum 
of five years after the employee has left the company. 
In addition, various other obligations, such as relating to security and confidentiality, 
information of the employees and the data subject’s rights to access and correct personal data 
apply. 
In case a biometric data processing complies with all the stipulations of the Authorization, the 
data controller does not have to submit the processing to the prior authorization of the CNIL. 
Biometrics applications based on hand geometry 
Applications for the management of working hours and presence time, and for access control 
of employees to restricted areas and access control of visitors, based on hand geometry, and 
for catering at the workplace (access control, management, payment system) have also 
obtained the benefit from an unique authorisation.
191  
The biometric application should comply with the following technical constraints: 
  No picture of the hand can be stored. Only the template can be stored in a database 
where it can be linked to an identification number; 
  The elements analysed for the identification purpose exclusively rely on the hand 
geometry;  
  When the purpose consists in controlling working hours, the biometric system can be 
linked to an application of time schedule management;  
                                                 
191 CNIL, Authorization unique n° AU-007, Délibération n°2006-0101, 27 April 2006, O.J. n° 138 of 16 June 
2006, text n°99. FIDIS 
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  When the purpose consists in controlling the access to the catering service the 
biometric system can be linked to a catering management software and a payment 
system.  
The unique authorization limits the personal data that can be processed to the data of identity, 
professional life, time of presence, movements and parking. In the case of catering services, 
other data may be processed, but only a general description of the food may be made.  
Biometrics identifiers should be deleted when the employee leaves the company. For the other 
data, other terms apply.  
A strict definition of the authorized use of personal data collected through the use of these 
systems by other staff members of the company shall also be realized depending on their 
tasks.  
In case a biometric data processing complies with all the stipulations of the Authorization, the 
data controller does not have to submit the processing to the prior authorization of the CNIL. 
 
4.4 Legal measures in response to specific threats by biometric 
systems  
 
As described above, France has adapted its data protection legislation by imposing that all 
biometric data processing shall be submitted to the prior authorization by the CNIL. 
Moreover, a decree is required if authentication or identity control is to be done by or for the 
government. These modifications of the law are supposedly taken to handle the specific 
threats posed by biometric systems.   
The same law also provides that the CNIL can issue simplified notification procedures. The 
CNIL has at the same time used this possibility for the notification of biometric applications, 
by issuing various so-called ‘unique authorizations’ as mentioned above. 
 
4.5  The National Data Protection Authority on biometrics  
 
Early involvement of the CNIL and an increasing number of cases  
The French DPA, the CNIL, is one of the first established DPAs in Europe. The CNIL 
celebrated recently its thirtieth anniversary. 
In the last twenty years, the CNIL has reviewed many biometric systems and the use of 
biometric characteristics for various purposes. One of the first occasions at which the CNIL 
expressed its opinion in this matter relates to the National Database of Digital Fingerprints 
(‘Fichier National des Empreintes Digitales’ (‘FNAED’)) of the Ministry of the Interior, 
which was used for law enforcement purposes.   FIDIS 
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Over the years, and as mentioned in the introduction, the CNIL was requested to render its 
opinion in a steep increasing number of cases. The modification of the data protection act in 
2004 does not seem to have solved all outstanding issues. In 2007 only, the DPA received 602 
requests for the review and the authorization of biometric systems (as compared to 186 
requests in 2005 and 2006 all together). 
In its annual report for 2000, the CNIL devoted one full chapter to access control by biometric 
systems.
192 At that time and based upon figures of the industry, the market of biometric 
systems consisted for 30% of systems which used digital fingerprints, shortly followed by 
systems using hand geometry (27%).
193 Because of the predominance of the systems which 
use these two biometric characteristics, the observations of the CNIL focused on these 
systems. In the same year, the CNIL also issued various opinions.  
 
Preference by the CNIL for biometrics which leave no traces 
In its report for 2000, the CNIL expressed its doubts with regard to the use of some specific 
biometric characteristics, in particular digital fingerprints, and qualified some biometric 
characteristics as being more ‘dangerous’ than other biometric characteristics. First, biometric 
characteristics which leave traces in places where individuals go, pose in the view of the 
CNIL more risks. In this regard, fingerprint and DNA (e.g., as contained in hair, skin flakes, 
…), but also face because of the increased use camera surveillance in combination with face 
recognition, are hereby identified by the CNIL as problematic. It is for the CNIL hereby 
essential to know whether these traces left in various places can, after analysis, be compared 
with the biometric reference data kept in the databases by controllers. The storage of 
biometric data in databases is hereby perceived as problematic and the storage on a 
protectable object such as a smart card or PC therefore is preferable.
194 The traces become 
also less reliable, because they can be found by anyone from anyone everywhere.
195 Second, 
fingerprint is comparable with the national registry number, in France called NIR (‘numéro 
d’inscription au répertoire’); both contain a real risk that the purposes and finality of data 
bases become loose. The CNIL hereby referred in particular to the risk that the databases with 
the biometric data become accessible and will be used by police.
196  
For the same reason, the CNIL has in 2007 approved five biometric systems, based on the use 
of veins in fingers, for access control. Because such veins are ‘hidden’, it is according to the 
CNIL not possible to collect such information without the knowledge of the person involved, 
and such biometric information could therefore be stored in a database.  
The CNIL also authorized in 2007 for the first time the use of another at that time rather 
uncommon biometric systems for access control, i.e. the use of a voice recognition system for 
employees of the company Michelin who wanted to renew their password.    
 
                                                 
192 CNIL, 21e rapport d’activité 2000, chapter 4, 101 – 120 (328 p.), available at 
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/014000460/0000.pdf 
193 Ibid., 104. 
194 Ibid., p. 108. 
195 CNIL, 21e rapport d’activité 2000 : ‘Sans doute, l’empreinte digitale présente-t-elle, à la différence d’autres 
caractéristiques, une spécificité : elle est le seul élément biométrique qui soit omniprésent (…) A cet égard, 
l’empreinte digitale est presque aussi redoutable que les traces ADN’, p.102.   
196 Ibid., p. 108. FIDIS 
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The CNIL on the type of storage of the biometrics identifiers 
The CNIL makes a distinction between biometrics applications where the biometric data is 
stored on a device under the control of the data subject or is under the control of a third party. 
In the first case, the individual stays in control of the biometric data. If the device were to be 
stolen or lost, it would not be possible to identify the data subject without his prior 
knowledge. On the contrary, when the data is stored by a third party, unlawful intrusion into 
the system will generally lead to access to biometrics data and to the linked identity. Risks of 
function creep and ID theft are thus higher and security measures should be reinforced.  
 
As a way of example, the CNIL is more willing to authorise devices where the fingerprint is 
exclusively stored on an individual carrier, e.g. a chip card, an USB key, than systems relying 
on a centralised database.
 197   
This interpretation has led the CNIL to prefer biometrics applications based on the storage of 
information on individual carrier. Only a strong need for security may justify the second 
option under very specific conditions (see also below).
198  
 
The CNIL and its position on the purpose of the processing 
The CNIL will check the compliance with the proportionality principle with regard to the 
purpose itself, i.e. weighing the legitimate interests of the employer when using a biometric 
system against the employee’s right to privacy, and with regard to the means used to achieve 
this objective. Solutions will differ depending on the type of system used (if the individual 
remains in control of the biometrics data stored or not) and the type of biometric identifier 
used.  
In that sense, the use of biometrics applications based on fingerprints and which require the 
storage by a third party is in principle banned in this context, except when an important 
significant security interest is at stake. As a way of example, the CNIL authorised in 1997 the 
French national Bank to implement a control access system based on fingerprint for the access 
to highly secured areas.
199 By the same token, Roissy Airport has been authorised to use such 
system to access restricted safety areas of the airport.
200 On the contrary, authorisations have 
been denied to systems of this kind for purposes access control and working hours monitoring 
due to the fact they were not based on any significant security motive.
201  
 
 
                                                 
197 CNIL, Biométrie : l’autorisation de la CNIL est obligatoire! Press release, 5 January 2007, 
http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=2166&news[uid]=421&cHash=2bd711454d. 
198 CNIL, Communication relative à la mise en œuvre de dispositifs de reconnaissance par empreinte digitale 
avec stockage dans une base de données, 28 December 2007. 
199 See above at footnote 179. 
200 CNIL, Decision n°04-017 of 8 April 2004. 
201 CNIL, Press release, Biométrie : quatre refus d’autorisation d’utilisation des empreintes digitales, 30 January 
2006, available online at  http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=1938&news[uid]=304&cHash=4fe9a32a5e FIDIS 
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Negative opinion on a central database for biometric passport 
On 11 December 2007, the CNIL issued a negative advice on the proposed legislation for 
biometric passports.
202 The CNIL stated that such central biometric database for French 
citizens can only be justified for a strong requirement of security or public order. The CNIL 
deems the purpose of the delivery or renewal of passports not a sufficient reason to keep the 
biometric data stored in a central database.
203 The advice of the CNIL however is not binding 
and was not followed.   
 
Criteria for the use of fingerprint stored in a database 
On the 28
th of December 2007, the CNIL has clarified in a communication the criteria that it 
applies for an authorization for biometric systems using fingerprint with storage other than on 
card, i.e. in the reader-comparator or on a central server. In 2007, the CNIL received 53 of 
such requests for authorization involving fingerprint, and rejected 21 of such requests.  
The CNIL stated in its communication that the published criteria should help the companies 
and the administrations to ask the ‘right questions with regard to technology and human 
rights’ before deciding to install biometric fingerprint systems and before filing a request for 
authorization with the CNIL.
204 In the document, the CNIL reminds the readers about the 
risks of fingerprint data. The CNIL reiterates that fingerprints easily leave traces, such as on 
glasses or on a door knob. These traces can be used by third parties without the knowledge of 
the individual to identify that person or to commit fraud with biometric systems.
205 The CNIL 
states that, in addition, if fingerprints are stored in a central place, such as in the fingerprint 
terminal of a biometric system for the reading and comparison of the data or in a central 
database, the individual loses control over his biometric data and the risks of abuse of the 
fingerprint data are increasing considerably. Further, the identification functionality capability 
of the biometric data
206 implies that the privacy rights of an individual are more intruded. 
Therefore, the CNIL is of the opinion that ‘only an important necessity for security reasons’ 
may justify the storage of fingerprint data in a fingerprint terminal or central data base
207 and 
that this technology shall only be used as a matter of ‘exception’. 
The four criteria are for the CNIL the following: 
  1) Finality criterion: The use of digital fingerprint systems with storage in a database 
shall ‘be limited to the access control of a limited number of persons to a well defined area 
                                                 
202 See above at footnote 175 ; See also CNIL, Passport biométriques : la CNIL reservé sur la création de la 
première base de données biométriques relatives aux citoyens français’, 5 June 2008, available at  
http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=2428  ;the French DPA issued in 2005 also an opinion on the electronic 
passport, which included at that time only the digitalised picture but no fingerprint (see CNIL, Opinion N° 2005-
279 of 22 November 2005 available at http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=1916&news[uid]= 
300&cHash=3e013e7d09 ) 
203 CNIL, Opinion N° 2007-368 of 11 December 2007, p. 3. 
204 CNIL, Communication de la CNIL relative à la mise en œuvre de dispositifs de reconnaissance par empreinte 
digitale avec stockage dans une base de données, 28 December 2007, 12 p., available at http://www.cnil.fr/ 
fileadmin/documents/approfondir/dossier/CNI-biometrie/Communication-biometrie.pdf (‘Communication 
central storage fingerprint’). 
205 Ibid., 4; see also  D.6.1. Forensic Implications of Identity Management Systems, M. Meints and M. Gasson 
(eds.), Fidis 9 January 2006, p. 28 et seq., available  at www.fidis.net. 
206 See also E. Kindt and L. Müller, o.c.,  p. 13.   
207 Communication central storage fingerprint, p. 5. FIDIS 
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representing or containing a major stake which surpasses the strict interest of the 
organisation and which relates to the protection of the (1) physical integrity of persons, (2) 
the protection of goods and installations or of (3) information’
208 (underlining added). 
The CNIL gives some examples for each of the categories defined above: (1) physical 
integrity of persons: the use as access control to places with risks of explosion or with 
dangerous goods, or with risks of theft of such goods (e.g., access to specific zones of nuclear 
installations or cultivation of vaccines, but also access to use of elevating vehicles); (2) 
protection of goods and installations: The use as access control to specific area’s which could 
incur irreversible and important damages going beyond the strict interest of the organisation 
(e.g., a company engaged in national defence), and (3) information. The use of access control 
to information which need to be protected in particular because of the risks of divulgation, 
other use or destruction (e.g., to rooms of a company classified and producing goods 
restricted for exportation, but also to the rooms of an intellectual property advisor).    
  2) Proportionality criterion: The use of digital fingerprint systems with storage in a 
database shall ‘be well suited or the best suited for the finality that has been determined 
before’.  
This criterion requires that one shall check (a) whether non-biometric access control systems 
could provide a sufficient or equivalent level of security and (b) the reasons for use in a 
database (instead of storage on card). Whether access has to be secured at all times and 
without delay could play a role, as well as to whether the number of persons in the database is 
limited.  
  3) Reliability and the security of the biometric system; and   
  4) Information and transparency for the data subject: The use of digital fingerprint 
systems with storage in a database shall be made transparent for the individuals concerned. 
The CNIL hereby refers to the general information obligation as set forth in the data 
protection legislation.  
The CNIL hereby also states that if these individuals are employees, the representative 
organisations of these employees need to be consulted in accordance with the requirements of 
labour law. 
None of the criteria above will solely determine the legality of the system. The CNIL will 
finally always take the state of the art of the technology into consideration. 
 
VIS and SIS II 
The CNIL is also concerned about the establishment of VIS, the information system about 
visas. In a communication in August 2006, the CNIL shares various points made by the 
Article 29 working party, such as the fact that data collected for public administration 
purposes (so-called ‘first pillar’ data collection) is used for the prevention and the combat 
against crime (so-called ‘third pillar’).
209  
Other  
                                                 
208 Ibid., 7. 
209 See CNIL, Système d’information sur les visas VIS : dernières négociations avant la mise en oeuvre de la 
plus grosse base d’empreintes digitales au monde, available at http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=1773 FIDIS 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D13.4 
 
Final , Version: 1.1 
File: fidis_deliverable13_4_v_1.1.doc 
Page 66 
 
The CNIL will also shortly issue guidelines on the use of facial recognition and video 
surveillance (to be further checked). 
Finally, The CNIL started awareness campaigns in order to inform people, inter alia pupils in 
schools, about the importance of data protection.   
4.6 Conclusion 
France is one of the first countries to adapt its data protection legislation to the risks of 
biometric systems. The law expressly states since 2004 that biometric systems employed in 
the private sector need to be prior checked and authorized by the CNIL, unless the controller 
files a declaration under a simplified procedure that the system conforms to one of the ‘unique 
authorizations’ issued by the CNIL. Such ‘unique authorizations’, of which three were issued 
for biometric applications 2006 were deemed useful, also in the interest of the CNIL, because 
of the high demand for review of biometric systems.  
The French CNIL has furthermore developed since quite some time its views and position on 
the use of biometric systems in France. Long before 2004, the CNIL clearly indicated its 
preference for biometric systems which deploy characteristics which do not leave traces (such 
as hand geometry, and more recently vein analysis of fingers). In case fingerprint is used, 
such should according to the CNIL only be stored on a card under control of the data subject. 
The central storage of biometric data is only proportional in case the criteria forwarded by the 
CNIL in its communication of December 2007 are met. 
The opinions and the unique authorizations of the French CNIL provide many elements for 
the review of the proportionality of biometric systems, including the central storage of 
biometric characteristics which do leave traces, such as fingerprint. These criteria certainly 
provide guidance in determining the proportionality of a system, while other criteria remain 
more disputable. The finality criterion for central storage of fingerprint, for example, does not 
clarify much as to whether the verification or identification function is permitted or about the 
error rates of the system. Another criterion on the same subject matter is whether there is a 
need for access in urgent cases without delay, which seems to contradict the need for a 
biometric (restricted) access control. The unique authorizations, for example, also do not 
impose alternative means for the data subjects in case they would not consent or if the system 
fails. In any case, a request for authorization is subject to a factual analysis of each case, 
where an outcome is sometimes hardly predictable.
210 Further clarifications and 
harmonization with the guidelines of other CNIL would therefore be welcomed. The unique 
authorizations give more certainty, but in that case, strict observance of all criteria are 
necessary, but may not always be fit in a particular case.    
 
                                                 
210 For example, the use of fingerprint in a centralized system for access control to and for the use of lifting 
devices was accepted by the CNIL while access to rooms where uniforms are manufactured was not deemed 
proportional by the CNIL.  FIDIS 
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5  Germany   
5.1 Introduction   
One of the first steps towards the use of biometrics by public authorities in Germany goes 
back to January 2002 when the German government adopted an act against terrorism (‘Gesetz 
zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus’) (‘TBG’).
211 The TBG was passed to enable 
the use of biometric characteristics in passports and identity cards for German citizens as well 
as in identity cards for foreign citizens.
212  
When the European Union agreed on the inclusion of biometrics in the electronic passport by 
Council Regulation No 2252/2004, Germany was among the first countries in Europe to issue 
a travel document containing a digital facial image as a biometric characteristic of its holder 
(Elektronische Reisepass, ePass) in November 2005. In June 2007, the German government 
decided on the inclusion of finger scans. As a result, the second generation electronic 
passports, including the fingerprint identifiers as well, have been issued since November 
2007.
213 Even though the above Council Regulation does not apply to identity cards, Germany 
will include biometric data on its yet to be introduced electronic Identity Card (Elektronischer 
Personalausweis) as well.  
The use of biometrics in the German private sector, however, has gone more undocumented. 
At the same time, compared to other countries, there have been some stakeholder efforts to 
make reliable information accessible. Producers have worked together to make information 
about biometric products available to the public. One of the results is a geographical map that 
is available on line and that allows consumers to access information and to find expert 
advice.
214 It is obvious that there are a large number of German firms selling biometric 
applications successfully.
215 Germany is the largest market for biometric products, according 
to BITKOM (the German Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications and 
New Media).
216 The German market showed sales of 100 million Euros (US$126 million) in 
                                                 
211 Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz [Act against terrorism] of 9 January 2002 (BGBl. I S. 361, 3142), modified 
by Article 2 of the Act of 5 January 2007 (BGBl. I S. 2), available at http://www.buzer.de/gesetz/4197/ 
212 T. Petermann, S., Scherz, and A. Sauter, ‘Biometrie und Ausweisdokumente’ [Biometrics and Identification 
Documents], TAB Arbeitsbericht, issue 93, 2003, p. 11. See for example article 7 (1) (b) and article 8 (1) in the 
aforementioned act, available at <http://217.160.60.235/BGBL/bgbl1f/bgbl102003s0361.pdf>, last consulted 18 
March 2009. See also TAB working report 76, Biometric Identification Systems, available at 
http://www.tab.fzk.de/en/projekt/zusammenfassung/ab76.htm  
213 There is an abundance of literature on the introduction of biometrics into the German passport. For some 
authoritative sources see: A. Albrecht, Biometrische Verfahren im Spannungsfeld von Authentizitat im 
elektronische Rechtsverkehr und Personlichkeitsschutz, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003; G. Hornung, ‘Biometric 
Passports and Identity Cards: Technical, Legal, and Policy Issues’, European Public Law, vol. 11, issue 4, 2005; 
H. Biermann, M. Bromba, C. Busch, G. Hornung, M. Meints, G. Quiring-Kock, White Paper zum Datenschutz in 
der Biometrie, 2008, available at  http://teletrust.de/fileadmin/files/ag6/Datenschutz-in-der-Biometrie-
080521.pdf. See also the implementation by the German home office, available at http://www.interoptest-
berlin.de/pdf/Elbel_-_Experiences_in_introducing_the_new_German_ePassport.pdf  
214See http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/studies/GermanLandscape_of_Stakeholders.pdf and www.bit 
kom.org/files/documents/Flyer_Landkarte_Biometrie_-_V6.0_de.pdf;  Compare with P. De Hert and A. 
Sprokkereef, The Use of Privacy Enhancing Aspects of Biometrics: Biometrics as a PET (privacy enhancing 
technology) in the Dutch Private and Semi-public Domain, 2009, University of Tilburg (‘TILT’), pp 1-50 and 
the efforts of their project team to gather information in the Dutch situation. 
215 There are more than eighty large biometrics companies in Germany.  
216 http://www.bitkom.org/en/about_bitkom/42611.aspx FIDIS 
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2005, expected to grow 25 percent annually through 2010.
217 According to market analysts at 
Frost & Sullivan ‘the market for biometrics products is going to almost triple by 2012 from its 
2008 value’
218, despite the economic situation. As can also be deducted from the information 
provided by the German Commissioner for Federal Data Protection and Freedom of 
Information
219 on notifications of handling of biometric data, a considerable number of 
German citizens have agreed to the use of their biometrics to obtain services. 
Some examples of applications involving a large number of people include paying with your 
finger for example, which is used by customers at the 120 stores of a German supermarket 
chain.
220 At Hannover Zoo, a face recognition system is installed that allows a “smile and go” 
for the over 70.000 regular visitors with a season pass.
221 Smaller applications can be found in 
a range of settings, such as, for example, for access control purposes in nursery schools.
222 
In what follows, an attempt will be made to provide an overview of relevant legal aspects and 
issues relating to the use of biometrics in Germany.  
 
5.2 The  spreading  of  biometric applications  
5.2.1  Fields in which biometric applications are implemented  
 
The ePass 
As in the rest of the European Union, the traditional passports
223 in Germany are gradually 
being exchanged for the new digital passport, also called the ePass, in accordance with 
Council Regulation No 2252/2004. The Federal Parliament approved the introduction of 
electronic passports on 8 July 2005. Four months later the first ePass was issued with the 
RFID chip containing only the facial image of the holder as the biometric feature. In June 
2007, the Passport Act, which will be dealt with in more detail below, was again revised and 
approved by the parliament in order to lay down the legal foundation for the second 
generation electronic passports including additional finger scans (usually two index fingers) 
as biometric identifiers. These second generation electronic passports were issued in Germany 
from 1 November 2007 on.
224 Holders of these new passports thus carry a document with a 
chip containing their biometric data. These finger scans are not stored centrally but only 
                                                 
217 http://www.cio.com/article/26000/German_Railway_Tests_Biometric_Technology 
218http://news.prnewswire.com/ViewContent.aspx?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/03-19-
2009/0004991263&EDATE=  
219 http://www.bfd.bund.de/EN/Home/homepage__node.html  
220 http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/12/12/digitalbiz.biometrics/index.html  
221 The Zoo first introduced a finger scan system but this proved too time consuming because the most frequent 
groups of visitors to a zoo (children and older people) had practical difficulties having their fingers scanned. See 
http://www.zoo-hannover.de/zoo-hannover/en/zoo_v3/unternehmen_zoo/presse/pressedetails/ 
presseDetails_1791.html 
222 See http://www.net-tribune.de/article/r071207-01.php Even the traditional passport could be read 
electronically with scanning and optical character recognition (OCR)! 
223 With traditional passports we refer to passports that in principle would not be read electronically (although 
such passport could be read electronically with scanning and optical character recognition (OCR)) and the 
passports that included already the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ). 
224 See also J-H. Hoepman et al.. ‘Crossing borders: security and privacy issues of the European E passport’, 
Advances in Information and Computer Security. LNCS 4266, 2006, Berlin, Springer, pp. 152–167. FIDIS 
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stored on the RFID chip. This means that in case there is a suspicion that biometrics on RFID 
chips have been tampered with, the data cannot be compared to the originals as submitted at 
the moment of enrolment. The relevance of this will be discussed below. Another interesting 
observation is that according to German officials, the data are hardly ever read out by German 
authorities, as the equipment to do so is currently not present or not used.
225 
 
The eID Card (Electronic Identity Card -Elektronischer Personalausweis) 
The German government has considered the advantages and disadvantages of the introduction 
of an electronic identity card for some time, launching a first feasibility study in 2003.
226 A 
second study was carried out by the Office of Technology Assessment (‘Büro für 
Technikfolgenabschätzung’), which had already submitted a first general report on biometric 
systems.
227 The Federal government adopted an electronic card strategy in a cabinet decision 
of 9 March 2005 aiming at the coordination of various projects (mainly ePass, electronic 
health card and the eID Card) carried out by different federal ministries.
228 As it stands, the 
electronic health card is not yet set to include biometric data. 
The legal basis for the current paper-based identity cards (‘Personalausweis’) can be found in 
the Identity Card Act (‘Personalausweis Gesetz’, ‘PAuswG’). This act is in the process of 
being revised, in order to provide for the introduction of the proposed eID Card. On 23 July 
2008, the German cabinet decided on the wording of the law proposal for the new eID Card. 
It was agreed that, in addition to the traditional functions (photo ID, identification document, 
travel document), the new card would offer the possibility to store biometric data (facial 
image/ finger scans) on the microchip. By including biometrics, the use of the new eID Card 
as a travel document/passport replacement could be guaranteed whilst the new features would 
also improve the card’s resistance against fraud. 
A draft law was presented by the federal government to the Parliament (‘Bundestag’) on 7 
October 2008.
229 The inclusion of the facial image will be mandatory while the inclusion of 
the finger scans will be at the discretion of the card holder.
230 The card can store two finger 
scans, but only when the holder specifically agrees. The inclusion of finger biometrics is 
therefore optional.
231 The proposed law also contains a provision that biometric data will not 
be stored centrally.
232 When the index fingers are lacking or because of physical problems the 
quality of the scans is not sufficient, then a thumb, middle finger or ring finger is scanned. 
When as a result of a permanent medical condition no good quality scan can be obtained, the 
scan will not be stored on the chip.
 Further details on the proposed eID Card can be consulted 
                                                 
225 Bundes Kriminal Amt Interview in November 2008. This statement has not been checked statistically as no 
such data are available. 
226 G. Hornung, l.c., p. 503. 
227 Büro für Technikfolgenabschätzung, ‘Biometrische Identifikationssysteme’ [Biometic Identification 
Systems],  Sachstandsbericht Bundestags.  
228 IDABC, eID Interoperability for PEGS: National Profile Germany, available at  http://ec.europa.eu/ 
idabc/servlets/Doc?id=31524>,  p. 17.  
229 http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/104/1610489.pdf 
230 IDABC, eGoverment Factsheet Germany, available at < http://www.epractice.eu/factsheets>, last consulted 
11 December 2008, p. 23 (‘IDABC, eGoverment Factsheet Germany’). 
231 See the proposed addition to the Personalausweis Gesetz: § 1 Abs. 4 bis 5 PAuswG. 
232 § 1 Abs. 5 second sentence PAuswG. Section 1, para 5 (9) reads that the left and right index finger will be 
scanned and that the scans will be stored on the chip. FIDIS 
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in the draft law as presented by the federal government to the national parliament (Bundestag) 
on 7 October 2008.
233 The revision will come before Parliament in 2009,
234 while the first eID 
Card is expected to be issued on 1st November 2010.
235 
 
eGovernment services 
The eID Card will be the universal token for authentication and identification on the Internet 
for eGovernment and eBusiness services. The introduction of the eID Card can be considered 
as an important prerequisite for the eGovernment 2.0 programme, Germany’s eGovernment 
strategy.  
For the purposes above, features for electronic authentication and for digital signatures will be 
implemented. The chip of the eID Card will also contain certificates to prove these data. Data 
from the chip can only be read if the holder agrees by entering a PIN beforehand (multi factor 
authentication). As the card shall be used for authentication in the private sector as well, and 
because in different contexts different parts of the total data are necessary, there will be a 
function to allow the holder to control which data can be read in a specific situation. For 
example, when an age check is required, only the data from the age field can be read. The new 
identity card thus offers possibilities of an electronic identity proof for eGovernment and 
eBusiness applications. The new eID Card will also contain a pseudonym function. The 
central idea is that the individual card number is used to generate a pseudonym that cannot be 
reconverted mathematically into the original card number. This pseudonym could then be 
used to register at, for example, eBay, or any other web service that requires personal 
identification. Section 4 of the proposed modifications is devoted to the use of the eID Card 
as an electronic signature. The use is limited by the following conditions: (1) the objective for 
using the electronic signature is not illegal, (2) the data transmitted are not used for 
commercial gain, (3) the service provider has justified the necessity of using the data for the 
goal of the transaction, (4) data protection law is adhered to, (5) and there are no indications 
that data abuse might take place. (par.2 (1) – (5)).  
On 29 January 2009, the German government approved its eGovernment implementation 
plan.
236 It presents the government’s view of an innovative and modern public administration 
with eGovernment. It provides a detailed overview of the progress achieved in 2008. For 
public authorities to provide on-line services to citizens based on biometric technologies, 
administrative law (‘Verwaltungsgesetzgebung’) such as the social codes 
(‘Sozialgesetzbücher’) which regulate the processing of social and medical data has to be 
applied. Of the thirty-two eGovernment projects, some are concerned with the identification 
with the Electronic Office ID Card. In section 3.3.2. the plan is detailed on how to test the ID 
card and how to attract a maximum of interested parties to make the use of the ID card for 
                                                 
233 See Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Personalausweise und den elektronischen Identitätsnachweis sowie zur 
Änderung weiterer Vorschriften, Bundestagsdrucksache 16/10489, available at 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/104/1610489.pdf  
234http://www.typotype.de/news-und-faqs/news/latest/bundesrat-gibt-gr-nes-licht-f-r-den-elektronischen-
personal ausweis.html  
235 IDABC, eGoverment Factsheet Germany, p. 23. 
236 Bundesministerium des Inneren, Umsetzungsplan 2009, E-government 2.0. Das Program des Bundes, Berlin, 
2009 (‚Umsetzungsplan’), available at http://www.cio.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/325318/publication 
File/16655/egov2_umsetzungsplan_2009_download.pdf  (‘Umsetzungsplan’) FIDIS 
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electronic services as attractive as possible. The implementation plan confirms that the date 
for introducing the new card is 1
st November 2010.
237   
Other domains 
Apart from the large scale public authorities initiatives mentioned above, various private 
initiatives use biometrics such as casinos and most notably many companies use biometric 
access control and time registration.
238 The latter will be touched upon in more detail below.  
In the semi-public domain, biometric applications are used in various places. For example, 
Deutsche Bahn has tested a facial recognition system at Mainz train station. Special cameras 
scanned the train station in search of 200 people who have volunteered to have their pictures 
stored in a database whose features can be detected by special biometric facial recognition 
software.
239 All these initiatives have been reported to the German data protection authority, 
but very little is known about the extent to which they comply with the Directive 95/46/EC 
and German legislation in practice. There is some case law regarding the use of biometrics at 
work (see below), but we have not come across other case law specifically dealing with the 
use of biometrics.  
 
5.2.2 National  studies  and debate about biometrics 
We have already mentioned that a national report on biometric identification systems was 
commissioned in 2003.
240 This was followed by a clear guide on how to use biometrics in 
private organizations and companies issued by the Teletrust organization in 2005.
241 In 2008, 
the Teletrust organization also published a white paper on data protection and the use of 
biometrics.
242 The recommendations of the report concentrate on the use of privacy enhancing 
features of biometrics: 
 
‘A solution that does justice to data protection should contain the following characteristics: 
 
The complete biometric part of the application, containing a sensor, characteristic extraction (template), 
and data reference storage, is under the direct control of the user.   
                                                 
237 Umsetzungsplan, p. 61.  
238 See also Unisys, Biometrics in Europe: trend report, available at http://www.europeanbiometrics.info/images/ 
resources/121_975_file.pdf , last consulted 11 December 2008, p. 32.  
239 See also the reference to the research project at footnote 66 and http://www.cio.com/article/26000/German_ 
Railway_ Tests_Biometric_Technology    
240 Büro für Technikfolgenabschätzung, ‘Biometrische Identifikationssysteme’, Sachstandsbericht Bundestags, 
2003. 
241 Teletrust, Orientierungshilfe für eine Betriebsvereinbarung beim Einsatz biometrischer Systeme [Guideline 
for the employment of a biometric system], 21 September 2005, available at < 
http://www.teletrust.org/uploads/media/ag6_ak-recht_orientg-betriebsvbg-biometrie_1.2.pdf>, last consulted 25 
March 2005. TeleTrusT is a non-profit organization dedicated to the promotion of trustworthiness of Information 
and Communication Technology. It was founded in 1989 and comprises members from industry, science and 
politics. 
242 H. Biermann, M. Bromba, C. Busch, G. Hornung, M. Meints, G. Quiring-Kock (eds.) White Paper zum 
Datenschutz in der Biometrie, 2008 (‚White Paper zum Datenschutz in der Biometrie’), available at 
http://teletrust.de/fileadmin/files/ag6/Datenschutz-in-der-Biometrie-080521.pdf  . Both the guide and the white 
paper were edited by a working group with support from the German Data Protection Authorities from the 
Federal and the State level. FIDIS 
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To realise this goal, the biometric part of the system is stored on a token which does not leave the 
control of the user. The biometric section of this card is completely separate from the data handling 
activity of the system. The latter has been protected with strong encryption and will produce no, or only 
the minimum of data, as necessary in the particular situation. The validity of the certification used will 
be confirmed by a third trusted party (for example a Trust Centre) for every transaction. This way, 
illegally obtained tokens can be ”de-activated”. With the use of a token will the advantage of being able 
to authenticate without having to carry or remember things. On top of these requirements it can be noted 
here that there are several other privacy enhancing application that work in individual situations and 
provide possibilities for secure data handling.’ (stress added) 
243 
 
In 2005, BITKOM
244 conducted a study to develop a strategy for the German biometrics 
industry, and set up a national working group concerned with biometric issues, called German 
Biometric Strategy Platform. The study included the assessment of requirements, objectives, 
tasks and member structure of the German Biometric Strategy Platform.
245 The report states 
that the two most important international factors influencing the German biometric industry 
are international standardization and security policy efforts.
246 According to the report, the 
German federal government is the most important driver for biometric technologies in 
Germany. It takes a position as promoter and customer – on the one hand it seeks to support 
the industry with a national, seller-independent economic policy, and on the other hand it is 
expected to be the first major German customer for biometric applications. Moreover, federal 
and Länder authorities are involved in the biometric standardization process.
247 The six most 
important federal institutions involved in biometrics identified in the report are: 
-  the Federal Ministry of the Interior (‘Bundesministerium des Innern’, ‘BMI’) mainly 
concerned with ID document safety and smart cards,  
-  the Federal Border Police (‘Bundesgrenzschutz’, ‚BGS’) the Automated Biometric 
Border Control (‘Automatisierte und biometriegestützten Grenzkontrolle’) at Frankfurt 
airport, 
-  the Federal Office for Information Security (‘Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik’, ‘BSI’). The BSI is involved in testing biometric applications, 
standardization and representative work in international bodies,  
-  the Federal Criminal Police Office (‘Bundeskriminalamt’, ‘BKA’) coordinating the 
AFI-systems (Automated Fingerprint Recognition System) for criminal prosecution 
purposes,  
-  the Federal Ministry for Economics and Labour (‘Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
und Arbeit’, ‘BMWA’) involved in stimulating the economical development of the 
biometrics industry, and  
                                                 
243 White Paper zum Datenschutz in der Biometrie, p. 25 (free translation by the authors).  
244 BITKOM represents more than 1,300 companies with combined sales of more than 120 billion Euro, with 
900 direct members and around 700.000 employees, including practically all German global players as well as 
600 key midsize companies in the information technology, telecommunications, and new media industry. The 
association’s services comprise political consulting, public relations, knowledge management and other 
customized services. 
245 BITKOM, The German Biometric Strategy Platform: Biometric State of the Art, Industry Strategy 
Development and Platform Conception, Berlin, 2005, available at http://www.europeanbiometrics.info 
/images/resources/95_363_file.pdf (‘BITKOM, The German Biometric Strategy Platform’)  
246 BITKOM, The German Biometric Strategy Platform, p. 24. 
247 Ibid., p. 35. FIDIS 
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-  the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (‘Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung’, ‘BMBF’) which provides research support.
248  
 
The report was very ambitious, and many of the facts and figures it brought together very 
useful, but it seems that the strategy has not worked. The German Biometric  Strategy 
Platform has not become a major player in the field.  
Many studies on the introduction of biometrics in Europe lament the lack of debate.
249 In 
Germany, Hornung also observes an absence of a widespread public debate before the 
European Regulation 2252/2004 was adopted. Deliberations have occurred in several 
hearings
250, but this has not resulted in a decision from the Bundestag on the issue. The 
Bundestag had nevertheless in an earlier act reserved itself the right to decide on the issue.
251 
At the same time, there has been some organized assessment and there have been public 
discussions. So on a scale indicating level of public discourse or debate in Europe, Germany 
would do relatively well.  
Compared to other countries, the public perception of biometrics in Germany is also strongly 
influenced by ethical questions.
252 This translates itself also into a more principled stance on 
the use of biometrics. The clearest example of this is a general agreement on the fact that a 
central database containing biometric data would be unconstitutional and be a violation of 
basic rights.
253 The possibility of a nationwide database has already been ruled out by the 
German legislation relating to the ID card.
254 The compatibility of the idea of a central data 
base with the German Constitution will be discussed further below. 
 
5.3 Legislation  regulating the use of biometric data  
5.3.1  General and specific privacy legal framework for biometrics 
Three so-called ‘first pillar’ instruments govern the EU data protection framework: the 
general Directive 95/46/EC which has been implemented in Germany through the Federal 
Data Protection Law (‘Bundesdatenschutzgesetz’, ‘BDSG’)
 255,  the  specific Directive 
97/66/EC
256 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
telecommunications sector (replaced by the privacy and electronic communications Directive 
                                                 
248 Ibid., p 35. 
249 See J. Ashbourn, The Social Implications of the Wide Scale Implementation of Biometric and Related 
Technologies, European Commission, DG JRC, Sevilla, 2005. 
250 See the Bundestagsdrucksache No. 15/3145, 9; 15/3642, 12 ff.; 15/3663, 3; 15/3765, 4 f.; 15/4211, 7 ff.; 
15/4477, 8 f., 17 ff). 
251 Sec. 4 (4) Passport Act (Passgesetz). See Hornung, Die digitale Identität [The Digital Identity], 173 ff.; 
Hornung, Biometrische Systeme [Biometric Systems], 355 ff. 
252 BITKOM, The German Biometric Strategy Platform, p. 24. 
253 See also Z. Geradts, ‘Forensic implications of identity systems’,  Datenschutz und 
Datensicherheit, 2006, 30,  pp. 556–558. 
254 §1 (5) of the German Gesetz uber Personalausweise of 21
st April 1986 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 548), as amended 
(‘Personalausweisgesetz’), available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/persauswg/BJNR008070950.html . 
255 This act came into force in 1977 and was revised in 2001 to integrate the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
into the German framework. For a translation of the Act see: http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BDSG.htm 
256 Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector; O. J.  L 024, 30 
January 1998,  pp. 1-8 FIDIS 
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2002/58/EC)
257 transposed in the Telecommunications Act (‘Telekommunikationsgesetz’, 
‘TKG’) and the Regulation No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
by the institutions and bodies of the Community and on the free movement of such data.
258 
As stated above, the Directive 95/46/EC constitutes the main and general legal framework for 
the processing of personal data.
 For a general discussion of the provisions of the Directive in 
relation to biometrics see the general section above. 
In Fidis deliverable D3.10, it was already highlighted that national regulators have a 
considerable margin of appreciation when evaluating biometrical issues. This can be 
explained by the fact that most national data protection laws implementing the Directive 
95/46/EC contain no specific provisions or criteria on the processing of biometric data.
259 
This observation certainly applies to the German legal framework that contains no specific 
laws or regulations on the use of biometrics. The most important general requirement is the 
protection of human dignity according to Article 1 of the German Constitution (‘Grundgesetz’ 
‘GG’). This article stipulates that ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it 
shall be the duty of all state authority’.
260 Furthermore, in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, 
the application of biometrics is predominantly governed by general data protection laws.  
In Germany, the Federal Data Protection Law, controls the storage, processing and use of 
personal data collected by public federal and state authorities and by private parties, the latter 
in case they process and use data for commercial or professional aims. The Federal Data 
Protection Law is the most important law for the processing of biometric data and contains 
rights and obligations with respect to data protection. The Federal Data Protection Law 
stipulates the following principles: proportionality, purpose specification, and data reduction 
and data economy. This means that it has to be guaranteed that only data are collected or 
used, which are necessary and which are permitted by the law.
261 Although there is no 
German case law dealing specifically with the handling of biometric data, there is some 
publicly available data protection advice on the application of the various laws to biometrics 
and the choices that can be made for privacy enhancing variations of the technology.
262  
                                                 
257 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, O. J. L 201, 
31 July 2002. Article 3 §1 states: ‘This Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data in connection 
with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services in public communications networks 
in the Community’.  
258 O. J. L 8, 12 January 2001. 
259 Kindt, E. and  Müller, L. (eds.), o.c.,    
260 http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm 
261 For more details, see section 2 of this deliverable or E. Kindt, l.c, , Datenschutz and Datensicherheit (DuD), 
2007, 31, pp. 166-170. 
262 See the publications by Das Unabhängige Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein, available at  
https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/projekte/biometrie/kap6krit.htm; 
https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/projekte/biometrie/index.htm; see also Datenschutz Berlin, available at   
http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/content/themen-a-z/biometrie/biometrische-authentisierung; and the website 
of: http://www.datenschutz.de/. In addition, and apart from FIDIS publications, see other academic literature, for 
example, L. Donnerhacke, ‘Anonyme Biometrie’,  Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 1999, Vol. 23 , Nr. 3, S. 
151-154; M. Köhntopp, ’Technische Randbedingungen für einen datenschutzgerechten Einsatz biometrischer 
Verfahren’, Horster (ed.), Sicherheitsinfrastrukturen, Vieweg, Braunschweig 1999, sections 177-188; A. 
Pfitzmann et al., ’Trustworthy User Devices’, Müller and Rannenberg (eds), Multilateral Security in 
Communications, Addison-Wesley, München 1999, sections 137-156. FIDIS 
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Finally, the German Constitution (‘Grundgesetz’) includes the right to informational self-
determination (‘Recht auf informationnelle Selbstbestimmung’). At first it was argued by most 
commentators, that a central database (or its de-central equivalents) would be incompatible 
with this right.  
However, the strict legal interpretation of this principle seems to come under some 
pressure.
263  
One significant and recent case on the issue of central storage of personal data of the 
European Court of Justice relates to a preliminary question of a German court. The 
background, the Court’s reasoning and the implications of the case have been discussed above 
in section 2.3. The German Act relating to a Central Register of Foreigners Act (‘Gesetz über 
das Ausländerzentralregister’)
264 has established a centralised register which contains certain 
personal data relating to foreign nationals who are resident in Germany for a period of more 
than three months. From 2005, The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (‘Bundesamt 
für Migration und Flüchtlinge’) is responsible for maintaining that register.
265 There are 
around 7 million permanent inhabitants in Germany that do not have the German nationality. 
The register is used for statistical purposes by security and police services and judicial 
authorities in exercising their powers in relation to the prosecution and investigation of 
criminal activities which threaten public security. In its ruling, the Court of Justice stated in 
an answer to the preliminary questions that the centralisation of the data does not satisfy the 
requirement of necessity laid down in the Directive 95/46/EC. 
 
5.3.2  Legal provisions for government controlled ID biometric 
applications (passports, other civil ID biometric applications and 
law enforcement) 
The design and the use of the identity card and passport are regulated in respectively the 
Identity Card Act (‘Personalausweis Gesetz’, ‘PAuswG’). and the Passport Act 
(‘Passgesetz’), which have already been discussed to some extent above.
266  
With regard to biometrics, Article 7 of the Act against terrorism (‘TBG’) (see above) adds a 
new paragraph 23a to the Passport Act that allows the use biometrics in the German 
passport.
267 
The authorities responsible for the identity cards (the citizen’s registration offices at the 
municipality level) keep records on identity cards.
268 Among others, these local registries 
issue the identity cards and verify their authenticity. Every identity card has a unique serial 
                                                 
263 G. Hornung, ‘The European Regulation on Biometric Passports: Legislative Procedures, Political 
Interactions, Legal Framework and Technical Safeguards’, SCRIPTed vol. 4, issue 3, 2007.  
264 Gesetz über das Ausländerzentralregister (‘AZR-Gesetz’) of 2 September 1994 (BGBl. I S. 2265), recently 
modified by Article 2 of the Act of 26 February 2008 (BGBl. I S. 215). See  http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/azrg/gesamt.pdf 
265 See http://www.bamf.de/cln_092/nn_441806/sid_4914EA581C5A6781FB012BA5814E3264/SharedDocs/ 
Pressemitteilungen/DE/DasBAMF/2005/050629-pressemitteilung-07-05-bamf.html?__nnn=true 
266 For the full text of the Act In German, see http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/pa_g_1986/index.html  
267 See also Article 11 TBG which changes the foreigner law (Ausländergesetz, AuslG) and provides for the 
integration of biometrics in visas and residence permits of foreigners. 
268 § 2a of the Identity Card Act. FIDIS 
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number. It is explicitly forbidden to use this number for accessing personal data in files or for 
linking data in different files.
269 
The by the Passport Act regulated passport register is controlled by the passport authorities 
(again, the citizen’s registration offices at the municipality level). They issue passports and 
verify their authenticity, as well as the identity of the person who owns the passport or for 
whom it has been issued. Besides authorisations for respective police, customs and 
registration authorities, the Passport Act explicitly stipulates that the use of biometric data is 
strictly limited to verification and authentication of the passport and the identity of the holder 
(purpose specification).
270 Careful reading indicates that the fingerprint data are not stored on 
a database, but only on the passport itself.
271 In the future, only other Nations granted 
permission by the Federal Republic of Germany (in the form of a special cryptographic 
certificate to be used in electronic Passport reading devices) will be able to access the 
microchip’s data of the ePass.  
As already mentioned above, a nation-wide database, hence not only a biometric database, is 
explicitly forbidden by the legislator in the German Passport Act (§ 4 (3)).  
Biometric facial data can be preserved in a local database.
272 As regard to fingerprints, the 
2007 revision of the Passport Act stipulates that finger scans are to be stored exclusively on 
the passport’s microchip, and that they should in no case be stored locally or in a central 
database. Subsequent the scanning and use of the finger scan data the authorities are obliged 
to delete the data.  
 
5.3.3  Biometric systems and the privacy rights of employees  
German companies increasingly base their security systems on biometrics, for example to 
organize workplace and network access control.
273 Notwithstanding this development, 
Germany does not have a specific employee data protection law. The two laws that govern the 
use of biometrics are therefore the above mentioned Federal Data Protection Law together 
with the Codetermination Act (‘Betriebsverfassungsgesetz’, ‘BetrVG’). 
274 
The Federal Data Protection Law stipulates a general prohibition on the use and processing of 
personal data.
275 This is accompanied by an exception clause making it permissible only in 
case of a legal basis or an explicit consent of the parties concerned. Moreover, the German 
Federal Office of Health (‘Das Bundesamt für Gesundheit’, ‘BAG’), and the German labour 
court (‘Bundesarbeitsgericht’),
276 issued a decision in 2004 making the introduction and use 
                                                 
269 § 3 of the Identity Card Act.  
270 § 16a of the Passport Act.   
271 See § 4 (3) in connection with § 16a of the Identity Card Act; see also  http://dip21.bundestag.de 
/dip21/btd/16/104/16104 89.pdf The digital face picture, however, will be stored by the citizens register in the 
same way as a second paper based photo was stored in the past.  
272 Most of these local databases, the citizens registers, however, would be centrally accessible via an XML-
interface. So technically there is no big difference to a central database in case of an authorised access e.g. by 
police forces e.g. in cases of ongoing investigations is needed 
273 E. Schedel, ‘Mitbestimmung bei biometrischen Kontrollen’ [Codetermination with respect to biometric 
control], C’t magazin für computertechnik, vol. 21, issue 4, 2004, p. 39.  
274 For the full German text see: http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/betrvg/gesamt.pdf 
275 § 4 section 1 of the FDPL. 
276 Decision of 27 January 2004, 1 ABR 7/03.  FIDIS 
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of biometric systems within the working environment subject to the codetermination rights of 
employee representatives such as the works council and trade unions.
277 
Biometric technology used at work falls within the scope of informational self-determination. 
As already discussed above, the right on informational self-determination is embodied in the 
German Constitution (Grundesgesetz) in articles 1 and 2. It includes the right to decide and 
know where one’s personal data is captured, stored and used.
278 The submission to the 
codetermination regime derives from the Codetermination Act itself, namely that biometric 
technologies are intrinsically linked with issues concerning work rules and behaviour of 
employees ((§ 87 I 1 Codetermination Act). 
Consequently, an agreement – usually the employment agreement - will provide a legal basis 
for the collection, processing and use of personal data in case a biometric application is 
installed by the employer. In this agreement, it must be specified precisely, among others, 
what the purpose of the biometric application is. In addition, it should indicate whether 
verification or identification takes place, whether raw data or templates are used, whether data 
is stored, and, if so, whether this will be in a decentralized or a central database. There are 
also clear rules about preference for use of chips on card from a data protection point of 
view.
279  
The employees – usually represented by the works council (which may be supported by trade 
unions) – and the employer will have to take into consideration their respective interests 
during the negotiations before they sign the agreement. In specific cases, the security interests 
of the employer will have to be weighed against the affected privacy rights of the employees 
in an appropriate way. In particular, the question has to be addressed whether the use of the 
biometric application is necessary in view of the purpose it is expected to serve. Purpose 
binding should take place in the context of a proportionality test. This means that biometric 
applications which potentially interfere with the right to informational self-determination 
require a justified interest of the employer in each case. Of course, the more privacy 
enhancing alternatives of for example Type II access control systems should be carefully 
explored in the interest of the employee.
280  
 
5.4 The  Supervising Authorities  
The federal oversight is executed by the Federal Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
Commissioner who controls that all federal agencies comply with the data protection 
legislation.
281  Chapter 3 of the FDPL provides the legal basis for the Commissioner and 
outlines his functions. The key role is to ensure that the Data Protection Act is implemented 
correctly. Section 24 states that the Commissioner has to monitor compliance with the Act 
and grants him powers of access to information as well as the opportunity to inspect all 
                                                 
277 G. Hornung, ‘Biometrie am Arbeitsplatz – sichere Kontrollverfahren versus ausuferndes Kontrollpotential’ 
[Biometrics at the work place – secure inspection procedures versus expanding control potential], Arbeit und 
Recht, vol. 29, issue 6, 2005, p. 205.  
278 T. Probst, T., ‘Biometrie aus datenschutzrechtlicher Sicht’ [Biometrics from the data protection legal 
perspective], in Nolde, V. and Leger, L. (eds.), Biometrische Verfahren [Biometric procedures], pp. 115-128, 
Fachverlag Deutscher Wirtschaftsdients, Cologne, 2002.  
279http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cln_007/nn_530440/DE/Themen/Arbeit/Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz/Artikel/Chipausw
eise.html#inhalt 
280Ibid.  
281 http://www.deutschland.de/link.php?lang=2&link_id=24 FIDIS 
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documents and the right of access to all official premises at any time. Section 25 stipulates 
that the Commissioner can lodge complaints with higher authorities (e.g. the competent 
supreme federal authority) in the case of breaches. In Section 26 it is laid down, inter alia, that 
the Commissioner can be requested by federal government to give opinions and make 
recommendations on matters pertaining to the law. The FDPL also sets out the penalties for 
breaches in Sections 43 and 44.1. They are fines and imprisonment. 
However, as the Federal Republic of Germany is a federation of 16 States (Bundesländer)
282 
the competences of the State are divided between the federal and the State governments. The 
federal system of government, with its clear division of powers between the governments of 
the States and the federal government also affects the supervision of data protection. 
Therefore, there is number of different authorities that are responsible for making sure that 
data protection laws and regulations are complied with. Thus German Federal States have 
their own DPAs, which are responsible for controlling the observance of data protection 
legislation by public bodies located in their jurisdictions.
283 There is no uniform system for 
the supervision over the private sector in the individual states. In some States, the supervisory 
functions are performed by the Ministry of Home Affairs or by the authorities that report to 
the Ministry. In other States, e.g. North Rhine-Westphalia, supervision is exercised by the 
DPA.
284 A private company is supervised by the authority that has jurisdiction over the 
district where it has its headquarters.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This country study has provided a short overview of all relevant aspects and issues 
surrounding the use of biometrics in Germany. Clearly, a pivotal event in this regard was the 
introduction of the ePass in Germany. The introduction of the passport, so soon after the EU 
Regulation 2252/2004, was the result of independent German government deliberations about 
the introduction of biometrics since 2002. Initially, the ePass contained only a facial image as 
a biometric identifier, but as of June 2007 the German government approved the inclusion of 
finger scans. As a result, the second generation electronic passports, with EAC and including 
the fingerprint identifiers have been issued since November 2007. The fingerprint identifiers, 
however, are by law stored exclusively on the passport’s microchip, and not stored locally in 
the citizens’ registers or in a central database. 
The German government is also proposing to include biometric data on its new eID card, 
albeit on voluntarily
285 grounds. The eID Card, planned to be issued from the end of 
November 2010 onwards, will encompass a mandatory electronic facial image, whilst the 
inclusion of fingerprints will be at the discretion of the citizens. The aim is to implement the 
eID Card as a universal token for authentication and identification on the Internet for 
eGovernment and eBusiness services.  
                                                 
282 These States (‘Bundesländer’) are not just provinces but states with their own original sovereign rights and 
legislative responsibilities. 
283 For a list see https://www.ldi.nrw.de/mainmenu_Service/submenu_Links/Inhalt2/ 
Datenschutzbeauftragte/Datenschutzbeauftragte.php 
284 For a list see  https://www.ldi.nrw.de/mainmenu_Service/submenu_Links/Inhalt2/Aufsichtsbehoerden/ 
Aufsichtsbehoerden.php  
285 Voluntary in the sense that is not required by EU law. FIDIS 
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As for the regulatory framework, there are no specific regulations or laws concerning 
biometrics in German law. The Federal Data Protection Law, which covers the storage, 
processing and use of personal data collected by public federal and state authorities and by 
private parties, serves as a framework for the handling of biometric data. A nation-wide 
database, with data relating to the passports, hence not only a biometric database, is explicitly 
forbidden by law (§ 4 (3) Passport Act). Biometric facial data can be preserved in a local 
database, while finger scans are stored exclusively on the passport’s microchip thus excluding 
any local or central storage. 
Given the fact that there are more than eighty major biometrics companies in Germany and 
the market for selling biometric products per capita is considered the largest in the world, it is 
surprising that there are no significant court cases yet.
286 On the other hand, the use of 
biometrics in the workplace and the weighing of privacy rights of employees has been a legal 
issue already. From the current public information
287 available, it is difficult to determine 
whether biometric technologies are used in a privacy enhancing manner in day to day routines 
across Germany. Therefore, in the forthcoming years we might well see individuals come 
forward asking for legal clarification on data protection or other aspects of biometric 
applications.  
                                                 
286 Apart from the cases concerning the privacy rights of employees mentioned above. 
287 For sources for good practice see: FAQ referred to at many DPA websites: 
https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/faq/biometri.htm and also note 62. FIDIS 
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6  The Netherlands   
6.1 Introduction 
During the Dutch presidency, a consensus was built on the content of the The Hague 
Programme and the programme was adopted by the European Council in November 2004. In 
June 2005, the Commission presented a detailed five year programme.
288 The Hague set a 
new policy agenda and specific objectives for the next five years for developing the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The programme made the road for the introduction of 
biometrics, and the move towards availability and interoperability of data systems in the 
European Union.  
The Dutch government itself had in fact already started up a policy process aiming at the 
introduction of biometrics in identity documents. This was five years ago. In this country 
report, we will first sketch the current use of biometrics in the Dutch public and private 
domain. We will then describe the legal framework for the use of biometrics and how this has 
evolved.  
 
6.2 The  spreading  of  biometric applications  
We see a gradual rolling out of biometric applications in the Dutch public sector. The main 
government policies in this regard are the introduction of face and finger scans into the Dutch 
passport, identity management using biometrics within the criminal justice system (Progis)
289, 
and the use of biometrics for the registration and identification of foreigners (in visa, 
residence permits and political asylum and immigration procedures). Of these examples, only 
the use of biometrics in the criminal justice system is not in direct parallel with developments 
in the EU. All the other government applications that are being introduced have been initiated, 
or at least re-enforced by decisions made at EU level about machine readable documents.
290 
Therefore, although the introduction is gradual, in a few years time the majority of people 
living in the Netherlands will have become enrolled in a government biometric application. 
Over the past decade, biometric applications have spread across the Dutch semi-public and 
private sector. At the same time, they are not omni present. One of the conclusions of our 
recent report on the use of biometric applications in the private domain was that detailed 
information is very difficult to obtain.
291 We found that it proved impossible to draw up a 
reliable inventory of all biometric applications in the Netherlands. The Dutch Data Protection 
Authority (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, ‘CBP’) keeps a register of all projects 
                                                 
288 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice_ home /news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/ 
289 CIS (Coordinatiegroep Informatievoorziening Strafrechtsketen), Protocol for establishment of identity (in law 
enforcement) (Protocol Identiteitsvaststelling (strafrechtketen)) (‘Progis’), 3 September 2008, Directie Generaal 
Rechtspleging en Rechtshandhaving, the Hague, 2008. 
290 P. de Hert,  W. Scheurs and E. Brouwer, "Machine-readable identity Documents with Biometric Data in the 
EU - part III - Overview of the Legal Framework", Keesing Journal of Documents and Identity, 2007, No. 22, 
pp. 23-26.  
291 P. de Hert and A. Sprokkereef, The Use of Privacy Enhancing Aspects of Biometrics: Biometrics as PET in 
the Dutch Private and Semi-Public Domain, TILT, January 2009, p. 23 available at 
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=93109 (last consulted 1
st april 2009) (‘The Use of Privacy Enhancing Aspects of 
Biometrics’). FIDIS 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D13.4 
 
Final , Version: 1.1 
File: fidis_deliverable13_4_v_1.1.doc 
Page 81 
 
notified under the data protection legislation
292, but in the current set up, the biometric 
projects are difficult to count and to qualify. Detailed information is often unavailable and the 
circumstances under which data handling takes place are in practice unclear without further 
investigation.
  
There are private initiatives such as the Netherlands Biometrics Forum (Nederlands Biometrie 
Forum) starting a web project on the voluntary registration of biometric projects in 2007.
293 
All in all, it remains unclear whether information about the spread of biometric applications in 
the Netherlands will become better accessible in the near future. 
 
6.2.1  Fields in which biometric applications are implemented  
Our estimation is that the number of private and semi-public projects using biometrics at this 
moment in time will not exceed a few thousand. We examined the use of privacy enhancing 
aspects of biometrics in less than a hundred projects, as randomly found on the Internet.
294  
Despite a lack of statistical information, it goes undisputed that the number of applications 
that use biometrics has increased considerably. Improved measurement methods and 
reliability rates, decreased physical sizes of sensors and accompanying price reductions have 
all played a part in this process. Biometric applications have also been integrated with other 
products such as cars and computers. Another observation in our report The Use of Privacy 
Enhancing Aspects of Biometrics was that companies selling biometrics have employed 
marketing strategies designed to create a demand.
295 It is interesting that in the German 
country study of this deliverable (see section 5), a supply led tendency can equally be 
detected. This is illustrated by a press report of a German biometrics manufacturer giving a 
biometric access system to a nursery school as a Christmas present.
296 In March 2008, the first 
Dutch schools started using biometrics as a key for personnel and parents.
297 These schools 
sought to acquire a biometric entry system nor did pay for it: they were offered a trial for 
free.
298 It is too early to conclude whether the use of biometrics in semi-public institutions 
such as schools in the Netherlands will mushroom over the next few years. If it will, then at 
least it will do so at a slower pace than in the UK.
299  
 
                                                 
292 See Article 27 of the Dutch Data Protection Act. The so-called notification duty (meldingsplicht) applies to 
all automatic data processing, with the exception of processing falling within the decision with exemptions 
(Vrijstellingbesluit). 
293 See an announcement at http://www2.biometrieforum.nl/bio/annoucement.php?aid= 24&cid=17 
294 The Use of Privacy Enhancing Aspects of Biometrics, pp. 48-50.  
295 The Use of Privacy Enhancing Aspects of Biometrics, p. 24. 
296 See http://www.net-tribune.de/article/r071207-01.php (last accessed 28th March 09) 
297 See http://www.identysoft.nl/pers.php (last accessed 28th March 09) 
298 See The Use of Privacy Enhancing Aspects of Biometrics, pp. 24-26. 
299 Compare with the UK country report in the present deliverable. As far as we are aware, Dutch schools do not 
fingerprint pupils yet. There are schools with access control systems for parents and personnel. Library- and 
access control systems for pupils are already available in the Netherlands but we have not found a school that 
employs them. In the UK, a large number of schools were quick to take up biometric library card systems 
sometimes in combination with the use of the cards for school meal provision. A school meal system does not 
exist in the Netherlands but the reasons for a different pace may well be found in the various marketing strategies 
employed. FIDIS 
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6.2.2 National  studies  and debate about biometrics 
At the end of the 1990s, biometrics became a subject of discussion and the first Dutch legal 
academic articles were published.
300 In 1999, the Dutch Data Protection Authority published 
an extensive report on the privacy aspects of biometrics with the title At Face Value.
301 It was 
the result of a study performed jointly by the DPA and the Dutch Organization for Applied 
Research- Physics and Electronics Laboratory (‘TNO-FEL’). The report concluded that 
designers, developers, suppliers and users of products using biometrics for identification, 
authentication or exposure of emotions needed to consider ways to protect the privacy of 
users. Amongst others, the report recommended the following measures to minimise or 
eliminate privacy risks: 
  
‘1. Analysis of the need for biometrical identification or authentication. Is the application of biometrics 
proportional with the goal to be achieved? 
2. Decentralisation of the template storage and verification process; as a rule both the storage of 
templates and the verification process should be decentralised. In some specific cases and 
environments, the processing of personal data can be seen as a pure personal activity. 
3. Encryption of databases: the protection of personal data can be realised by using different encryption 
keys and algorithms to encrypt the personal data (including biometrical data) in different databases. The 
original biometrics should preferably be destroyed after the derivation of the digital template.’ (stress 
added)
302 
 
The  At Face Value report also briefly mentioned certification of privacy-compliance of 
products as a possible solution for future problems. According to the report, certification 
would guarantee an adequate handling of the personal data of future users.
303 The research 
results also included a checklist with practical directions, for those who want to build a 
privacy-enhanced product that processes biometrical data. It stated that personal data should 
be protected with proper PETs
304 and referred to crucial decisions in the design phase. In 
particular, it referred to decisions concerning the question whether to protect data by 
decentralisation of the template storage and/or verification, or encryption.
305 
                                                 
300 R. van Kralingen, C. Prins and J. Grijpink, Het Lichaam als Sleutel. Juridische Beschouwingen over 
Biometrie [The body as a key. Legal observations on biometrics], Samson, Alphen ad Rijn, 1997; C. Prins,  
‘Making our Body Identify for Us: Legal Implications of Biometric Technologies’, Biometric Technology Law - 
Computer Law and Security Report , 1998, Vol. 14. no. 3; J. Grijpink,  ‘Biometrics and Privacy’, Computer Law 
and Security Report, 2001, Vol. 17 no. 3, pp.154-160. 
301 R. Hes,  T. F. M.Hooghiemstra and J.J. Borking, At Face Value. On Biometrical Identification and Privacy, 
Registratiekamer, Achtergrond Studies en Verkenningen 15, September 1999, 70 p., available at   
http://www.cbpweb.nl/documenten/av_15_At_face_value.stm (‘At Face value report’); compare with A. 
Albrecht, ‘BIOVISION. D 7.4, Privacy Best Practices in Deployment of Biometric Systems (Final Report)’ 2003 
and V. Andronikou, D. Demetis and T. Varvarigou, ‘Biometric Implementations and the Implications for 
Security and Privacy’, Journal of the Future of Identity in the Information Society, 2007 Vol. 1 N° 1, available at 
http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/journal/issues/1-2007/Biometric_Implementations_and_the_Implications_for_ 
Security_and_Privacy.pdf (last accessed 1st april 2009) 
302 At Face Value report, p. 63. 
303 Ibid., p. 63. 
304 The At Face Value report identifies PETs as different technological elements that can help to improve privacy 
compliance of systems. See p. 49. 
305 See pp. 58-59 of the At Face Value report. FIDIS 
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The report is still regarded as authoritative. Until now, it has not been updated. In fact most of 
the conclusions and recommendations, especially those on the use of biometrics as a privacy 
enhancing technology, are still valid. What is lacking now, are more detailed guidelines and 
descriptions of best practice as developed over the past ten years.  
The Dutch Organization TNO-FEL mentioned above has also conducted technical studies to 
assess the claims made about biometrics products or processes. TNO was the first to 
investigate the use of fingerprint-based biometric technology on children. Their conclusion 
was that in the current state of the art (two dimensional) fingerprint technology is impractical 
for children under the age of six.
306 TNO found that facial recognition can be used for young 
children, although with adaptations to standard hardware. 
TNO carried out research on a relatively small sample of 161 children aged from birth to 
twelve, with at least five children for each year of age. Fingerprints and facial images were 
successfully taken from all the children aged seven and over, with success defined by a NIST 
quality check for fingerprints
307 and a biometric verification check for the facial image. But 
no infants from birth to two years old could be enrolled for fingerprints, along with just 8% of 
three-year-olds. The fingerprint success rate rose with age, to 50% of four-year-olds, 67% of 
five-year-olds and 89% of six-year-olds.
308 Facial images were much more successful, taken 
with 77% success for the group from birth to two years, and at least 89% from all age bands 
above three years.  
In 2008, a Telematica Institute report on government identity management examined and 
assessed current trends in the field, and the role of new technologies in particular. The report 
is brief on biometrics and concludes that the use of biometrics as PET often does not sit easily 
together with customer friendly identification and user comfort.
309 The unintended side effects 
of using biometric applications are highlighted. The side effects identified are inconvenience 
for citizens, certain categories of people that have physical difficulties with biometric systems 
(children, older people, and people without hands), possibilities for biometric identity theft, 
absence of 100% reliability and the impact on the use of fingerprint data in criminal 
prosecution.
310  
In early January 2009, a report named Our Digital Shadow (Onze Digitale Schaduw) was 
commissioned by the Dutch Data Protection Authority.
311 The main aim of the research was 
to assess in how many data bases a Dutch citizen would normally be registered. The outcome 
of the research was that a citizen who is inactive in social life and on the internet will feature 
                                                 
306 Ministerie van Buitenlandse zaken, Evaluatierapport Biometrieproef 2b or not 2b, Den Haag, 2005, pp. 26-28 
(section on children (3.3)), available at  www.minbzk.nl/aspx/download. 
aspx?file=/contents/pages/43760/evaluatierapport1.pdf.  See also  http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news 
/051021_biometrics_children.htm 
307 This is a standard set by the US National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) (see 
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/biometrics.htm) 
308 The results were improved by wiping and then drying children’s fingers, to get the best level of humidity. 
309 Brussee, R., Heerink, R. Leenes, S. Nouwt, M. Pekarek, A. Sprokkereef and W. Teeuw, Persoonsinformatie 
of Identiteit?  Identiteitsvaststelling en Elektronische Dossiers in het Licht van Maatschappelijke en 
Technologische Ontwikkelingen, 2008, Telematica Instituut, Report TI/RS/2008/034:1-98 (‘Persoonsinformatie 
of Identiteit?’). See also Ministry of Home Affairs, Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Witboek Voor Beslissers, 
2004, R. Koorn et al., The Hague. 
310  Persoonsinformatie of Identiteit?,  p. 18. See also E. de Leeuw, ‘Biometrie en Nationaal 
Identiteitsmanagement’, Privacy and Informatie, 2007, Vol. 2 N°. 10, pp. 50-56.  
311 Schermer and Wagemans (Considerati), Onze Digitale Schaduw, Amsterdam, January 2009, available at   
http://www.cbpweb.nl/downloads_rapporten/rap_2009_onze_digitale_schaduw.pdf?refer=true&theme=blue   FIDIS 
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in about 250 data bases, whilst an active citizen can end up in thousands of data bases. In 
view of these numbers, and of the increasing trend of government departments and companies 
to share information, some questions can be posed about the practical workability of Article 
33 and 34 (duty to inform) of the Data Protection Act. In a reaction, the Dutch Data 
Protection Authority urged public and private institutions to strengthen the information 
provision on their data handling practices.
312 
In February 2009, the study Migration Machine (De Migratie Machine) was published.
313 
This is the first academic study that attempts to assess the impact of the use of biometrics and 
the body on the Dutch society as a whole, and the vulnerable group of migrants in 
particular.
314 The work brings experts together who are writing on the daily and increasingly 
automated practice of immigration and border control in Europe and the Netherlands. The 
book, so far only available in Dutch, poses meaningful and longer term questions about the 
role of biometric and other body related technologies, the political discourse surrounding the 
introduction of biometrics and the impact of the belief in the unfailing measurability of the 
human body. A chapter on the legal context laments the lack of power of the Dutch Data 
Protection Authority to give binding advice. It also identifies a discrepancy between data 
protection powers and the staffing levels of the data protection authorities in the EU in 
general.
315 According to the authors, the migration machine is still in development and in 
need of evaluation. In fact, to paraphrase, they identify a machine geared towards ‘delivering 
high tech’ and ‘screening broad’ with an increasing danger of running out of control.
316 By 
choosing a title that suggests efficiency but also hints at an unfair balance between the 
anonymous state and a vulnerable, individual migrant, the authors hope to stimulate debate 
and increase democratic accountability. In the concluding chapter, Dijstelbloem and Meijer 
conclude that shaping technological boundaries is of democratic, humanitarian and legal 
concern and deserves more attention than it does to date.
317 
 
Security and public policy implications of the large scale use of biometric data have not been 
addressed in Dutch national reports yet. The national differences in approach become clear 
from the different solutions preferred by EU Member States when deciding on centralized 
and/or de-centralized storage of biometric data contained in the new EU passports.
318 
Analysis of current Dutch laws or proposals (especially the amendment to the Passport Act 
and the Act relating to Foreigners of 2000 - see below) show that centralisation is the trend in 
the Netherlands. Dutch policymakers favouring the creation of central databases see the 
storing of biometric characteristics on the passport chip only as irresponsible.
319 Failure to 
                                                 
312http://www.cbpweb.nl/documenten/rap_2009_onze_digitale_schaduw.shtml?refer=true&theme=blue  
313 H. Dijstelbloem, and A. Meijer, De migratie-machine : de rol van technologie in het migratiebeleid (The 
migration machine : the role of technology in migration policy) Amsterdam, Van Gennep, 2009 (‘De Migratie 
Machine’). 
314 On the role of biometrics, see the chapter by D. Broeders ‘mobiliteit en surveillance: a migratiemachine in de 
maak’, pp 35-60 and the chapter of Van der Ploeg and Sprenkels, ‘migratie en het machine-leesbare lichaam: 
identitificatie en biometrie’,  pp. 61- 98, both in De Migratie Machine.  
315 This is the chapter by Brouwer, ‘Juridische grenzen aan de inzet van biometrische technologie’, De Migratie 
Machine , pp. 191-228. 
316 See the final chapter of De Migratie Machine pp. 229-254. 
317 Dijstelbloem and Meijer , ‘public attention for an unprecedented machine’, De Migratie Machine,  p. 253. 
318 See for example the German country study in this deliverable. 
319 For an overview, see J. Grijpink, ‘Identiteitsfraude en Overheid’, Justitiele Verkenningen, Vol 32, n° 7, 2006, 
pp 7-57. FIDIS 
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store the biometrics in a database that is accessible for the future will make prevention, 
investigation or prosecution of identity fraud possible in case of illegal tampering with the 
chip. The prevailing view is that the impossibility to compare the scan on the chip with the 
scan originally taken will hamper identity fraud detection and will encourage fraud. 
 
6.3 Legislation  regulating the use of biometric data  
6.3.1  General and specific privacy legal framework for biometrics 
In the Netherlands, as in many other countries, the existing data protection legislative 
framework governs the use of biometrics and no separate legislation has been proposed or 
adopted. As the data protection perspective on technology is characterised by an 'enabling 
logic’, law has not acted as a barrier to the diffusion of biometric technologies. Thus, data 
protection legislation makes existing processing practices transparent, and does not prohibit 
them as a rule.
320 In other words, Dutch data protection regulations create a legal framework 
based upon the assumption that the processing of personal data is allowed and legal in 
principle.
321 Therefore, ownership of individuals regarding their data is not recognised, but 
individual controlling rights are granted instead.  
The legal framework for data protection in general in the Netherlands consists of Article 10 of 
the Dutch Constitution, Directive 95/46/EC
,, the Dutch Data Protection Act (‘Wet 
Bescherming Persoonsgegevens’)
322, and a number of other specialized laws and regulations 
such as the Medical Treatment Agreement Act (‘Wet op de Geneeskundige 
behandelingsovereenkomst’)
323, the Database Act (‘Databankenwet’), the Municipal Database 
Personal Files Act (‘de Wet Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie’)
324, the Police Files Act (‘Wet 
Politieregisters’)
325, Foreigners Act (‘Vreemdelingenwet  2000)’
326 and the 
Telecommunications Act (‘Telecommunicatie Wet’).
327 
 
                                                 
320 There are exceptions. Some sections of the data protection regime provide for a prohibition of processing (e.g. 
sensitive data, secretly collected personal data) in which case such processing operations actually fall under a 
privacy or opacity ruling.  
321 An outright processing ban effectively applies only to special categories of sensitive personal data such as 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, health or 
sex life. On the limitations of the data protection approach see also A. Sprokkereef, ‘Data Protection and the Use 
of Biometric Data in the EU’, S. Fischer Huebner, P. Duquenoy, A. Zaccato, L. Martucci (eds.), The Future of 
Identity in the Information Society, IFIP (International Federation for Information Processing), 2008, Volume 
262, Boston Springer, pp 277-284. 
322 The Dutch Personal Data Protection Act of 2001, last amended in 2002, available at 
http://www.dutchdpa.nl/indexen/en_ind_wetten_wbp_wbp.shtml 
323 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0007021/geldigheidsdatum_31-03-2009 
324 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0006723/geldigheidsdatum_31-03-2009 
325 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0010477/geldigheidsdatum_31-03-2009 
326  http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0011823/geldigheidsdatum_31-03-2009 ; This Act is also available in 
English at  http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/4680 
327 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0009950/geldigheidsdatum_31-03-2009. FIDIS 
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The Data Protection Act is applicable to the collection and processing of personal data and 
also applies to the processing of biometric data.
328 The Act does not contain specific 
provisions that mention biometric data as such. Nevertheless, there has been hardly any 
discussion about whether, or under which conditions, biometric data should be considered 
personal data. In 2007, a report called First Phase Evaluation of the Data Protection Act, 
presented an analysis of the obstacles in the implementation and application of the Data 
Protection Act.
329 One of its conclusions was that ‘the vagueness of the concept of personal 
data implies obscurity on the scope of the act and this leads to divergent interpretations’.
330 It 
can therefore not be excluded that encrypted biometric data will in certain instances not be 
regarded as personal data under Dutch law. There is, however, no case law at all in this field 
yet. It is remarkable that the 211 pages report does not mention biometrics once. As the report 
is based on a literature and case law study only
331, this just reflects the fact that no conflicts or 
obstacles in the area of biometric data handling have arisen so far.  
The second part of the evaluation report (the second phase evaluation) will be based on 
empirical research and might throw more light on the application of Dutch Data Protection 
Act to biometric data handling. Based on our own study
332 and the general conclusions of the 
First Phase Evaluation of the Data Protection Act report, we are making an informed guess in 
stating that the use of biometrics takes place in a relatively uninformed manner. One of the 
conclusions of the report is that ‘self regulation within the scope of the Data Protection Act 
leaves much to be desired’.
333 The final conclusion of the report is that many rights and 
obligations of controllers and persons involved that arise from the Data Protection Act are not 
effectively exercised through a lack of familiarity with these rights.
334 Thus, one of the core 
objectives of the Data Protection Act, to increase the transparency of data processing though 
the granting of rights and obligations and the introduction of a regulatory authority, has not 
been fully achieved yet.  
 
6.3.2  Legal provisions for government controlled ID biometric 
applications (passports, other civil ID biometric applications and 
law enforcement) 
Passport and a Central Database  
Since 26 August 2006, all Dutch passports are issued as a biometric passport with an 
embedded RFID chip for storing the face scan. Two finger scans will be added from the end 
of June 2009 onwards. An amendment
335 to the Passport Act enabling the storage of finger 
scans in a central data base on top of two finger scans on the chip in the passport itself, is 
                                                 
328 For one of the first Dutch attempts to provide an oversight of all laws that govern particular aspects of 
biometrics: S. Artz and van Blarkom, ‘Beveiliging van persoonsgegevens: de WPB. Privacy en Biometrie: een 
technisch vraagstuk?’, Jaarboek Fraudebestrijding, 2002. 
329 G . J  Z w e n n e ,  A . W .  D u t h k e r ,  M .  G r o o t h u i s ,  H .  K i e l m a n ,  W .  K o e l e w i j n  e n  L .  M o m m e r s ,  Eerste Fase 
Evaluatie Wet Bescherming Persoonsgegevens: Literatuuronderzoek en Knelpunt Analyse, 
eLaw@Leiden/WODS, 2007 (‘Eerste Fase Evaluatie’). 
330 Eerste Fase Evaluatie, p. 210. 
331 See Eerste Fase Evaluatie, p 5. 
332The Use of Privacy Enhancing Aspects of Biometrics 2009. 
333  Eerste Fase Evaluatie, p. 211. According to the authors, especially further interpretation of substantive 
standards through self-regulation has only been realized to a restricted extent. 
334 Eerste Fase Evaluatie, p. 211. 
335 First Chamber, 31.324 (R1844). FIDIS 
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currently going through the parliamentary process. On 20 January 2009, the Dutch Second 
Chamber passed the amendment with a majority formed by the PvdA, VVD, ChristenUnie, 
SGP, CDA, PVV and the member Verdonk. The amendment is still pending before the Senate 
(First Chamber). The Senate commission for Home Affairs (BZK/AZ) has published its report 
on 24th March 2009
336 and is waiting for a ministerial reply.   
The amendment to the Passport Act provides that the public prosecutor can request access to 
the data in the central database ‘Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie’, under the strict rules 
applying to access to data in the context of a criminal investigation.
 337 For a ruling about the 
necessity of central storage, we refer to the Huber case
338 of the European Court of Justice 
discussed above in section 2.3. 
Basisvoorziening Vreemdelingen (Foreigners’ Database) 
Finger scans of foreigners (including other EU citizens)
339 are stored in the Foreigners’ 
Database for the purpose of identification. The finger scans are stored to prevent identity 
fraud and to make the implementation of the Foreigners Act 2000 more efficiently. The finger 
scans are not stored for law enforcement purposes. 
After the Huber case, the Commission Meijers, the Dutch Standing Committee of Experts on 
International Immigration, Refugee and Criminal law,
340 has suggested
341 that the European 
Court of Justice may find a swipe search of the Foreigners’ Database on the basis of Article 
55c Code of Criminal Procedure 
342 unlawful. In a reply to the Dutch Senate, the Minister of 
Justice has indicated that he does not think this is the case. He refers to the fact that in the 
proposal for the amendment to the Passport Act, Article 4a (1) stipulates that a face scan and 
four finger scans of every Dutch citizen are stored when he or she applies for a passport. As a 
result of Article 4b (4) of that amendment, the public prosecutor can request access to these 
data. According to the Minister, the conditions in the law which apply to a Dutch passport 
                                                 
336 http://www.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vi3muuvdnnsz/f=y.pdf 
337  Artikel 4b, al. 4 of the amendment states it in Dutch as follows : ‘De verstrekking van biometrische 
kenmerken van de houder uit de reisdocumentenadministratie in de gevallen, bedoeld in het tweede lid, onder a 
en c, geschiedt uitsluitend aan de officier van justitie. De verstrekking vindt slechts plaats: a. ten behoeve van de 
vaststelling van de identiteit van een verdachte of veroordeelde voor zover in het kader van de toepassing van het 
strafrecht van hem biometrische kenmerken zijn genomen en er twijfel bestaat over zijn identiteit; b. in het 
belang van het onderzoek in geval van een misdrijf waarvoor voorlopige hechtenis is toegelaten’, available at 
http://parlis.nl/pdf/kamerstukken/KST121168.pdf  
338 OJ C 44 21.2.2009, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:044 
:0005:0005:EN:PDF 
339 See Article 1(e) of the Foreigners Act 2000, available at http://www.legislationline.org/ documents/id/4680  
340  The Standing Committee of Experts on International Immigration, Refugee and Criminal law, is an 
independent committee established by five non-governmental organisations: the Dutch Bar Association, the 
Refugee Council, the Dutch section of the International Commission of Jurists, the Dutch Centre for 
Immigrants/FORUM and the National Bureau against Racism (LBR). It monitors developments in the area of 
Justice and Home Affairs and presents its opinion to the Dutch Parliament, the European Parliament, parliaments 
in other Member States, the European Commission and to other public authorities and non-governmental 
organisations. 
341 The Commission Meijer has published an open letter about the Bill on identification of suspects 
(‘Wetsvoorstel Identiteitsvaststelling verdachten’) on the 22nd January 2009, which is available at 
http://www.commissie-meijers.nl/assets/commissiemeijers/Commentaren/2009/CM0901%20 
Brief%20Commissie%20Meijers%20Wetsvoorstel%20Identiteitsvaststelling%20verdachten.pdf  
342 Article 55c of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a procedure which allows the prosecutor to access 
data held by other authorities under certain circumstances. FIDIS 
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holder who is suspected are similar to the ones in applying to a suspect who ‘is probably an 
alien’ and ‘a search request is made by the prosecutor in order to have access to data of 
foreigners in the database.’
343  
An interesting legal point is here whether the Minister in fact implies that swipe searches can 
be held in both databases to compare the finger scans of a suspect against all scans held.   
 
Progis Protocol Identification in the Criminal Justice Chain (Progis Protocol 
identiteitsvaststelling in de Strafrechtketen) 
The goal of the draft law on Identification in the Criminal Justice Chain
344 is to strengthen a 
trustworthy identification of suspects and convicts in the criminal justice chain. The proposed 
Act on the Identification of Suspects, Convicts and Witnesses (‘Wet identiteitsvaststelling 
verdachten, veroordeelden en getuigen’) recognizes four ways of identifying a person: a 
declaration, the presentation of a valid identification document, providing a face scan and 
finger scans. The proposed law indicates which type of identification is required/allowed at 
which moment in time. The law would also introduce new elements such as that the suspect 
needs to identify him or her self before a judge. 
The proposed law was passed by the second chamber of the Dutch Parliament in December 
2008 and is currently pending before the Senate Chamber. The Justice committee of that 
Chamber has received a Ministerial reply (‘Memorie van Antwoord’) on 17th of March 
2009.
345 The Progis protocol has in the meantime been tested within the criminal justice 
system and several changes have been made. The protocol relies heavily on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of biometric identification and verification.    
  
                                                 
343  Memorie van Antwoord 31436, 17 March 2009, p. 11, available at http://www.dnasporen.nl/docs/ 
wetregelgeving/KST128925.pdf .The Minister stated it as follows :  ‘These conditions are materially similar to 
the conditions under which the fingerprints of foreigners for the purpose of determining the identity of a 
suspected foreigner (see Article 55c, second and third paragraph, Code of Criminal Procedure) and the detection 
and prosecution of criminal offenses (see my letter of November 12, 2007) are consulted. Therefore, I believe, 
contrary to the Commission Meijers, that there is no reason to doubt whether the Court would deem it acceptable 
that the fingerprints that have been taken from a suspect on the basis of Article 55c, second and third paragraph, 
Code of Criminal Procedure are compared with the fingerprints that have been processed in the context of the 
“Basisvoorziening Vreemdelingen”, if the suspect is probably a foreigner’ (free translation). 
344 http://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20081202/gewijzigd_voorstel_van_wet_2/f=y.pdf 
345 See Eerste Kamer Stand van Zaken: http://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/31436_wet_identiteits 
vaststelling   FIDIS 
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6.4  The National Data Protection Authority on biometrics  
In contrast to France, it is in the Netherlands not mandatory to request an opinion on or an 
authorization for the processing of biometric data. A notification of the use of a biometric 
application with the DPA is all that is required to get a new biometric application started. 
Normally, the DPA does not take further steps after it receives the notification of the 
processing of biometric data.
346  In principle, the notification to the DPA does not imply an 
approval. To the contrary, the notification allows the authority to react if this is needed. In 
practice, and due to staff constraints, this seldom happens, however. As it is not required that 
the processor or controller waits for a 'green light', the controller can start the processing 
straight after notification. 
Thus, in practice the role of the DPA has been to receive notifications, to make an 
administrative check on them and to place all notifications on a register accessible through its 
website.
347 A few organisations have asked the DPA to issue a preliminary opinion. Whilst 
the 1999 report At Face Value mentioned above was pro-active, the Dutch DPA activities 
have been of a more re-active nature since then.
348  
Concerning the semi public or private use of biometric applications, the main supervisory 
activity of the DPA has been the publication of three preliminary (non-binding) opinions, 
which are hereunder discussed.  
  
Opinion relating to an access control system with the use of a biometric disco pass
349 
In 2001, a producer requested the DPA an opinion on an access control system named ‘VIS 
2000’.
350 This biometric system was designed for use by sport centres, social clubs or similar 
establishments. Apart from organising access control, the system served marketing and 
management purposes and allowed keeping a ‘black list’ of customers who had violated the 
rules. The VIS 2000 stored the templates of the fingerprint and the face. The templates of the 
face were stored in a central database, combined with the membership card number and a 
code for the ‘violation of club rules’. The card number was linked to the personal details of 
the members. The biometric data were also stored on a smart card, and used for membership 
verification when entering the club. When a person entered with the card, the system 
performed a check against the black list of banned persons, one of the main purposes of VIS 
2000. The biometrics were hence used for the purposes of verification (1:1 check, comparing 
whether the holders of the membership cards were the owners of the card) and of 
identification (1:N check, comparing whether the holders were registered on the black list).  
In case of incidents, violators could be identified by their biometric characteristics. This 
involved reverse engineering of the stored templates of the face to images, comparing the 
                                                 
346 See also The Use of Privacy Enhancing Aspects of Biometrics. 
347 See www.cbp.nl. 
348 For a comparison between for example Belgium and the Netherlands see also E. Kindt and J. Dumortier, 
‘Biometrie als Herkenning- of Identificatiemiddel’, Computerrecht 2008, p. 132 et seq. and P. De Hert  and A. 
Sprokkereef, ’Biometrie en Recht in Nederland’, Computerrecht, 2008, pp. 301-302. 
349 CBP (before ‘Registratiekamer’), Biometrisch toegangscontrole systeem VIS 2000, 19 March 2001 (‘discopas 
opinion’), available at  www.cpbweb.nl (last accessed 28th March 2009).   
350 About this opinion, see also E. Kindt, ‘3.2.2. Situation in some selected countries. The Netherlands’, in  
FIDIS deliverable D3.10 Biometrics in Identity Management, E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds), p. 45 et seq., 
available at  www.fidis.net   
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images with the images of the violators taken by surveillance camera’s, and connecting the 
templates with the name, address and domicile data if a membership card had been issued. 
The purposes of VIS 2000 were to increase the security of visitors and employees at the clubs, 
to maintain order and to refuse access to unwanted visitors.   
The DPA stated in its opinion that the use of biometric data for access control purposes is far 
reaching. It should be evaluated whether the use of biometric data is in proportion with this 
purpose. To this end, the DPA checked the collection and use of the biometric data against 
several obligations of the Data Protection Act. The DPA did not report on investigating 
whether there were other, less intrusive means to maintain order and refuse black list 
individuals entry to the club without storing biometrics in a central database.
351 In this 
opinion, the DPA explicitly recognizes the possibility of the algorithm used to reconstruct the 
face of the original scanned facial image from the template. This reverse engineering of the 
templates was one of the main functionalities of VIS 2000 in identifying violators. This 
technical feature, however, has important consequences. First, it should be noted that the face 
scan might well contain information about race, which shall in principle not be processed. The 
Dutch Data Protection Act contains an explicit exception to this prohibition of processing of 
this information, in particular, when such processing is used for the identification of the 
person and to the extent that this is necessary for this purpose. On the one hand, the DPA 
concluded it was inevitable that use is made of templates of the face (containing information 
about race) for the identification of troublemakers.
352 On the other hand, the DPA stated that 
the use of personal data for marketing purposes should not include biometric data and that the 
processing for this purpose should be separated from the other purposes. The DPA concluded 
its opinion with several recommendations, including conditions for storage and security 
(encryption of templates and membership card numbers) and for the operation of the 
biometric system. The DPA also requested that any systems already installed would comply 
with these requirements. 
This opinion of the Dutch DPA is different from the evaluation, comments and conclusion of 
the Belgian DPA with regard to a similar system. The Belgian DPA reported in its annual 
report of 2005 that it rendered a negative opinion on a similar system. It considered the use of 
biometric characteristics for access control for a dancing club not proportionate with such 
purpose.
353 More particular, the Belgian DPA found the use of biometrics for identification 
purposes disproportionate and entailing risks for the privacy of the visitors. 
 
Opinion relating to the amendment to the Passport Act in order to introduce biometrics in 
2001
354   
Several EU member states planned or started to issue biometric passports in furtherance of the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004.
 The regulations and the legal aspects of the use of 
biometrics in ID documents and passports have been analyzed in detail in FIDIS deliverable 
                                                 
351For example, the simple confiscation of the membership card of the person concerned in combination with 
checking new applications against a central list of suspended individuals.   
352 As stated above, the DPA did not make a proportionality test about the use of biometric data, and the opinion 
therefore indicates that a necessity test to use information about race should be regarded as sufficient for the 
purpose.  
353 See  E. Kindt, l.c., Datenschutz and Datensicherheit (DuD), 2007,  N° 31, pp. 166-170. 
354 CBP, Wijziging Paspoortwet z2001-1368 (invoering biometrie), 16 October 2001. FIDIS 
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3.6. ‘Study on ID Documents’ of 2006.
355 On 19th September 2001, the Dutch Home Office 
Minister requested the DPA’s advice on some new paragraphs proposed to Article 3 of the 
passport law. On examination of the provisions, the DPA concluded that the new passport law 
would allow biometric data to be stored in the travel document administration of the 
appropriate authorities. The DPA pointed out that there were not enough arguments to support 
the necessity of the measure. On the basis of the current arguments, the DPA rejected the need 
for such a measure. It also stated that even if these grounds were to be put forward, the 
Passport Act would still need to be based on the purpose limitation principle, whilst in the 
current wording the purpose was open ended.  
In a second advice of 30 March 2007, this argument was repeated, and the DPA argued 
against (de-)central storage, warning for the effect of ‘function creep’.
356 It should be noted 
that databases are not necessary for passport control procedures as the data are to be matched 
against the reference data on the chip in the passport. It is clear that central databases may 
prevent citizens from obtaining several identity documents in different names. At the same 
time, the question is whether anti identity fraud objectives cannot be achieved with other 
means. A central, or decentralized, database is inherently privacy invasive and security 
sensitive.
357  
A strong proponent of storage of original biometric data is Grijpink who argues that 
decentralized storage of four (in stead of two in the passport only) finger scans in the local 
data base of a Dutch municipality is a very powerful way to prevent large scale identity fraud 
with biometrics in passports.
358 In the absence of a database, the biometrics of an individual 
who claims to be the victim of identity fraud cannot be checked against original finger scans 
stored, and the perpetrator can easily go undetected. According to Grijpink, in the case of 
small scale, private or semi public applications, this argument does not hold, because the 
impact of identity fraud is not so profound and proportionality becomes a more important 
issue. In smaller scale applications, it is also possible to detect or prevent fraud through other 
means.   
 
Opinion of 2004 on the use of face recognition and the use of biometrics for access control to 
public events, combined with use for police investigations
359 
The most concrete DPA opinion on the legal requirements to be fulfilled when introducing a 
biometric system is this opinion on the protection of personal data and the use of face 
recognition technology.
  
The system involved the use of a smart card that served as an entry ticket at large scale events. 
The smart card contained an identifying number, a limited period of validity and a face scan 
(digital template) of the holder. At the entry gates, a digital picture was taken of the person 
                                                 
355 For a very good analysis, see Hornung, 2007. 
356 CBP, Wijziging Paspoortwet advies z2007-00010 (invoering biometrie), 30 maart 2007, 5 (cbpweb.nl) 
357 See for example JH, Hoepman, E. Hubbers, B. Jacobs, M. Oostdijk and R. Wichers Scheur, ‘Crossing 
Borders: Security and privacy issues of the European e-Passport’, 1st Int. Workshop on Security, LNCS 4266, 
page 11, Kyoto, Japan, October 23-24, 2006. 
358 J. Grijpink, ‘Biometrie, Veiligheid en Privacy’, Privacy en Informatie 2008, Vol 11, pp. 10-14; J. Grijpink, 
’Two Barriers to Realizing the Benefits of Biometrics’, Computer Law and Security Report 2005, Vol. 21(3), 
249-256; J. Grijpink, ’Biometrics and Privacy’ , Computer Law and Security Report 2001,Vol. 17(No. 3), pp. 
154-160. 
359 CBP, Vragen over de inzet gezichtsherkenning z2003-1529, 3 February 2004. FIDIS 
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offering the card and the resulting template compared to the template on the smart card. This 
entailed a verification as to whether the person offering the card is in fact the legal holder. The 
decision to let someone pass the gate was an automated decision as the number of the smart 
card would be checked against the card numbers of banned persons on a black list. The 
templates made at the entry gates and the numbers of the cards would be stored on a temporary 
event database. These data served to identify persons that had caused disturbances at the event, 
through templates obtained through pictures taken by surveillance cameras. These would be 
checked against the templates stored in the event data base. A hit would result in getting access 
to the information stored on the card and in the administration of the event organiser.   
The DPA stated in a commentary at its website www.cbp.nl that, generally speaking, it is not 
an opponent of the use of biometrics for event access control. In fact, the DPA stated that 
sometimes the use of biometrics can prevent the unnecessary handling of personal data. In the 
present case, however, there is a strong link between access control and identification. 
However, as the templates are in this case stored in an event data base, the use of the smart 
card is not restricted to access control. Therefore the objectives of the access control system 
needed careful examination and specification, especially when visitors have no other option 
than using the system. 
Whether more personal data are processed than necessary in detecting the violators of the 
event’s rules, is determined by the following. An adequate process for the issuance and 
management of smart cards leads to better access control and therefore to a reduced need for 
setting up a ticket holder data base. Stricter access control would normally lead to a reduction 
in the number of those intending on misbehaving, and therefore less identification is needed. 
To determine whether the building of an event data base is necessary, it would be necessary to 
have an insight into the impact of biometric controls. It can also be expected that potential 
violators of the rules will try to avoid recognition by the system by putting on all kind of 
disguises after having passed access control.
360 
When the detection of a violator depends only to a limited extent on the templates stored on the 
event data base, then the use of the system threatens to become disproportional. If the use of 
the system does not really produce more benefit than the already existing instruments to detect 
violators, then the concept contains unnecessary processing of data. The DPA confirms that 
unnecessary processing of data is illegal.
361  
In the conclusion, the third DPA opinion introduces the basic condition that it needs to be 
proven that the use of face recognition technology increases safety in a proportional manner. 
The key sentence in the opinion is therefore the following:  
 
“When the introduction of the system, in view of all the instruments already available, 
does not provide additional value, the concept entails unnecessary processing of 
data”.
362  
                                                 
360 All these observations are mentioned the DPA opinion itself 
361 See the full opinion on a detailed test of the concept of data processing: CBP , 27 May 2004, z2003-1529.  
362 See also section 6.1.2. of the fore mentioned opinion of the DPA. FIDIS 
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6.5 Conclusion 
Our fieldwork reported elsewhere
363 and other studies
364 have shown that in the Netherlands 
external supervision on the use of biometrics is lacking especially. Due to staff shortage 
and/or lack of powers, the Dutch DPA has not been able to develop an active policy on the 
promotion of good practice in the use of biometrics. At the same time, the DPA can possibly 
not be expected to provide informed steering of the approach to biometrics all by itself.
365 So 
far, the introduction of biometrics has not been given significant attention. Guidelines on 
good practice in the implementation of biometrics such as those issued on the use of 
biometrics in schools in the UK
 would be one way of providing a lead and improving the 
information position of data subjects. For the DPA to issue detailed guidelines no new legal 
powers would be necessary.  
Certification of biometric applications would require a separate regulation on biometric 
applications. This approach was hinted at in the 1999 Face Value report but was never given 
serious attention. When such a legal basis for certification would be established, then other 
rules on the use of biometrics could be considered for codification. These provisions could 
include inter alia explicit legal prohibition to process raw images, an obligation to encrypt 
biometric data used for processing and an obligation to use multiple authentications.
366 The 
question is of course whether in practice these goals cannot be achieved with other means 
such as the information provision, the broadening of administrative powers
367, the extensive 
use of opinions and effective enforcement through increased consultation. Categorisation of 
different biometric applications in combination with more incentives for self regulation, 
would be a mid way house. This could be done through organising informal negotiations 
among stakeholders resulting in non-binding government advice (or categorisation of 
products) on the criteria with which biometric applications should comply with in particular 
situations. The advice would also have to include the conditions placed on overall system 
safety and information provision. 
Given the complexity of the assessment of the technical possibilities of biometrics, detailed 
legislation on the use of biometrics might make compliance more likely. However, no other 
European country has issued detailed and separate regulation for biometrics yet. As this study 
has shown, there is at least still room for a more effective enforcement of existing legislation 
through the instruments mentioned above in the Netherlands. Therefore, enforcement is the 
more obvious choice for the regulation of biometrics.  
                                                 
363 See The Use of Privacy Enhancing Aspects of Biometrics. 
364 For example: First Phase Evaluation of the Data Protection Act and also Brouwer in De Migratie Machine. 
365 On the role of the DPA and the development towards a second generation of supervisory authorities see P. 
Hert,  Citizens’ Data and Technology: An Optimistic Perspective, 2009. The Hague, Dutch Data Protection 
Authority, pp. 38-40. 
366 See The Use of Privacy Enhancing Aspects of Biometrics, p 302. 
367 Citizens’ Data and Technology: An Optimistic Perspective, p 39. FIDIS 
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7 Switzerland 
7.1 The  spreading  of  biometric applications 
Switzerland delivers since September 2006 a passport for a limited period of 5 years 
containing the digital image of the face of the person in a so-called pilot-project. The 
introduction of the biometric passport, however, remains pendant as the introduction waits for 
a decision of the people of Switzerland that will vote on the subject, foreseen for 17 May 
2009. 
Biometrics are not yet implemented in the Swiss ID and neither in the social security card. 
Furthermore, and according to reports of the Federal Data Protection Agency, biometrics have 
been implemented in other applications for access control. The two different access control 
implementations are as described below.  
First of all, a biometric application was used for securing the check-in at the airport of Zürich-
Klotten.
368 During a test phase (from December 2004 to mid-April 2005), the firm Swissport 
International AG used biometrics for easing the boarding. The test was limited to one 
destination and one company. The passengers for that destination received the opportunity to 
participate to the pilot project. At the check-in desk, the attendant checked the ID of the 
participant and the biometrics of the participant was then stored on a chip-card that was 
carried by the passenger. The passengers could then use a biometric system (matching their 
data with the ones on the card) for boarding. The advantage was that identity was checked 
only once by the Swissport. This didn't interfere with the security checking and border control 
that were not affected by this measure. The information on the card was deleted right after the 
boarding and no central database was used. The Data Protection Agency (DPA) made some 
recommendations regarding the information to be provided and the explicit consent of 
participants, as well as on the immediate deletion of data contained in the cards. 
Biometrics was also implemented in the access control system of a swimming pool in 
Schaffhouse.
369 This application was introduced in a first version in the summer 2005 for a 
test period. Then the comments of the DPA required changes in the implementation and these 
changes were introduced during the year 2006. The system is used to control the access to the 
swimming pool. The system is based on a central database containing all the templates, and a 
set of cards, and each user of the pool receives one card. In the enrolment phase, each user 
shows his/her forefinger whose fingerprint is registered. The fingerprint is transformed into a 
template that is stored centrally in the database. The user also receives a card containing an 
identifier. For entering the pool, the user inserts his/her card in the system. The system gets 
the corresponding template and asks the user to present his finger. The fingerprint is scanned 
and compared to the template. If the data match, the person can enter the swimming pool.  
                                                 
368  Eidgenössischen Datenschutz- und Öffentlichkeitsbeauftragten (EDÖB)/ Préposé Féderal à la Protection des 
Données et à la transparence  (PFPDT)) [Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC)], 
Einsatz von Biometrie beim Check-In und Boarding im Rahmen des Pilotprojektes “Secure Check” der 
Swissport International AG und Checkport Schweiz AG am Flughafen Zürich-Kloten, June 2005. 
369 Eidgenössischen Datenschutz- und Öffentlichkeitsbeauftragten (EDÖB)/ Préposé Féderal à la Protection des 
Données et à la transparence  (PFPDT)) [Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC)], 
Erhebung biometrischer Daten beim Erwerb einer Dauerkarte in den Sport- und Freizeitanlagen KSS 
Schaffhausen, Schlussberricht, April 2006. 
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Biometrics are also used by the police. The police use biometrics to find the committers of 
crimes. In some cases of the federal court, reference is made to biometrics.
370 The police is 
also allowed to use DNA profiles to identify criminals.
371 Since Switzerland has now become 
part of the Schengen Area, it will participate in the Schengen Information System which 
contains biometric information.  
As to whether there has been any public debate about the introduction of biometrics in 
Switzerland, reference is made to the discussion about biometrics because of the introduction 
of biometrics in passports (see below). 
7.2 Legislation  regulating biometric applications 
Biometric applications are governed by the Law on Data Protection.
372 The federal law on 
data protection has been revised in 2008 and includes a definition of the role of the DPA. The 
Swiss Federal DPA published guidelines for the development of biometric applications.
373 
These guidelines will be discussed below. 
As far as known, there are in general no specific provisions in the national legislation which 
refer to biometric data/applications, and no legal definition of biometrics.  
For the adoption of biometrics for passports and travel documents (implementation of Council 
Regulation 2252/2004), the parliament (both Chambers) discussed the issue and the legal text 
was approved by the Chambers.
374  
Notwithstanding this law, a referendum has been set up and the citizens of Switzerland will 
vote on the subject on 17 May 2009.
375 
During the months of April and May 2009, it is very likely that there will develop a new 
public debate to convince voters about the choice to make for the biometric passports. All the 
elements of this debate are not yet known, but the promoters of the referendum who are 
against the biometric passport used the following arguments in their campaign:
376 
  The passport will be more expensive; 
  Risks with the security because of the centralization of data; 
  Competence transferred to the Swiss Confederation; 
                                                 
370 See, for example, Swiss Federal Court, 6S.454/2006 /rod, Refus du sursis à  l'exécution de la peine et à  
l'expulsion (art. 41 CP), 28 December 2006. 
371 Swiss Federal Court, 1B_71/2007, Probenahme und Erstellung eines DNA-Profils im Rahmen eines 
Strafverfahrens, 31 May 2007. 
372 Loi Fédérale sur la Protection des Données [Federal Data Protection Act ], June 1992, as modified (‘Federal 
Data Protection Act’). 
373 See Eidgenössischen Datenschutz- und Öffentlichkeitsbeauftragten (EDÖB)/ Préposé Féderal à la Protection 
des Données et à la transparence (PFPDT)) [Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC)],  
Guide relatif aux systèmes de reconnaissance biométriques, November 2008 (‘Guide for Biometric Systems 
2008’). 
374 Arrêté fédéral portant approbation et mise en œuvre de l’échange de notes entre la Suisse et la Communauté 
européenne concernant la reprise du Règlement (CE) 2252/2004 relatif aux passeports biométriques et aux 
documents de voyage (Développement de l’Acquis de Schengen) [Federal Act approving and implementing 
Regulation (CE) 2252/2004] (Développement de l’Acquis de Schengen), Swiss Parliament, 13 June 2008. 
375 Département Fédéral Justice et Police [Federal Department Justice and Police], Communiqué ‘“Passeport 
biométrique et liberté de voyager: votation populaire en mai prochain”, Bern, Switzerland, October 29, 2008 
376  Überparteiliches Komitee gegen Biometrische Schweizer Pässe und Identitätskarten  [Party-independent 
committee against the Swiss biometric passport and identity card], FREIHEITSKAMPAGNE.CH, available at 
http://www.freiheitskampagne.ch/ FIDIS 
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  Insecurity about where and when the RFID tag can be read; 
  Insecurity about the usage of the data stored inside the passport or in the central 
database. 
 
The arguments of the advocates of the new passport are not known. Nevertheless, the main 
argument was until now the obligation to comply with the Council Regulation (CE) 
2252/2004.   
In a communication
377, the federal government of Switzerland (‘Conseil Fédéral’) states that 
the biometric passport must be introduced for the following reasons: 
 
  Obligation to fulfil the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) 
recommendations ; 
  The fact that every state member of the Schengen area will include two fingers and the 
picture of the person inside their passports ; 
  Obligation for Switzerland to implement the Council Regulation because of the 
Schengen Association Agreement ;  
  The fact that electronic and biometric passport have been or are being introduced in 54 
states and that such passports simplify the verification of identity, and make it more 
secure. As a result, electronic biometric passports reduce the risk of misuse of a 
passport and travelling under a false identity. 
 
As to the decision about the use of a national biometric database, such database is created by 
the “arreté fédéral”.
378 It can only be introduced if the citizens of Switzerland accept it at the 
referendum of the 17
th of May 2009. 
 
7.3  Approach to the specific legal issues of biometric applications 
There are, as far as known, no specific rules for the processing of biometrics as unique 
identifiers in particular. The goal of the “Guide relatif aux systèmes de reconnaissance 
biométique” (‘Guide for Biometric Systems 2008’) of the Swiss Federal DPA, however, was 
to prevent the use of biometrics as unique identifiers, by limiting the use of central databases 
and promoting decentralized applications. 
In the same Guidelines, the Swiss federal DPA states that some biometric data can contain 
sensitive information which fall within the relevant provisions relating to sensitive data of the 
Swiss Federal Data Protection Act. Sensitive data are data related to race or health (art.3 lit.c 
of LPD), so the following characteristics and biometric technologies which could contain 
some sensitive information are mentioned: fingerprint, hand or face geometry, iris scan, voice 
recognition because they contain information related to the race or the health of the person. 
                                                 
377 Département Fédéral Justice et Police [Federal Department Justice and Police], Communiqué “Passeport 
biométrique et liberté de voyager: votation populaire en mai prochain”, Bern, Switzerland, October 29, 2008. 
378 Arrêté fédéral portant approbation et mise en œuvre de l’échange de notes entre la Suisse et la Communauté 
européenne concernant la reprise du Règlement (CE) 2252/2004 relatif aux passeports biométriques et aux 
documents de voyage (Développement de l’Acquis de Schengen) [Federal Act approving and implementing 
Regulation (CE) 2252/2004] (Développement de l’Acquis de Schengen), Swiss Parliament, 13 June 2008. 
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The law in Switzerland gives a special status to “sensitive” data as described above. There is 
no other special type of data. Biometrics in general are not special data.  
Although the proportionality principle is mentioned both in the Federal Data Protection Act 
and in the Guide for Biometric Systems 2008 of the DPA, no precise definition of this 
criterion is given in both documents.  
 
As to whether consent is accepted as a basis for the processing of biometric data, the Swiss 
Federal data protection officer insisted in the two cases documented and described above
379 
on the notion of consent. The DPA obliged the providers to offer an alternative solution to the 
customers/users refusing the enrolment at the same costs for the service. The DPA also 
obliged the provider to give enough information (by augmenting the size of a poster for the 
check-in or by providing flyers to the clients of the swimming pool). As a result, the consent 
is only valid if it is given by a well informed customer who has also the opportunity to deny 
the offer. 
As to whether there are additional information and transparency requirements for the benefit 
of data subjects, the Data Protection Agency recommends informing the user before he enters 
such a program for the deployment of a biometric application.  
A biometric system should also not be based on elements that can be acquired without the 
users’ knowledge. The DPA hereby referred to the Working Document on biometrics of the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, which recommends the use of elements that can 
not be seen as traces.   
A biometric system that is only used to verify the identity of a person should always be 
decentralized, that means, that the user has in his/her possession a token containing his/her 
biometrics.  
 
In its Guide for Biometric Systems 2008, the Swiss Federal DPA recommends to implement 
security measures, without giving details. The biometric data are sensitive, so one should 
prevent any unjustified access. The access control can be both physical  and logical. The 
identified risks are located inside the storage and the data communication subsystems.  
As stated above, an alternative procedure must be provided according to the non-
discrimination principle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
379 See above, at footnote 368 and 369.   FIDIS 
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7.4  The National Data Protection Authority on biometrics   
Position of the DPAs in 2005 on the biometric passport 
In 2005, a group composed of federal and all cantonal Data Protection Officers wrote a 
commentary on the introduction of new passports containing biometrics.
380  
In this document they recommend not to use fingerprint and iris template in the passport. 
They also recommended not to store any raw data (for instance, the picture of the face) on the 
card, but rather to store a template, because the raw data may give access to more 
information (information relating to race, health, ...). They further recommend storing the 
information only inside the passport and not in a central data base. The use of RFID-chips to 
store the information is also a security risk for the DPAs.  
 
Guidelines on biometrics of November 2008 
In November 2008, the Swiss federal DPA published guidelines on the introduction of 
biometric applications.
381 The Guidelines provide definitions regarding core concepts of 
biometrics, such as “biometric template”, “failure to enrol”, “biometric identification” or 
“verification”, “false acceptance rate” or “false rejection rates”. The Guidelines further 
provide recommendations for the implementation of biometrics based identification systems. 
Finally, the Guidelines also include an evaluation guide. 
The decisive criteria deployed by the Swiss federal DPA and explained in the Guidelines 
mentioned above, are hereunder briefly described.   
The DPA requires that the biometric application is legal (‘licite’), transparent and contains a 
clearly defined goal. If the goal is explicitly identification (means 1 to N matching) then the 
data have to be centralized. But since in most of the cases only verification of the 
identification (means 1 to 1 matching) is required, the DPA suggests to only use decentralized 
data in this case. The objective is that the user always controls the use of his/her personal 
biometrics by carrying it physically with him/her (smart card or any similar device).
382  
The processing of biometric data is further restricted: it must be done accordingly to the 
purposes. No central data base should be used for doing the verification of the identity of a 
person, since other less privacy-invasive solutions exist. 
The Guidelines of de Swiss federal DPA restrict the use of biometrics to biometric 
information that need the consent of the person to be captured.
383 Some biometric 
characteristics can be captured and used without been noticed by the concerned person. In real 
life, people leave a lot of more or less usable traces. Moreover, some biometric characteristics 
can be captured in a way such that a person does not notice it. One should not implement 
biometric system using technologies based on data that can be leaved as traces or captured 
without involving the person (‘à l'insu des personnes concernées’). So one should opt for a 
system based on the shape of the hand rather than for a system based on fingerprints. 
                                                 
380 Die Schweizerischen Datenschutzbeauftragen/Les commissaires Suisses à la protection des données [The 
Swiss Data Protection Authorities], Vernehmlassung. Einführung des biometrischen Passes: Vorentwurf zur 
Änderung des Gesetzes und der Verordnung über die Ausweise für Schweizer Staatsangehürige, 26 September 
2005, available at http://www.privatim.ch/content/pdf/050926.pdf  
381 See above, at footnote 372.   
382 Ibid.  
383 Ibid. FIDIS 
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As to the security measures the Swiss federal DPA recommends to storing the templates of 
data and not the raw data. One has to explicitly express the need for storing raw biometric 
data. 
Guidelines on biometrics of Privatim of February 2007 
The group of Swiss DPAs, Privatim, had also issued earlier guidelines for the evaluation of 
data protection guidelines of biometric systems.
384 In these guidelines, the Privatim group 
stressed compliance with the existing legislation, recommending respect for the 
proportionality principle, restricted use of a minimum amount of personal data, in a 
decentralised way, with the use of anonymity or pseudonymity where possible, the use of 
systems which give results close to 100 %, security evaluation and appropriate legislative 
measures relating to liability.  
 
Pilot projects on biometrics in Switzerland 
Two pilot projects have been conducted under the surveillance of the DPAs. One pilot project 
related to the check-in at the airport of Zürich-Klotten and one was an access control system 
of a swimming pool in Schaffhouse.
385  
For the pilot at the swimming pool, the DPA obliged the operator of the system to include 
following features or improvements: improvement of the information about the system, 
provision of a possibility to use an alternative system for entering the pool and the 
anonymisation of the transaction data as soon as possible.  
But the main improvement imposed by the DPA was to store biometric data on smart cards. 
Since the system was only used for the verification of the identity of persons entering the 
area, there was no need for the central database. According to the report, this improvement 
should have been implemented for the start of the summer season 2007 (before 15 May 2007).  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
Switzerland is waiting for the result of the referendum of the 17
th of May 2009. This vote will 
certainly influence the future developments of biometrics in the country. 
  
                                                 
384 Privatim, Guidelines for the data protection compliance review of biometric systems, 6 February 2007, 15 p. 
reference available at http://www.privatim.ch/content/suche.php?zoom_query=biometrie  
385 See above at footnotes 368 and 369. FIDIS 
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8  United Kingdom   
8.1 Introduction   
Unlike most of the other EU Member States, the UK did not participate in the decision 
making around the Council Regulation 2252/2004
 which introduced the European electronic 
passport with biometric identifiers. This Regulation was adopted in the context of Schengen, 
in accordance with Council Decision 2000/365/EC. As such, because the UK does not take 
part in Schengen, there was no obligation on the UK to introduce biometrics, in particular 
biometric fingerprint.
386  Nevertheless, in line with international developments, the British 
government prepared for the introduction of biometrics into UK passports. More importantly, 
the UK government has made it clear with the proposed National Identity Register (NIR) that 
it intends to take the use of biometrics in identity management to an unprecedented large-
scale.  
At the same time, in the private and semi-public domains, the first biometric applications have 
already found their way into schools, banks, places of work and so on. What follows is an 
overview of relevant aspects and issues surrounding the use of biometrics in the UK. In our 
analysis, the NIR will be dealt with in detail. The expectation is that the NIR will play a 
pivotal and central role in the introduction of biometrics as the major factor in identification 
and authentication processes in the UK.
387 
 
8.2 The  spreading  of  biometric applications  
In general, the use of biometric applications in the UK is rapidly becoming wide spread. 
Below is a description of the areas where biometric applications are implemented, as well as 
of the debate about the introduction of biometrics, especially with regard to the introduction 
in the NIR. 
 
8.2.1  Fields in which biometric applications are implemented  
In December 2003, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Home Office listed the 
government projects that do or will make use of biometrics. The list was presented in an 
answer to a parliamentary question. The projects were listed in what seems to be an order of 
importance: the inclusion of the first and second biometric identifier in the British passport; 
biometric identifiers in the identity cards programme; the UK visas biometric programme; 
biometric travel documents; biometric residence permit; IAFS (Immigration and Asylum 
Fingerprints System); the e-Borders programme; the PITO project to use face recognition to 
support FIND; LANTERN (a mobile fingerprint system) and the national DNA database. In 
addition, the Under-Secretary of State listed some smaller projects involving the Home 
                                                 
386 The UK is, however, an ICAO member and the ICAO document 9303 for Machine Readable Travel 
Documents binding. This document provides for the inclusion of a digital photograph on a contactless chip, 
while an addition biometric identifier, such as fingerprint, remains for the members optional (See about ICAO 
document 9303 and the requirements of biometric identifiers  also M. Meints and M. Hansen (eds.), o.c., p. 59 et 
seq.). 
387 The goal of the application of biometrics in the UK is to hold the biometrics of all citizens on a register so 
that the government can achieve reliable authentication of identity claims, in particular to ensure that the person 
presenting an identity document is the lawful holder.    FIDIS 
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Office: IDENT1, Application Registration Cards (ARC), ISRP, VIAFS, IRIS, C-Nomis, pilot 
of methadone dispensing system using iris recognition at HMP Eastwood Park, and a trial of 
fingerprint based access control to IT systems in prisons.
388 Participation in most of these 
government projects is mandatory. Of course, the decision to request a passport or identity 
card can be framed as voluntary. However, given the fact that many government services 
cannot be obtained without passport or identity card, this is a theoretical argument. 
Interestingly, the use of biometrics is also on the rise in the semi-public domain. Current 
estimations are that 1000 schools in the England and Wales use body characteristics of their 
pupils to increase the efficiency of their processes or the safety on their school premises. 
When the news about schools using biometric applications for library loans, school access or 
registration of school lunches was getting some publicity through the media, this resulted in a 
political response. Questions were asked in the House of Commons,
389 a Member of 
Parliament started an investigation in his constituency
390 and individual concerned parents 
filed requests for information in the context of the Freedom of Information Act (‘FOI’). 
Lateron, a parent pressure group was established leading to some coordinated action and a 
website with advice and information for parents.
391 Some time later, the Information 
Commissioner for England and Wales
392 and BECTA
393 issued guidelines on the use of 
biometrics in a school context. In February 2009, the fist draft of Scottish guidelines on the 
use of biometrics in schools was published.
394 As the use of biometrics on systems involving 
school children is now growing rapidly, it is interesting to note that at the website of the 
CESG,
395 it is stated that there are currently no UK government approved biometric 
applications for this purpose. Schools are thus free, but also relatively alone, in making 
complicated choices on whether and what kind of applications to introduce.  
Although commercial applications have become widespread, many projects still take the form 
of pilots. In some of these projects participation is not voluntary but obligatory. Two pilots 
have been reported extensively in the media: paying with your finger and renting a car with 
your finger as a security against theft.  
For the first pilot, three Co-op supermarkets in Oxfordshire registered clients who would pay 
their groceries through a pay by touch (fingerprint) system. Market research by the Coop 
found that of the 1,000 shoppers questioned in the three stores, half had already signed up to 
                                                 
388  See http://gizmonaut.net/blog/2006/12/03  
389 The question (82580) was submitted by David MacLean on 13 September 2005 and the answer can be found 
at:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm060931/text/60913w2385.htm#060919160
00121   
390 See http://archive.thenorthernecho.co.uk/2007/1/9/233273.html  
391  See http://www.leavethemkidsalone.com/  
392 Information Commissioner’s Office, The use of biometrics in schools, available at < http://www.ico.gov.uk/ 
upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/fingerprinting_final_view_v1.11.pdf>, last 
consulted 11 March 2009.  
393 Becta, Becta guidance on biometric technologies in schools, available at < http://schools.becta.org.uk/upload-
dir/downloads/becta_guidance_on_biometric_technologies_in_schools.pdf>  
394 See http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/feb/scotland-biometrics-in-schools-consult.pdf  
395 The CESG does provide advice on biometrics product selection and for this purpose publishes on its website 
a manual: UK Biometrics Working Group, Biometrics for Identification and Authentication – Advice on Product 
selection, available at < http://www.cesg.gov.uk/policy_technologies/biometrics/media/biometricsadvice.pdf>, 
last consulted 11 March 2009.  FIDIS 
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the scheme or planned to do so soon and the trial was subsequently extended to three more 
supermarkets.
396  
The second pilot project by car rental companies and Essex police at Stansted required 
customers to provide their fingerprints; if they failed to oblige they could not rent a car at the 
airport. Biometric data that were collected were kept by the rental company, but handed over 
to police when the car had been stolen or used for another crime. Some customers have 
reacted negatively and have called the measure disproportionate, felt threatened or exposed or 
questioned the safety of their data.
397 
Nevertheless, evidence of the use of biometrics in the private sector remains quite anecdotal 
and as far as we are aware, no reliable empirical data are available. 
 
8.2.2 National  studies  and debate about biometrics 
The London School of Economics (‘LSE’) initiated a project, called The Identity Project,
 to 
examine the potential impacts and benefits of the National Identity Scheme in detail. The LSE 
presented its findings in the highly profiled report ‘The Identity Project: an assessment of the 
UK Identity Cards Bill and its implications’. In this report the LSE concludes that the scheme 
could offer some basic public interest and commercial sector benefits. However, the main 
findings and conclusions drawn up in the report indicate that the scheme is too complex, 
technically unsafe, overly prescriptive and lacks a foundation of public trust and confidence.
398 In 
particular, with regard to the technology that will be used, that is biometrics, the report states:   
‘The technology envisioned for this scheme is, to a large extent, untested and unreliable. No scheme on 
this scale has been undertaken anywhere in the world. Smaller and less ambitious systems have 
encountered substantial technological and operational problems that are likely to be amplified in a 
large-scale, national system. The use of biometrics gives rise to particular concern because this 
technology has never been used at such a scale. 
The proposed system unnecessarily introduces, at a national level, a new tier of technological and 
organisational infrastructure that will carry associated risks of failure. A fully integrated national system 
of this complexity and importance will be technologically precarious and could itself become a target 
for attacks by terrorists or others.’ (stress added) 
399 
 
And with regard to the National Identity Register, the report states: 
‘From a security perspective, the approach to identity verification outlined in the Identity Cards Bill is 
substantially – perhaps fatally – flawed. In consequence, the National Identity Register may itself pose a 
far larger risk to the safety and security of UK citizens than any of the problems that it is intended to 
address.’
400 
 
                                                 
396 See http://software.silicon.com/security/0,39024655,39160744,00.htm  
397 The aim of this project was to prevent criminal organisations from stealing rental cars by using stolen 
passports, driving licenses and credit cards. For customer reactions and the first results of the trial see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/6129084.stm  
398 LSE, The Identity Project: an assessment of the UK Identity Cards Bill and its implications, June 2005, 
available at < http://is2.lse.ac.uk/idcard/identityreport.pdf> (‘The Identity Project’), p. 5. The Identity Project, 
accompanied with all other relevant reports and documents, can be consulted at http://is2.lse.ac. uk/idcard/ 
399 Ibid., p. 10.  
400 Ibid.,  p. 11.  FIDIS 
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The same points of criticism were expressed by the Information Commissioner as well, who 
stated it as follows: “My anxiety is that we don't sleepwalk into a surveillance society where 
much more information is collected about people, accessible to far more people shared across 
many more boundaries than British society would feel comfortable with.”
401 
In the above report, LSE also observes that since the publishing of the Identity Cards Act in 
2006, which is the bill which would lay down the legal foundation for the National Identity 
Scheme, there was increasing concern within business, academia and civil liberties groups 
about the lack of informed public debate about its implications for the UK.
402 In this respect, a 
parallel can be drawn with the by Hornung observed absence of a widespread public debate 
about the Council Regulation 2252/2004 which would bring about the introduction of 
biometrics within the European Union.
403  
The United Kingdom Passport Service (UKPS) itself carried out an investigation into the 
performances of several biometric identification methods. The study measured performances 
of three biometrics (face scan, finger scan and iris scan) in large scale applications in 2005.
404 
The key findings published were mainly concerned with technical issues concerning the 
employment and use of biometrics. The majority of participants from all sample groups 
successfully enrolled on all three biometrics. The enrolment success rate for disabled 
participants was much lower than the enrolment success rate for the other participants. 
Analysis showed that the factors which mostly affect the success rate are environmental, in 
particular the lighting conditions at different locations. Whilst the majority of participants 
were ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ concerned about having their biometrics recorded prior to 
enrolment, there was more concern felt within disabled participants and in particular for the 
iris biometric. Across all three biometrics and all three groups, the total number of 
participants ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ concerned about having their biometrics recorded after 
enrolment dropped when compared with pre-enrolment. The majority of participants felt 
biometrics would help with passport security, preventing identity fraud, preventing illegal 
immigration and would not be an infringement on their civil liberties.   
 
In 2006, the Information Commissioner commissioned the Surveillance Studies Network to 
write a report on the surveillance society.
405 The resulting 88 pages report includes some 
glimpses of life in 2016.
406 Although the use of RFID features in some of the examples, the 
role of biometrics is not presented as a major aspect of the developing surveillance society. 
One of the contributions of the report to the national debate is the introduction of the concept 
of surveillance impact assessment.
407  
                                                 
401 The Times, Beware rise of Big Brother state, warns data watchdog, available at < 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article470264.ece>, last consulted 23 February 2009.  
402 LSE, The Identity Project: an assessment of the UK Identity Cards Bill and its implications, available at < 
http://is2.lse.ac.uk/idcard/identityreport.pdf>, last consulted 23rd February 2009. p. 15.  
403 G. Hornung,  ‘Biometric Passports and Identity Cards: Technical, Legal and Policy Issues’, European Public 
Law, vol 11, issue 4,  2005; G. Hornung, ‘The European Regulation on Biometric Passports: Legislative 
Procedures, Political Interactions, Legal Framework and Technical Safeguards’, Script-ed, Vol 4, issue 3, 
September 2007.     
404 United Kingdom Passport Service, o.c.  at footnote 66. About the trial, see also fore-mentioned footnote. 
405 The Surveillance Studies Network, A Report on the Surveillance Society For the Information Commissioner, 
London,  2006. 
406 Ibid., pp 64-75. 
407 Ibid., pp 89-98. FIDIS 
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In 2007, the Nuffield Council published a report examining current police powers in the UK 
to take and retain bio information are justified by the need to fight crime. Using the 
proportionality principle as the basis, the report formulates a number of critical observations 
and/or recommendations to policy makers: 
408  
  the permanent storage of bio information taken from witnesses, victims, children, and 
people who are not later convicted;  
  the use of the National DNA Database for familial searching, ethnic inferencing and 
research;  
  the establishment of a population-wide DNA database;  
  the use of bio information in court; and  
  the governance and ethical oversight of forensic databases.  
One of the main concerns expressed in the report is that the threshold for holding DNA 
profiles on a forensic database is much lower in the UK than in any other member state of the 
EU. The government is urged to examine the implications of DNA exchanges for those on the 
UK NDAD. In this context the UK government should insist on two obligations into the Prüm 
Treaty.
409 These obligations are an obligation on national agencies to produce annual reports 
(including statistics) and an obligation on the European Commission to produce an overall 
evaluation.     
 
In January, 2009 the Rowntree Foundation has published a report on the so-called ‘Database 
State’.
410 The report, written by members of the Foundation For Information Policy Research, 
poses many questions about the legality of most of the government databases in the UK. This 
report charts these databases, creating the most comprehensive map so far of what the authors 
state have labelled the “Database State”. The authors of the report also indicate that 
information has sometimes been difficult to obtain and there may be omissions and errors. 
They point out that this year another study is carried out
411 to get an insight into the data held 
on citizens by UK government and see their study only as the beginning.
412  
 
Of the databases examined in this report, some hold biometric data. They are given the 
following lights
413: 
                                                 
408  Nuffield Council on Ethics, The Forensic Use of Bioinformation: Ethical Issues, September 2007, available 
at  http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/bioinformationuse/publication_441.html (last accessed 25th 
March 2009) 
409 Ibid., pp xxiii-xxiv. 
410 R. Anderson, I. Brown, T. Dowty, P. Inglesand, W. Heath, A. Sasse, Database State, York, Rowntree 
Foundation, March 2009 (‘Database State’). 
411 N Heath, ‘More data breaches to come, warns gov’t’, Silicon.com, Nov 27 2008, at 
http://www.silicon. com /publicsector /0,3800010403,39354289,00.htm 
412 Database State, p. 11. 
413 In the report, a traffic light system is employed to assess the databases identified. The system thus puts the 
databases in three categories:
 Red means that a database is almost certainly illegal under human rights or data 
protection law and should be scrapped or substantially redesigned. The collection and sharing of sensitive 
personal data may be disproportionate or done without consent, or without a proper legal basis; or there may be 
other major privacy or operational problems. Amber means that a database has significant problems, and may be 
unlawful. Depending on the circumstances, it may need to be shrunk, or split, or individuals may have to be 
given a right to opt out. An incoming government should order an independent assessment of each system to 
identify and prioritise necessary changes. Green means that a database is broadly in line with the law. Its privacy 
intrusions (if any) have a proper legal basis and are proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. Some of FIDIS 
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  INDENT1, the National Fingerprint Database (‘NFD’), (criminal), gets a green 
light (one out of only six green lights) 
  CRS, the Border Agency’s Central Reference System that holds information on 
people entering and leaving the country, including visas, is given the amber light 
  The Immigration and Asylum Fingerprint System (see below UK biometrics 
programme) obtains an amber light 
  NDAD, the Border Agency’s Central Reference System that holds information 
onpeople entering and leaving the country (see below UK biometrics programme) 
gets an amber light 
  PNC, the Police National Database that contains a wide range of information to 
support police operations, holds intelligence data and links to many other systems 
including biometric SIS data from 2010 receives an amber light 
  UKvisas Biometrics Programme receives an amber light
414 
  C-Nomis, The National Offender Management Service’s system, now part of 
Omni, used to run prisons: amber light
415 
  (NDNAD) The DNA database which holds DNA profiles taken from crime scenes, 
suspects and witnesses is shown the red light
416 
  NIR, the National Identity Register, receives a red light 
  ID cards (connected to NIR) receives also a red light.
417  
 
The following database relate to European data sharing: 
 
  SIS, the Schengen Information System, is shown the amber light; and 
  Data sharing agreements within the Prüm Framework receive a red light.
418 
 
Out of the ten recommendations in the report, we will highlight two that are particularly 
relevant for the use of biometrics in government databases. 
 
Following up on the conclusion that the UK public sector is starting to rely on systems that 
will have to be changed drastically once a litigant takes a case to Europe, the first 
recommendation is that government system builders should set out to comply with the ECHR 
rather than avoid it.
419 According to the authors, the existing mismatch has been made quite 
                                                                                                                                                          
these databases have operational problems, not least due to the recent cavalier attitude toward both privacy and 
operational security, but these could be fixed once transparency, accountability and proper risk management are 
restored. 
414 Database State, p. 24. 
415 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
416 Ibid., p. 21 
417 Ibid., p. 25. 
418 Ibid., p. 39. 
419 The first recommendation is that ‘Government should compel the provision or sharing of sensitive personal 
data only for clearly defined purposes that are proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. Where 
consent is sought for further sharing, the consent must be fully informed and freely given.”
419 The third 
recommendation of the report follows from there: “The systems rated amber in this report should be subjected to 
an independent review, for both their privacy impact and their overall benefits to society, while the systems rated 
red should either be scrapped (ID cards, communications database) or rewritten to support effective opt-outs 
(NHS Secondary Uses Service).’ Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
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clear first by I v Finland, which upholds a patient’s right to keep her medical records private 
from clinical staff not involved in her care, and S & Marper v UK in which the National DNA 
Database was found in breach of ECHR (see above section 2.2.1). 
 
The tentative conclusion from this section is that some very detailed and critical reports have 
been written but so far have not resulted in a change of course. That course is that the UK is 
rapidly introducing large scale biometric applications, and that the possibilities and 
opportunities for central storage and interlinking of data are explored rather than avoided.      
 
8.3 Legislation  regulating the use of biometric data  
8.3.1  General and specific privacy legal framework for biometrics 
The national legal privacy framework for biometrics is the Data Protection Act 1998, which 
came into force in March 2000 (hereinafter the ‘DPA 1998’) which is in principle applicable 
to the collection and processing of biometric data. However, the DPA 1998 does not contain 
specific provisions which mention biometric data as such. 
There are a number of separate instruments at the national and international level that would 
apply to certain aspects of the use of biometrics. As apart from DNA cases, there are no cases 
involving biometrics yet. Therefore, an analysis will have to be carried out on the basis of 
existing case law involving personal data. 
As stated above, according to Art 3 (2) and recital 13, the Directive 95/46/EC does not apply 
to the processing of data in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of European 
Community law, such as provided for by Titles V (provisions on common foreign and 
security policy) and VI (provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) of 
the Treaty on European Union. Activities that are processing operations concerning public 
security, state security and the activities of the state in areas of criminal law therefore all fall 
outside the scope of the Directive.  
Certainly, all matters relating to passports and national ID cards are not regulated by the 
Directive 95/46/EC and find their legal basis in UK legislation. For example, as already 
discussed above, the legal base for biometric data processing has been a major issue in the 
build-up to the adoption of the Identity Cards Act 2006.
420   
It is clear that beyond the directly applicable national legal framework, the right to privacy 
and the use of biometrics is complex. This applies especially to the use of biometrics in the 
context of the fight against terrorism.  
 
8.3.2  Legal provisions for government controlled ID biometric 
applications   
The UK National Identity Scheme 
The UK national identity system, also called the National Identity Scheme (NIS), is the main 
government initiative with regard to the use of biometrics in the UK. The scheme, based on 
the Identity Cards Act passed in March 2006, will provide a comprehensive way of recording 
                                                 
420 See for example the abovementioned The Identity Project. FIDIS 
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personal identity information, storing it and making it possible to use it if one wants to prove 
his or her identity. The NIS will apply to all those over 16 years old, including foreign 
nationals, who legally reside or work in the UK.
421  
The NIS is a long-term programme which will take several years before it becomes fully 
operational. The UK government envisages that the scheme will protect the public against 
identity theft and fraud. Other expected benefits include increased safety, through protection 
of the community against crime, illegal immigration and terrorism, and reassurance that 
workers in positions of trust, such as those working at airports, are who they say they are. 
The scheme is set to compound the deployment of government controlled biometric 
applications such as biometric visas, enhanced passports and identity cards, including those 
cards issued to foreign nationals in the form of biometric immigration documents.   
Notwithstanding the title of the Identity Cards Act, the basis of the Act is not the ID card but a 
database (The National Identity Register (‘NIR’)) containing information relating to 
individuals. The ID card will only be issued after the required “registrable” facts have been 
entered into the NIR.
422 A registrable fact in relation to an individual includes personal 
information which is defined as ‘his full name’, his other names by which he is or has been 
previously known, data and place of birth, date and place of death and ‘external 
characteristics of his that are capable of being used for identifying him’.
423 The term 
‘identifying information’ is also used in the Identity Cards Act and applies to biometric data 
especially. The Act refers to a photograph of head and shoulders, fingerprints and ‘other 
biometric information’ as well as to a handwritten signature. Iris scans are not mentioned in 
the Act. The Identity and Passport service has set up a website that also devotes special 
attention to biometrics. On the website facial recognition is mentioned but also “the features 
of the iris and other parts of the eye”.
424 
This and other explanations in publications of the Identity and Passport Service indicate that 
options are left open to include other biometrics as a later stage.
425 By using the term 
‘identifying information’ as a label for biometric data, the UK legislator shows that it places 
its trust primarily on biometrics for the authentication of identity.
426   
The identifying information (including biometric data) is recorded in Schedule 1 that contains 
eight other categories of information.
427 When a person enrols, biometric information (e.g. 
facial image, fingerprints) will be recorded, and there are mobile and local centres that are 
                                                 
421 Identity Cards Act 2006 (‘Identity Cards Act’) section 2 (2)(b). The Identity Cards Act can be consulted at < 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/pdf/ukpga_20060015_en.pdf>.  
422 Identity Card Act section 6 (6) and (8).  
423 Identity Card Act section 7 (1). 
424 See http://www.ips.gov.uk/identity/scheme-what-produced.asp  
425 New biometric identifiers can be introduced through the procedure as described in Section 3(6) of the Identity 
Card Act. See also below.   
426 The website for example explains: ‘Your biometrics will be permanently paired with your biographical 
information to create completely unique and secure identity data’. See http://www.ips.gov.uk/identity/scheme-
what-produced.asp 
427 This information is: the fore mentioned personal information, residential status, personal reference numbers, 
record history, registration and card history, validation information, security information and records of 
provision of information. It is important to note that the categories of information in the register can be changed 
at a later date: under the Act section 3(6) the Secretary ‘may by order modify the information for the time being 
set out in schedule 1’. Under section 3 (7) of the Act, the draft order must be laid ‘before Parliament and 
approved by a resolution to each House’.  FIDIS 
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equipped to register these kinds of data. The basic identity information will be recorded and 
maintained on the NIR. The NIR will thus contain only identity-related information.  
As it stands, medical records, tax and benefits information and other government records are 
not stored in the NIR. Of course, an important legal issue is whether registration under the Act 
is  compulsory. Registration is only required for certain groups of people, such as all 
individuals requiring a new passport and individuals subject to compulsory registration as 
mentioned in section 7(1)a of the Act. An individual subject to section 7 must register and 
apply for an ID card. The definition of compulsory registration is worded like this: ‘required 
to be entered in the Register in accordance with an obligation imposed by an Act of 
Parliament passed after the passing of this Act.’
428 So the individuals to whom this applies are 
as of yet unknown as they may only be required to register as a result of future primary 
legislation. The number and kind of groups or individuals that will be compulsory registered 
in the future is therefore left open and difficult to assess.
429  
As soon as a person is registered, this person becomes also under an obligation to notify 
changes and errors.
430 In the case of the registration of biometric data, this means that as soon 
as individuals become aware of an error in (the recording of) their biometric data, notification 
of this is compulsory on pain of civil penalty.
431 Therefore all British passport holders will 
eventually be on the NIR on a compulsory basis and will also be under an obligation to report 
errors/abuse they observe relating to their biometric data.
432 
The NIR is not intended as a single, large, database.
433 The different sets of NIR information 
– biometric, biographical and administrative – are not all held in a single system, but stored 
compartmentalized to maximise the safeguarding information. The register has links with 
other government systems to share identity data, and supports identity checking services.
434   
The ID cards themselves combine the cardholder’s biometric data with their checked and 
confirmed biographical information covering basic personal details (e.g. name, address, date 
of birth). A sub-set of the identity information held on the NIR is also printed on an identity 
card – a photo card with an electronic chip.
435 The chip holds the identity information as 
printed visibly on the card such as a digital photograph but also contains two fingerprints. 
Each card has its own Identity Registration Number (IRN), which is printed on the card and a 
Personal Identification Number (PIN), which the cardholder can set and use as one would for 
a credit or debit card.  
                                                 
428 Identity Card Act section 42. 
429 See the explanatory notes to the Identity Card Act: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/en 
/ukpgaen_20060015_en_1.htm, see especially note 58. 
430 Identity Card Act section 10 (1). 
431 Identity Card Act section 10 (1). The maximum penalty is 1000 GBP. 
432 For a more detailed discussion of the complicated issue of compulsory registration, voluntary consequence, 
compulsory obligation and compulsory consequence flowing from compulsory obligation resulting from the Act 
see Sullivan, C., ‘The United Kingdom Identity Cards Act 2006- Civil or Criminal?’, International Journal of 
Law and Information Technology, vol. 15, issue 3,  pp 328-330. 
433Home Office, National Identity Scheme Delivery Plan 2008, p. 25, available at < 
http://www.ips.gov.uk/passport/downloads/national-identity-scheme-delivery-2008.pdf>, last consulted 23 
February 2009.  
434 Home Office, Strategic Action Plan for the National Identity Scheme, December 2006, p. 7, available at < 
http://www.ips.gov.uk/passport/downloads/Strategic-Action-Plan.pdf> (‘Strategic Action NIR Plan’).  
435 Home Office, Identity Cards Act Secondary Legislation: A Consultation, available at < 
http://www.ips.gov.uk/identity/downloads/NIS_Legislation.pdf>, last consulted 23 February 2009, p. 10.  FIDIS 
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Accredited organisations (that can be both public and private sector organisations such as 
banks) can check an ID card and/or an NIR record with the permission of the holder. In this 
case, different levels of verification apply, depending on the service a person wants to 
access.
436 Basically, an individual’s identity data or information as presented will be 
compared with his/her entry in the NIR.
437 There are three levels of verification. The lowest 
level is a check using the photo on the ID card. The next level involves multi factor 
verification: a check of the physical card including the photo and the use of the personal 
identification number (PIN) and/or designated questions. The highest level check includes 
biometrics. Under the NIS correlation is considered to be verification. A check is only made 
on whether data match, whilst the validity of these matching data is not checked. 
As the accuracy of the biometric information itself is not checked, this makes the accuracy 
and safety of the NIR potentially vulnerable. In terms of biometrics, it places extra importance 
on accurate enrolment. The assumed reliability of biometric data might otherwise give a false 
sense of security. Of course, a low false acceptance rate (FAR) and the false rejection rate 
(FRR)
438 in trials carried out by independent labs is the first requirement for the safe use of 
biometrics. At the same time, other external factors have an even greater impact on the 
reliability of the identification and authentication process in large scale applications. To 
mention a few: racial and age diversity, circumstantial factors such as light or stress non-
cooperation factors and fraud and sabotage. The latter can express itself in, for example, 
manipulation of the equipment, government infrastructure break in, ‘spoofing’ and sabotaging 
of the enrolment or authentication process. These factors are often difficult to assess and have 
never been tested at a large scale and/or over a long period of time. At the same time, some 
authoritative claims or predictions have been made in the UK in this respect (see national 
studies below).  
As regard to the security of the scheme, there are integral functions that will oversee and 
manage the scheme in order to provide safeguards and to make sure the scheme is properly 
run and is supported by the proper legislation and regulations.
439 The Home Secretary  is 
ultimately responsible to Parliament for the running of the scheme. The yet to be established 
independent National Identity Scheme Commissioner will continually review the operation of 
the scheme and report to the Home Secretary, who has to share the report with Parliament and 
answer MPs’ questions. Finally, the Information Commissioner’s key powers to protect 
personal information will also apply to information held in the NIR. 
The most recent information indicates the following timeframe and milestones in the 
implementation process of the scheme.
440 The first identity cards have been issued on the 25th 
November of 2008 in the form of biometric immigration documents to foreign nationals from 
                                                 
436 For example, a financial institution may ask for proof of identity before completing certain transactions and 
will wish to check the validity of the ID card when it is presented. Section 12 of the Act provides the legislative 
authority for the release of information. 
437 Identity Card Act  section 7 (3)(a). See also Identity Card Act section 10 (3)(a). 
438 To give an indication: in the context of national identity management in general a FAR of 0,1 % and a FRR of 
5,0% are regarded as acceptable result scores for biometric authentication under supervision (see, for example, 
European Biometrics Forum, Biometrics in large Scale Systems, available at < http://www.eubiometricsforum. 
com /dmdocuments2/3rdEBFRSMaxSnijder.ppt>, last consulted 11 March 2009) 
439 Strategic Action NIR Plan’, p. 7.  
440 Home Office, National Identity Scheme Delivery Plan 2008: A Response To Consultation, available at 
<http://www.ips.gov.uk/identity/downloads/ConsultReportv2.pdf>, last consulted 23 February 2009, p. 7.  FIDIS 
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outside the European Economic Area.
441 Also in the second half of 2009, the Home Office 
will make a start with the issuing of identity cards to British and foreign nationals working in 
sensitive roles or locations, starting with airport workers.
442 From 2010 on, the Home Office 
intends to start issuing identity cards to young people, albeit still on a voluntary basis. Finally, 
from 2011/12, the Home Office will start to enrol British citizens at high volumes offering a 
choice of receiving a separate identity card, a passport or both. Both documents will carry 
biometric data. 
The ePassport 
In March 2006, the UK made a transition from digital to electronic passports (ePassports) in 
order to comply with the US Visa Waiver Programme and other international requirements.
443 
The main aim was to strengthen border controls. The ePassport contains an electronic chip 
storing biographical data and a digital facial image of the passport holder. The chip can be 
read using an appropriate electronic reader located at border control.
444  
To conform to other EU requirements specifying that electronic passports within the EU 
should include a second biometric identifier in addition to the face scan (digital photograph) 
by 2009, the UK plans to issue second generation ePassports soon.
445 These passports will 
store the holder’s finger scans on the chip.
446 Although the chip units (chip, its operating 
system, the antenna and the plastic covering in which it is housed) have been tested in 
laboratory conditions, their ability to withstand real-life passport usage is unknown.
447 
 
Other government controlled applications 
Next to the identity card and the ePassport, the UK is also using biometrics in other 
government controlled applications. When viewed in the light of the list of the Parliamentary 
                                                 
441 The contract for the early releases was given to Thales in August 2008. In the second half of 2009, the award 
of contracts for application and enrolment, biometrics storage systems and the production of identity cards and 
passports will take place.This means a delay in the original schedule. The information was given in reply to a 
question [224718] by MP Huhne on 25
th November 2008. See  http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.com/pa/cm200708/ cmhansrd/cm081125/text/81125w0020.htm 
442 The Identity and Passport Service has commissioned National Identity Scheme Tracking research. The 
research is carried out “in waves” by IPS, Business Development and Marketing. The results are published on 
the internet. In the fourth wave (May 2008) of those British citizens questioned, 64% were not aware of the plans 
to introduce the first cards to airport workers.    
443 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Identity and Passport Service: Introduction of ePassports, 
available at <http://www.ips.gov.uk/passport/downloads/Introduction_of_ePassports.pdf>, last consulted 23 
February 2009, p. 7.  
444 The ePassport was the first official UK document to incorporate an electronic chip in a paper document and it 
incorporates technically advanced security features to make it harder to forge and prevent unauthorised reading 
of the chip.  
445 As stated above, the UK is not obliged to comply with the EU regulations as it is not a signatory of the 
Schengen Agreement. Nevertheless it has decided to participate on a voluntarily basis. This secures participation 
in the development of the EU regulations in this area and helps maintain the security of the British passport on a 
par with other major EU nations. 
446 Although planned for 2009, there may be a slight delay in including finger scans in British passport chips. 
The reasons for this delay have not been made public. 
447  In the UK, there have been reports of doubts on the durability and reliability of the chip units used. British 
ePassports are intended to last ten years but the RFID chip units used only have a two year warranty. Compare 
also with footnote 440, p 2. FIDIS 
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Under-Secretary for the Home Office in 2003,
448 apart from the introduction of the NIR, the 
most important biometric applications used by the British Government have not changed 
since then. The three major ones are hereunder briefly described:
449  
  Through the UK visas Biometrics Programme, biometric visas (fingerprints) are being 
issued to foreign nationals who wish to enter the UK and require an entry visa. The 
programme covers three quarters of the world’s population and operates in 135 
countries. More than one million fingerprint scans have been completed.  
  The UK Border Agency operates the Iris Recognition Immigration System (IRIS) at 
some UK airports which provides a fast, secure and convenient way for foreign and 
returning UK travellers to enter the UK.  
  The fingerprints of asylum seekers are recorded when they register for an Application 
Registration Card (ARC).  
 
The national DNA database 
In general, DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is not considered a biometric. At the same time, DNA 
also contains information that will uniquely identify a certain person. Because of that reason, 
and because of major (worldwide) attention for this database, we nevertheless discuss hereunder 
the in the UK existing DNA database.
450  
 
The national DNA database (NDNAD) in the UK (comprising in this instance England & 
Wales and Northern Ireland; Scotland has a separate DNA database with different rules) is the 
largest in Europe, with liberal rules for taking and retaining DNA samples and profiles 
compared to other European countries. It is possible in the UK to retain bodily samples and 
DNA profiles upon arrest for any offence, regardless of whether a charge and conviction 
follows. With the DNA of 940,000 people on file the UK has the most “profiled” population in 
the world.
451 Recently, there have been a number of significant developments in the use of 
DNA profiling techniques in law enforcement. The government has announced an increase in 
funding to enable the UK DNA database to be more rapidly expanded – at the end of 2008 the 
number of profiles held was rising at the rate of 6,000 per week.  
 
In view of the fact that EU Member States have already started exchanging DNA profiles, all 
profiles collected in the UK can potentially be used by authorities in other EU Member States. 
By its Decision of 23 June 2008,
452 the European Council agreed to integrate the main 
provisions of the Prüm Convention into the EU's legal framework, to enable wider exchanges 
(between all EU Member States) of biometric data (DNA and fingerprints). All EU Member 
States will therefore be required to set up DNA databases. The Framework Decision on the 
                                                 
448 See http://gizmonaut.net/blog/2006/12/03  
449 Biometrics Assurance Group, Annual Report 2007, available at < 
http://www.ips.gov.uk/passport/downloads/FINAL-BAG-annual-report-2007-v1_0.pdf>, last consulted February 
2009, p. 4.  
450 We will not discuss the interface between bio banks and the storage of biometric(s) (templates). This has been 
done elsewere. See http://www.jus.uio.no/iri/om_iri/seminarer/Bodycontrol.html  
451 In September 2008, the government announced an extra £109 million to expand the database (this comes after 
the extra £34 million announced in September 1999).  
452 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly 
in combating terrorism and cross-border crime and Council Decision 2008/616/JHA on the implementation of 
Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and 
cross-border crime, OJ L 210, 6.8.2008.  FIDIS 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D13.4 
 
Final , Version: 1.1 
File: fidis_deliverable13_4_v_1.1.doc 
Page 112 
 
protection of personal data in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters – is 
the first general data protection instrument in the EU third pillar.
453 In this decision the option 
of a future European database is not excluded. 
 
In the UK, police are only allowed to keep DNA profiles on the national database from people 
who are convicted of the offence for which the sample was taken. All other samples must be 
destroyed. However, a Home Office Inspectorate of Constabulary report, ‘Under the 
Microscope’, estimated that from 752,718 DNA profiles held at the time of their study, those of 
50,000 individuals which should have been destroyed have been retained.
454 This figure was 
based on a non-conviction rate of 20%.
455 
 
There have been individual court cases about illegally retained DNA samples. In 2008, Michael 
Weir’s conviction for murder was quashed at the Court of Appeal. Weir had been convicted on 
the strength of DNA evidence based on blood found on a glove.
456 The Court affirmed the rules 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which state that ‘information derived from the 
sample of any person entitled to its destruction [...] shall not be used - (a) in evidence against 
the person entitled; or (b) for the purposes of any investigation of an offence. If the sample was 
used for purposes of an investigation then all evidence resulting from that information must be 
excluded.’
457 
 
There is also a case pending involving three Police Federation backed police detectives who 
object to having been assigned desk-jobs as a result of failing to provide a voluntary sample.
458  
 
The last case to be mentioned here is the European Court of Human Rights judgment of 4th 
December 2008, in the case of S. & Marper v. the UK. 
459 The ECHR Grand Chamber (GC) 
found unanimously that the retention by the police of fingerprints and DNA samples from a 
man and a boy arrested, but not convicted, violated their right to privacy. The judgment 
provides a landmark decision setting limits to the growth of national DNA databases in 
general, and that of the UK in particular. The case had previously been rejected by the House 
of Lords, which had placed the importance of crime detection above issues of data privacy. 
                                                 
453 See above, section 2.4.  
454 Home Office, Under the Microscope, available at < http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspections 
/thematic/utm/microsco.pdf?view=Binary>, last consulted 11 March 2009.  
455 According to Statewatch (<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/uk-dna-database-background-
article.pdf>), more realistic figures would be non-conviction rates of 33 and 45% - suggesting that 82,UK 500-
112,500 DNA profiles should actually have been destroyed.  
456 The police matched the blood to a DNA sample taken from Weir a year previously when he was suspected of 
drugs offences. At the time, he had not been charged. Nevertheless, his profile was placed in the national 
register. 
457 Section 64 (3B) of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
458 According to Statewatch (<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/uk-dna-database-background-
article.pdf >) UK the Home Office has confirmed that at least 50,000 people’s DNA profiles are held illegally, 
but are yet to state what is being done about it. 
459 For the implications and the arguments in the case, see above and at 
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1581.html. That there were fundamental issues at stake is reflected in 
the fact that the case was put before the 17 judges of the Grand Chamber. It shall be particularly noted here that 
the Court gave a very broad definition to the concept of privacy within the meaning of Article 8 – the right to 
privacy. The Court had no hesitation in viewing fingerprints and DNA samples as falling within the ambit of 
Article 8. For the original case see: Regina v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police ex parte LS/ ex parte 
Marper [2004] UKHL 39, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd040722/york-1.htm  FIDIS 
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The applicants had subsequently applied to Strasbourg under Article 8 (the right to privacy) 
and Article 14 (non-discrimination).  
 
8.4 Legal measures in response to specific threats by biometric 
systems  
The ICO has proposed some legal measures to further protect private data, also with a view to 
possible security lapses that concern biometric data. In his evidence to the House of 
Commons Justice Committee inquiry into the protection of private data, the ICO made two 
specific proposals.
460 The first is to give the ICO the power to force data holders to 
commission an independent audit of their procedures. The second is a requirement for bodies 
to notify the ICO or a similar body, when a major and potentially dangerous privacy breach 
has occurred, as well as notifying the individuals who may be affected. 
The UK government plans to increase penalties for trading in personal data, from a fine as 
currently set to two years imprisonment under new penalties in the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration bill. 
 
8.5  The National Data Protection Authority on biometrics 
At the top of the UK Information Commissioner’s home page, the mission of the ICO is 
stated as follows: ‘the UK’s independent authority set up to promote access to official 
information and to protect personal information’.
461  
The House of Commons Home Affairs Committee has issued a report on the Surveillance 
Society
462 which was discussed above. In his response to the report, the ICO supported the 
proposal that the Home Office should submit contingency plans for the loss of biometric 
information to ICO.
463 The Committee also recommended that the Home Office should 
address ICO concerns on administrative information collected as part of the National Identity 
Register (paragraph 248 of the Report). In its reply, the ICO stressed its continuing concern 
that the amount of information is to be kept to the minimum with administrative information 
deleted as soon as it has served its purpose. The ICO states it is particularly concerned about 
the ‘audit trail’ data and wants this minimised, access restricted and early deletion.
464 In its 
reply, the ICO also supported the Committee’s recommendation that the Home Office submits 
detailed plans for securing NIR databases and contingency plans for the loss of biometric 
information to ICO for comment (paragraph 246 of the report). The ICO confirmed that it 
                                                 
460 House of Commons Justice Committee, Justice – First Report, available at < 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmjust/154/154.pdf>,  last consulted 11 March 
2009.  
461 See the site www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk .   
462 Constitution Committee, Fifth Report session 2007-2008:  A surveillance Society?, available at < 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldconst/44/44.pdf>, last consulted 11 March 2009.  
463 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, A Surveillance Society? Information Commissioner’s 
Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2007–08, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/1124/1124.pdf , last consulted 11 March 
2009,  p. 6. 
464 Ibid.,  para. 6.8.  FIDIS 
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would welcome the opportunity to provide comments on the data protection implications of 
the Home Office and IPS plans. 
465 
In January 2009, the ICO forced the Home Office to sign a formal declaration promising to 
hold personal data securely in the future.
466 With immediate effect, all portable and mobile 
devices which are used to store and transmit personal information must be encrypted. The 
case in question occurred in August 2008 when a Home Office contractor, PA Consulting, 
lost an unencrypted memory stick holding sensitive personal details of thousands of people 
serving custodial sentences or who had previously been convicted of criminal offences.
467 
8.6 Conclusion 
In the European context, the UK plays a pivotal role in the roll out of biometrics, at least in 
the public and in the semi-public domain.  
Both in policy and in legal terms, regulation of biometrics takes place at the liberal end of the 
spectrum. Cases such as Marper, and the subsequent challenge of implementing the Court’s 
decision, are a test for this liberal approach. The impact on society of the policies that have 
been initiated in recent years has only just begun to show.  
As a result of the pioneering nature of the use of biometrics in the UK, the outcome of current 
political processes will without doubt also have an impact on developments in the EU as a 
whole. 
                                                 
465 Ibid, para 6.7 
466 The ICO has ordered a number of organisations to sign undertakings following breaches of the Data 
Protection Act. These include the Department of Health, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Orange 
Personal Communications Services Ltd. 
467 Mick Gorrill, assistant Information Commissioner, issued the following statement: "This breach illustrates 
that even though a contractor lost the data, it is the data controller (the Home Office) which is responsible for the 
security of the information. It is vital that sensitive personal information is handled properly and held securely at 
all times. The Data Protection Act clearly states that organisations must take appropriate measures to ensure that 
personal information is kept secure. The Home Office recognises the seriousness of this data loss and has agreed 
to take immediate remedial action. It has also agreed to conduct future audits to ensure compliance with the Act. 
Failure to meet the terms of the Undertaking is likely to lead to further enforcement action by the ICO”. See 
http://www.karoo.co.uk/article.asp?id=18987429&cat=headlines. See also Information Commissioner’s Office, 
ICO takes enforcement action against NHS Trusts for data losses, available at 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pressreleases/2009/nhs_trusts_undertakings_final.pdf>, last 
consulted 11 March 2009.  FIDIS 
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9 Conclusions  and  Recommendations  
In general, the existing legal framework does not provide clear answers to the issues which 
are raised by the use of biometric data. Present legal provisions stipulate that personal data 
which are ‘adequate, relevant and not excessive’ shall be processed ‘fairly and lawfully’, ‘for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes’ and shall not be ‘processed in a way incompatible 
with those purposes’ (see Article 6 Directive 95/46/EC). It is not clarified what these notions 
mean for the applications which process biometric data. As a result, interpretations vary, 
resulting in sometimes opposing opinions or advices from national data protection authorities 
on similar data processing applications.   
Case law is expected, but is certainly not abundant yet.
468 Such case law may clarify some 
issues, but is in principle only valid for the specific circumstances of the case, and is therefore 
not apt to regulate in general the recurring issues of biometric data processing. Therefore, 
initiatives on the regulatory level are not only desirable but required in order to mitigate the 
(legal) uncertainty.  
The Directive 95/46/EC furthermore requires Member States to identify data processing 
which are likely to present specific risks. DPAs of various Member States have pointed to the 
risks of biometric data and have issued guidelines, but most Member States have not yet taken 
specific legislative action in order to protect the rights and the freedoms of the data subjects 
with regard to the processing of biometric data so far. Only in exceptional cases, prior 
authorization by the DPA is required before the start of biometric data processing (e.g., 
France).
 469  
For these reasons, and based upon various studies and reports, guidelines and opinions of the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, the EDPS and the national DPAs, suggestions and 
recommendations for some headlines of a legal framework are hereunder made. These 
recommendations aim at basically the use of  biometric data in the private sector (as opposed 
to the public sector) and propose to enact some general limitations in relation with the 
processing of biometric data. In case the legislator would not opt for such limitations, the 
processing of biometric data could be subject to well specified conditions for the processing 
of such data.  
 
9.1 Conclusions from the current legal framework, reports and 
opinions of the DPAs and the EDPS and the country reports 
The existing legal framework 
The present legal framework which applies to the processing of biometric data, in particular 
the Directive 95/46/EC and most national data protection legislations, does not regulate the 
                                                 
468 Exceptions includes the important case ECHR, S. and Marper v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 30562/04 of 4 
December 2008, which clarified some aspects of biometrics, such as with regard to the proportionality of the 
central storage and retention of DNA and fingerprint. Other exceptions include the French decision of the 
Conseil d’Etat, App. N° 297888, 297896,298085 of 13 March 2007 which pointed to the requirement of a legal 
basis for setting up a central database with digitised photographs, and the German decision of the labour court of 
24 January 2004 which requires the approval of the workers’ council or arbitration board for the installation of a 
biometric entrance control of workplaces.   
469 Such procedure of prior authorization puts often an important workload on DPAs which have already 
sometimes too limited means to execute their tasks. FIDIS 
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numerous specific issues
470 which result from the processing of biometric data. DPAs in most 
countries issue guidelines on the processing of biometric data, for example, the requirement 
that templates instead of raw data shall be used or that alternative control procedures shall be 
set up, but these guidelines are not binding.  
In the discussion about the existing legal framework in section 2 above, it was already 
demonstrated with various examples that the existing Directive 95/46/EC does not provide 
clear answers to the issues posed by biometrics (see in particular section 2.3).  
The Working Document on Biometrics of 2003 which contains guidelines also does not 
resolve all issues presently identified and relating to biometrics. These issues include that 
biometric data can be used (and misused) for identification purposes which affects the 
fundamental rights of the data subjects.
471 For such identification, there should in principle be 
a clear legal basis authorizing such identification. The Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party should also attach consequences to the fact that the FRR and the FAR are set by the 
controller/operator according to the purpose of the system, hereby invisibly increasing or 
decreasing security while the collection of biometric data from the data subjects will still 
remain required.  
The Working Document on Biometrics of 2003 also suggests that national legislators should 
provide for the requirement of prior checking of biometric applications with the national 
DPAs.
472 The requirement of prior checking, however, does not provide legal certainty as to 
the deployment of biometric operations. DPAs take varying elements in their case to case 
analysis into consideration. It further may lead to conflicting decisions. It is also not practical 
since DPAs become overwhelmed by requests.
473 We therefore recommend that the 
conditions for the use of biometric data are set forth by legislation. The Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party on the other hand rightfully points to the need of legislation where 
biometric data is used as an (unique) identifier of general application.  
Although the technology is still evolving considerably, the biometric characteristics that are 
most often used are known, including most risks associated with the use of these 
characteristics, such as the inclusion of health related and other sensitive information, the use 
of it as identification tool and, in case of central storage, the use as unique identifier enabling 
linking information from various sources and the re-purposing of data initially collected for 
other objectives. Biometric characteristics could hence be abused in many ways, including by 
using the information collected by the private sector for purposes of law enforcement. For 
these reasons, a regulation of the use of biometric characteristics is justifiable. Such 
regulation should provide a binding framework within which biometric data shall be 
processed.  
 
                                                 
470 These specific issues were as stated above to a large extent already spotted by the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party in its Working Document on Biometrics of 2003 and in its subsequent opinions on various 
proposals for large scale biometric data processing in the EU, such as for the epassports, VIS and SIS II. See also 
various reports, including the report of the Council of Europe, o.c.at footnote 18, The privacy and security 
aspects of biometrics were also described in literature and in various Fidis reports, including in E. Kindt and L. 
Müller (eds.), o.c., FIDIS, 2007.  
471 ‘Identification’ is to be clearly distinguished from ‘identification verification’ as stressed before.  
472 France, for example, has adapted it national data protection legislation in this way in 2004. 
473 The French DPA has therefore issued unique authorisations.   FIDIS 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D13.4 
 
Final , Version: 1.1 
File: fidis_deliverable13_4_v_1.1.doc 
Page 117 
 
The country reports 
In almost all countries studied in this report, the general processing of biometric data is not 
subject to specific legislation which completes the general data protection legislation and 
Article 8 ECHR. France is one of the few countries that have adapted its legislation due to the 
emergence of biometric applications. The data protection legislation in France has been 
modified in 2004 and requires that if biometric data is processed for identity verification, it 
shall be submitted for prior checking to the CNIL. If such processing is done by (or on behalf 
of) the government, a decree (‘décret’) is required (after advice from the CNIL). French 
national legislation, however, does not provide more conditions or criteria for the processing 
of biometric data. 
The debate about the introduction of biometric application is taking place at different times in 
the countries studied. In the Netherlands, some debate took place at the end of the nineties 
with the report At face value. In Germany, a first wave of discussion started end of the 1990s, 
leading to the first TeleTrusT project on biometrics from 2001 to 2003 and resulting in 
various publications. The debate arose thereafter again, in particular in the context of the 
introduction of the epass. In France, the matter retained the attention of the parliament in the 
period of 2002 - 2005, and in the United Kingdom and Switzerland, the debate seems more 
recent. Overall, however, the debate was rather limited. In case consumers were questioned 
about the introduction of biometrics, ease of use was a major factor for these consumers for 
being positive towards the introduction of biometrics. Whether the information about 
biometrics that was provided to these consumers included also information about the risks of 
the use of biometrics is not clear, however.  
In some countries, the introduction and the use of biometric systems in the working 
environment has been made subject to co-determination rights of employee representatives 
(e.g., Germany). It is also interesting to note that in some countries, there is a suppliers’ 
driven promotion for the use of biometric applications. 
In most countries, the national DPAs (e.g., in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland) have issued guidelines, advice or recommendations for the use of biometrics
474 
in addition to opinions on specific biometric systems.  
In all countries, the introduction of biometric identifiers in the epass is important and some 
legislative changes are being or have presented to the national parliaments. Some countries 
also consider the introduction of biometrics in the eID and plan to use such eID card as a 
universal token for authentication and identification (see, e.g., Germany; the inclusion of 
fingerprint however would be optional).  
In countries such as France, Germany and Belgium, position is taken against the storage of 
biometric data in (central) databases because of the various additional risks such storage 
entails (e.g., unintended use for law enforcement purposes, other use without knowledge and 
function creep, ….). There is a clear preference for local storage of the biometric data, for 
example on a card or token. Only in a few countries, the position against central storage is 
confirmed in some specific legislation, e.g., on the collection and use of biometric identifiers 
in passports, where for example German legislation forbids the storage of fingerprints in a 
central database. However, the DPAs do not exclude all storage in central databases, and 
                                                 
474 These recommendations are sometimes rather technical (for example, Switzerland).   FIDIS 
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provide some criteria (e.g., France, Belgium, …) which shall be applied in order to evaluate 
whether central storage could be acceptable. Various countries (such as Belgium, France and 
Switzerland) stress in the DPA guidelines the risks of the use of biometric characteristics 
which leave traces (such as e.g., fingerprint, face, voice…). In the Netherlands, there is 
preference for storage in a central database for Type I government controlled ID applications. 
It is disturbing, however, that there is uncertainty to what extent access may be granted to law 
enforcement in search of suspects. In this way, biometric applications are turned into Type V 
surveillance applications. 
Where required under the legislation (France), the DPAs issue prior authorizations for the use 
of biometrics. In France, where the CNIL issued three ‘unique authorizations’ so far, these 
prior authorizations permit to simplify the notification procedure for the controllers (and the 
DPAs). However, if the biometric data processing operations do not fully comply with all 
(detailed) conditions (e.g., because of the nature of the data or term of storage), prior 
authorization remains required.    
For some countries, the authors mention the need for more effective enforcement of the data 
protection legislation. In many countries, such as in the Netherlands and Belgium, but also in 
France, the DPAs cope with staff shortage and sometimes lack of powers for an adequate 
supervision of the use of biometrics.   
To conclude, the DPA in the United Kingdom also proposed more legal measures to protect 
data, including a requirement to notify when a major and potentially dangerous privacy 
breach has occurred. 
 
9.2 Recommendations   
Preliminary remarks 
The suggestions relate to the regulation of biometric applications. Such regulation may take 
many forms, including by self- or co-regulation (for example by establishing (business or 
ethical) codes of conduct), but also by taking legislative action on the national or international 
level. We hereby do not review the various ways in which such regulations can be 
established, as this is out of the scope of this report. The suggested recommendations do also 
not only relate to modifications to the Directive 95/46/EC or to the enactment of specific 
legislation, as legislative action could take many forms.   
The recommendations hereunder further mainly focus on the use of biometric applications, 
primarily in the private sector, whether for commercial or non-commercial purposes, by 
public and private controllers. Some general recommendations will also address Type I 
government controlled ID applications. The recommendations do not concentrate upon the 
use of biometric systems for law enforcement or other purposes which are within the so-called 
third pillar (e.g., the use of biometric data in SIS II).  
 
Recommendations  
In addition to the application of Directive 95/46/EC and Article 8 ECHR to the processing of 
biometric data, the following can be recommended:   
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 The existing legal framework for biometrics is in essence an ‘enabling legal environment’ 
regulating the use of biometrics but in fact lacking normative content.
475 For that reason, more 
specific rules are needed which prohibit use where there are disproportionate power 
balances.
476 Such legislative initiatives have to be sufficiently precise. Regulation which 
provides for the use of biometrics ‘for security purposes only’ is superfluous.
477  
Most of the analysis and the country reports mentioned in this deliverable refer to opinions or 
positions of institutes or authorities (in many cases of DPAs and the EDPS) which have 
studied biometrics. DPAs and the EDPS have clearly indicated that there are numerous risks 
of central databases with biometric data. They opt for a clear rejection, to a greater or to a 
lesser extent, of the central storage of biometric data in databases, because of the risks.
478 
These risks increase if the databases contain biometric characteristics which leave traces or 
can be collected without the knowledge of data subjects, such as fingerprint, face, voice, but 
also DNA.
479 But only few countries, such as Germany, have enacted laws which forbid the 
establishment of central biometric databases. In that case, such legislation is mostly in relation 
with a specific biometric application, such as the epassport.   
The present data protection legal framework does not (explicitly) forbid central databases. 
Only the application and the interpretation of general principles may point towards an 
obligation to avoid central databases. In case of biometric data, a central database with 
biometric data will in most cases be contrary to the right to privacy as guaranteed by article 8 
ECHR because of the various reasons summarized in this and in the previously mentioned 
FIDIS deliverables.
480 Interference with this right is only acceptable if there is a legal basis, 
the interference is for a legitimate purpose defined in article 8 ECHR (e.g., national security 
or public safety) and the interference is necessary in a democratic society. The evaluation of 
this last mentioned requirement is quite complex. The necessity in a democratic society 
requires that (i) there is a pressing social need for such central database, (ii) the database is 
relevant and sufficient and (iii) the interference with the privacy rights of the data subject is 
necessary (i.e. there are no alternative means which can be used to reach the purposes) and in 
proportion with the (legitimate) aims pursued (e.g., public safety). These different steps in the 
evaluation as to whether interference with the fundamental right to privacy is acceptable, 
                                                 
475 DG JRC and IPTS, Biometrics at the Frontiers : Assessing the Impact on Society, Sevilla, January 2005, p. 
15. 
476 DG JRC and IPTS, o.c., p. 15. 
477 Compare, for example, with the legislation in Slovenia which regulates the use of biometrics but only in a 
general way. 
478 The European Parliament has also before already pleaded in its legislative resolution of 2 December 2004 on 
the proposed Regulation 2252/2004 for forbidding the creation of a central database of European Union 
passports and travel documents containing biometric and other data (see proposed Amendment 5). See European 
Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation on standards for security features and 
biometrics in EU citizens’ passports (COM (2004)0116-C5-0101/2004-2004/0039(CNS), available at   
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2004-
0073+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN  Furthermore, the risks and fears for central databases and its misuse is also an 
important factor of (dis)trust of the citizens. See in that regard, Backhouse, J. and Halperin, R., D.4.12 ‘A 
qualitative comparative analysis of citizens’ perception of eIDs and interoperability’, Fidis, May 2009. 
479 In the light of new cryptographic measures for template protection, including a user specific secret as part of 
the verification method, this may need to be re-evaluated in specific cases of modern biometric systems. See also 
below. 
480 The risks of biometric central databases include use without knowledge of the data subject (e.g. for 
surveillance and tracing), function creep (including risk of use for identification purposes, for use of law 
enforcement, etc.), the use of the characteristics as unique identifier and identity theft.  FIDIS 
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especially the necessity in a democratic society, is often neglected and the application and the 
interpretation of these general principles is therefore difficult and uncertain.  
Biometric technologies however are further developing and being implemented. At present, it 
is not possible to foresee all future technologies, and legislation shall take such future 
developments into account as well.
481 On the other hand, new technical developments may 
provide effective means to increase the protection of the privacy rights and interests of the 
data subjects upon the central storage of biometric data. Such developments include 
methodologies to store only ‘biometric pseudonyms’ in a central database, whereby one-way 
(irreversible) calculations are made from the biometric characteristic and additional 
information, such as a PIN code, user-id or other information.
482 In case of misuse or theft, the 
‘biometric pseudonym’ can be revoked and re-issued.
483 Such new developments, however, 
are rather recent. Their effective use in the protection of the privacy rights of the data subjects 
is to be further demonstrated and proven. 
 
 For the above mentioned reasons, and awaiting further technical developments for the 
effective protection of privacy and fundamental rights upon the central storage of biometric 
data, it is recommended to choose for a general prohibition to set up central databases with 
biometric data. Such prohibition would solve most substantial data protection issues and 
risks, such as the use of the data contrary to the finality and purpose principle (function creep) 
and use of the data as unique identifiers and also the privacy risks, such as the use for 
identification purposes without knowledge of the individual, the use for surveillance purposes 
and attack of the databases for purposes of identity theft. Without such clear legal provision, 
uncertainty remains and data controllers remain in principle free to set up central databases. In 
this case, such central databases will only be scrutinized in case of a complaint with the DAP 
or legal proceedings, or, in the best case, if the controller submits the database for a prior 
checking by the DPAs (on a voluntary basis, or, for example, in the case of France, 
mandatory). In all other cases (and countries), data may be further collected and centrally 
stored for all types of applications (e.g., in schools).   
Only in limited situations, in conformity with the conditions of Directive 95/46/EC and 
justified on one of the legislative grounds set forth in Article 8 ECHR after analysis of the 
necessity in a democratic society and in application of the proportionality principle - to be 
explained and detailed during the legislative procedure in the specific law itself or at least in 
the preparatory works - exceptions to this principle could be allowed by legislative measure 
for specific types of applications. For some Type I government controlled applications, such 
exception to the general prohibition laid down by law may be possible by law if it is 
demonstrated in application of the proportionality principle that there is a pressing social 
need
484, the database is relevant and sufficient and there are no alternative means, and if the 
                                                 
481 See, for example, the developments in face recognition techniques.  
482 See, in this regard, also the EU patent application 08169061.2 ‘Biometric Pseudonyms of a fixed-sized 
template’ of the Berner Fachhochschule für Technik und Informatik HTI (pending).   
483 See also the TrUsted Revocable Biometric IdeNtitiEs project (TURBINE, EU project no. 216339 (2008- 
2011)) in which locally stored and revocable biometric pseudonyms for various identities are being researched 
and demonstrated. 
484 For some Type I government controlled applications, such ‘pressing social need’ to establish a central 
database could be the need to avoid double enrolment for social benefits or a need to combat fraud, if no 
alternative means are available and the establishment of the central database proves effective. Such pressing 
social needs will however in most cases not be present or only in very exception cases (where there is a ‘higher FIDIS 
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interference remains within proportions (because of applied security measures, restricted and 
divided data storage, full transparency to the data subjects, strict formulation of the purposes 
and limited access rights, etc.). Specific legislative provisions could determine additional 
conditions for such exceptions to the central storage and its use. Such conditions could 
include, as suggested by Teletrust in Germany, that individuals keep control over the 
biometric data that are stored centrally, e.g., by storing the encryption key(s) on the token 
which remains in the possession of the individual in order to avoid (i) use without the 
knowledge of the data subject and (ii) function creep. This proposed control, however, will 
not always be possible in practice.
485 In general, and only under particular conditions, a 
database could be proportional to the risks incurred by the data subjects, provided the other 
recommendations including such as relating to information, security and alternative means, 
are followed.  
In other words, regulation or legislation should provide that the set up of a central biometric 
database
486 is the exception. Every such exception shall be duly motivated and subject to 
conditions in the legislation providing for such exception. This will in principle also result 
into a stricter interpretation of the conditions to be fulfilled.  
 
 Alternatively, because of the generally admitted risk that biometric characteristics may 
reveal information relating to health or race, but also because of the special nature and unique 
characteristics of biometric data, it could also be recommended - and consistent with the 
existing data protection legislation - to, as a matter of general principle, to prohibit the 
processing of biometric data tout court. Such regulation would hence consist of a general 
prohibition to collect and process biometric characteristics of individuals. Such prohibition 
would be in line with other general prohibitions set out in the Directive 95/46/EC as a 
principle, such as the prohibition to collect and process other specified so-called sensitive data 
and data concerning health or sex life.
487  
Exceptions to the fore-mentioned suggested prohibition should only be acceptable under 
strictly defined conditions which are specific for biometric data processing
488 and if laid down 
in additional legislation. Such exceptions could include the (a) local (secured) storage of 
biometric data, (b) provided it is in the form of templates 
489of the biometric identifiers only, 
                                                                                                                                                          
need’ than a need of the controller only) for Type II access control applications.  Compare also with Court of 
Justice, Huber v. Germany, 16 December 2008, also discussed above, in which the necessity criterion as laid 
down in Article 7(e) of the Directive 95/46/EC was a main issue in relation with a central database with personal 
data of foreign nationals residing on the territory of a Member State (§§ 65-66).  
485 Compare with the central storage of biometric identifiers in Eurodac. The use of a token held by the data 
subjects may not be possible in practice. 
486 Distinctions may be made between central databases and local central databases. In case these local central 
databases could be linked or are accessible from a central point, they are equivalent to central databases. 
487 Compare with the definition of sensitive data in the Czech Republic general data protection legislation of 4 
April 2000 as amended which explicitly includes biometric (and genetic) data in the definition of sensitive data 
(Article 4(b)). The data protection legislation of Czech Republic, however, submits the processing of sensitive 
data to one of the exceptions listed (such as consent, necessity to comply with a legal obligation, etc) without a 
general prohibition to process sensitive data (Article 9).  
488 These conditions should come in addition to the exceptions (e.g., consent, etc) which apply for the general 
prohibition to process sensitive data. 
489 The use of templates, however, does not exclude the storage of sensitive personal data (special categories of 
personal data) in every case.  
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(c) for specified purposes well defined and (d) after implementation of for biometrics specific 
appropriate security measures.
490 This would in fact mean that the proportionality check is 
moved from the administrative level to a discussion in parliament.
491  
Existing biometric applications could be granted a limited time period in order be become 
compliant.
492  
  
 If one of the two suggested general prohibitions, completed with in legislation well 
defined exceptions, would not be possible or agreeable, at least a general prohibition on the 
collection and use of biometric characteristics and/or technologies without the knowledge of 
the individual is recommended in order to avoid that biometric characteristics which leave 
traces are abused (e.g., use for identification, linking or surveillance, but also for abusing the 
sample). Such prohibition is needed to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms
493 and to 
increase public confidence. This prohibition should apply to the private and public sector data 
controllers, such as cities or communes, equally.
494  
 
 Legislation or regulation shall also address the need for transparency in biometric 
systems.  This shall be done by imposing an information obligation upon data controllers 
which is more extensive than the general information obligation of Directive 95/46/EC and 
which is specific with regard to the functioning of biometric systems. Legislation could 
require the mentioning of the identification or verification functionality of the system and 
clarification as to whether or not the data are stored in a central database. Multi-layered 
information is an option and could provide the data subject with more insight into the 
functioning of the system. 
 
 Regulation shall also address the errors and technical failures of biometric systems. 
These errors and failures, which are inherent to biometric recognition systems, will confront 
individuals with the limited functioning of the system. The technical aspects of the 
functioning of biometric systems have been described in detail in Fidis deliverable 3.10, 
revealing how the physical measurement step of biometric processing systems is intrinsically 
error prone. This includes several aspects. Fidis D.3.10 warned inter alia for biometric 
characteristics which are not very distinctive and for oversimplified systems which reduce 
                                                 
490 For example, for Type I government controlled ID applications, an exception could be made for storage of 
biometric templates in an identity document held under the control of the individual (such as the epass) to 
authenticate the link between the document and the holder. For type II access control model applications, an 
exception could be made for storage of templates in an object where the biometric is held under the control of 
the individual (such as in an entrance token) for access control purposes only. For the type IV convenience 
model applications, the biometrics should be stored in an object privately owned and/or used by the individual 
for convenience purposes. For Type III public –private (mixed) application models, additional conditions may 
apply as the risk of re-use of the biometric data is in our opinion even higher.  
491 Even in case a parliamentary debate would be unsatisfactory, the regulation would remain subject to judiciary 
review, such as the review by the Conseil d’Etat in France, the State council (Raad van State/Conseil d’Etat) or 
the Constitutional Court (Grondwettelijk Hof/Court Constitutionel) in Belgium.   
492 Compare with various DPA decisions which impose that such similar requirements are implemented by 
processing submitted to them for checking or authorization. 
493 Compare with ECHR, Peck v. U.K..  
494 Such prohibition would in our view also exclude the use of face recognition technology in relation with 
cameras already installed. A clear legislative provision in this matter however should regulate this issue. FIDIS 
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biometric characteristics to a few components with poor separation capabilities. Other errors 
which need to be taken into account are those errors related to identification systems, because 
the reference templates overlap too much and the system becomes susceptible to impostor 
attacks.
495  
In addition to those system errors, system failures where the biometric system is unable to 
process the biometric data shall be taken into account. These failures include failures to enrol, 
failures to capture and failures to match. As known in general, all biometric systems include 
in addition false acceptances and false rejections to a certain degree, since the comparison is 
always calculated on probabilities. The rates for these false results will moreover depend on 
the threshold set by the operator or user and on the application of the system. These failures 
sometimes involve ethical questions in so far some groups, such as aged persons or disabled 
persons, are more affected than others.
496 Furthermore, biometric characteristics do not 
remain valid indefinitely, and if not renewed from time to time (e.g., voice, face, etc) will for 
that reason also provide false results. Finally, several biometric techniques are still subject to 
improvement. Various studies, such as the study of the Bundeskriminalamt in Germany of 
February 2007 for face recognition and the Biometric Enrolment trial of the UK Passport 
service of May 2005, have pointed to such unsatisfactory results.
497 
The legal framework shall hence explicitly acknowledge that biometric systems are never 
100% certain and shall not disregard the errors and failures of biometric systems. Information 
about the error rates should be made available to the data subjects. In addition, the rights of 
the data subjects in case of failure shall be determined. Such rights could include (i) the right 
for immediate second review, at no cost and (ii) the right to use an alternative system.
498 
Furthermore, the burden of proof should be on the data controller to prove that the data 
subject is not the person whose identity has been verified and not on the data subject who has 
to prove his or her identity through a (sometimes failing) biometric system.  
This also touches the ethical and human dignity and equality aspects of biometric systems: if 
human beings are obliged or requested to submit themselves to a biometric system, such 
system shall not dominate, but shall be at the service of the human beings. A legal framework 
could take the errors and failures of biometric systems in various ways into account. One 
possibility is to regulate the technical requirements of systems to be used for specific 
                                                 
495 E. Kindt and L. Müller (eds.), o.c., p. 26. 
496 See e.g., the UK Passport Service, Biometrics Enrolment Trial, May 2005, 299 pages. Although the majority 
of the participants from the sample groups successfully enrolled on the three biometric identifiers which were 
tested (face, fingerprint and iris), success rates were lower for disabled participants (whereby the general 
enrolment success rates for for example iris was 90 %, but 61 % for disabled participants).  
497 See the project of the Bundeskriminalamt mentioned in footnote 66. The project which was set up in a real 
environment, more particular the train station of Mainz, showed that the environment such as darkness and fast 
movements have a large impact on face recognition and that (at a FAR of 0,1%) (only) about 60 % was 
recognized. Various factors, such as the progressive replacement of analog camera surveillance systems by 
digital systems, however, may promise better results. See also, e.g., the study of the UK Passport Service of May 
2005 mentioned above, which pointed inter alia to the high verification failure rate that occurred with facial 
biometric verification, which was the least successful identification technology (p. 55). Fingerprint verification 
was successful in 81 % of the representative samples and 80 % among the disabled group.   
498 An obligation for the controller to address the failure of systems, for example for Type II access control 
models, is for example foreseen in the Unique Authorization N° 008 of the CNIL.   FIDIS 
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applications, for example by providing minimum requirements. Another possibility is to set 
up a certification scheme for specific biometric systems.
499  
 
 Regulation shall also address the need for restricted access to biometric data to authorized 
users only, including audit possibility of used access to the data, and other additional security 
measures as well.  
 
 The need for identity management (IdM) in public and private applications will increase 
and IdM will become very important in a networked society. Securing the authentication with 
(revocable) biometrics could be a useful tool. Biometrics, however, only provides one part of 
the link of a person with (identifying) information about that person. Regulation should 
therefore pay specific attention to the requirements for enrolment and the harmonization of 
the sometimes called ‘breeding documents’ which have to be submitted to prove who a person 
is.  
 
Various aspects of biometric verification are of a technical nature. In case of dispute, for 
example, in case of abuse, hacking, or identity theft, it would be advisable that courts have 
judges (and experts) who have obtained a certain specialization in this area in order to ensure 
qualitative judgments.  
  
 Furthermore, the importance of a public debate on such a topic as the use of biometrics 
which affects all human beings, minors and elderly people, foreigners and nationals, fit or 
disabled, used before only for criminal investigations, and which generalized use includes 
considerable risks, cannot be underestimated. Such debate has not taken place at the time of 
the introduction of the epass for all EU country nationals. It has to a limited extent taken place 
in some countries, but remains overall very underdeveloped and is in particular countries even 
completely lacking. Such public debate should take place at least when biometric applications 
are introduced in Type I government controlled application and upon drafting legislation. The 
challenge for such public debate, however, is to represent the technical aspects in a simplified 
and objective way and to further first inform the public of all aspects of biometrics, including 
of the balance needed between security and privacy rights, before requesting opinions from 
data subjects on the use of biometrics.  
 
 In addition, and in line with proposals in some countries and the discussions on a 
notification obligation for security breaches in the ePrivacy Directive, regulation should also 
provide for notification in case of security breach concerning biometric data, especially in 
case of central biometric databases. As suggested by DPAs, civil and criminal liability in case 
                                                 
499 The use of certification labels is to some extent already practised in some countries, such as in Germany, for 
products in general and was also proposed for biometric applications in the Netherlands in the At Face value 
report of 1999. FIDIS 
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of theft, misuse of biometric data and other security breaches concerning biometric data shall 
be provided for by appropriate legislation.
500  
The legal recommendations mentioned above may possibly politically - in times where 
security is a top priority of many governments - be difficult to defend. Appropriate measures 
however, should allow reconciling privacy with security. Increased security does not (always) 
has to be at the cost of privacy.   
 
                                                 
500 See for example, also Switzerland, Privatim, Guidelines for the data protection compliance review of 
biometric systems, 2007, p. 14, reference available at 
http://www.privatim.ch/content/suche.php?zoom_query=biometrie  FIDIS 
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11 Annex 1: Glossary 
 
 
AFSJ  Area of Freedom, Security and Justice   
BITKOM  the German Association for Information Technology, 
Telecommunications and New Media 
CAO  Collective labor agreement (Belgium) 
CBP  Dutch Data Protection Authority (College Bescherming 
Persoonsgegevens)  
CBPL  Belgian Data Protection Authority (Commissie Bescherming 
Persoonlijke Levenssfeer) 
CNIL  French Data Protection Authority (Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et des Libertés) 
CoE  Council of Europe 
DPA  Data Protection Authority 
EAC  Extended Access Control (in relation to epassports) 
Eurodac  Central database for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective 
application of the Dublin Convention (EU) 
FDPL  the Federal Data Protection Law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz 
(Germany) 
FOI  Freedom of Information Act  (The United Kingdom) 
ICO  The Information Commissioner  (The United Kingdom)   
LSE  The London School of Economics  
NIR   National Identity Register (The United Kingdom) 
NIS  National Identity Scheme (The United Kingdom) 
RFID  Radio Frequency Identity  
SIS  Schengen Information System 
SIS II  Second generation Schengen Information System 
TBG  Act against terrorism (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz)(Germany) 
VIS  Visa Information system 
WPPJ  Working Party on Police and Justice 
 